Critique of Indian Realism

A STUDY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA &
THE BUDDHIST DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

DHARMENDRA NATH SHASTRI
M.A., M.O.L., D.Litt.
Professor of Sanskrit and Director,
Institute of Indic Studies,
Kurukshetra University

with a Foreword by
Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN
President of India

AGRA UNIVERSITY, AGRA
1964

The late Mahapandit Rahul Sankrityayan, *Professor of Philosophy, Leningrad University, U.S.S.R. and Vidyalankar University, Ceylon:*

In this thesis, the author gives evidence of his deep and comparative study of the Buddhist and Brahmanic epistemology and philosophy. *It is an extensive work, quite unique of its kind, comparable to the Buddhist Logic of Professor Stcherbatsky.* He has always kept impartial and scientific point of view before him.

Epistemology is an important branch of Indian philosophy, which has not received adequate attention in our modern researches. There is no doubt that this thesis will prove a remarkable contribution in that direction. The thesis clearly demonstrates the unique contribution of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to Indian philosophy which cannot be overlooked.

Every page bears the imprint of author's deep study and clarity of thought.

As a result of this work, quite a number of wrong ideas have been removed. Few scholars could imagine that even Ācārya Mādhava, the author of *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, could fall a victim to such wrong notions. *I am sure, this work will have a permanent place in our philosophical literature.*

[illegible]
३१ जुलाई १९६५, शनिवार
(वाराणसी)

CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM

A STUDY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA & THE BUDDHIST DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

Critique of Indian Realism

A STUDY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA &
THE BUDDHIST DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

DHARMENDRA NATH SHASTRI
M.A., M.O.L., D. Litt.
Professor of Sanskrit and Director,
Institute of Indic Studies
Kurukshetra University

with a Foreword by
Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN
President of India

AGRA UNIVERSITY, AGRA
1964

Price : Rs. 35/-

To be had of:
Agra University, Agra

Printed at New Age Printing Press, New Delhi 1.

RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN,
New Delhi.

FOREWORD

In his *Critique of Indian Realism,* Dr. Dharmendra Nath Shastri makes a refreshingly new approach to the age-old problems of Indian Philosophy. The book is best described as a full and persuasive account of the inside story of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* Realism. Instead of giving an exposition exclusively from its own sources, Dr. Shastri presents this important system of Indian thought from a new perspective, from its long encounter with the Buddhist School of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Although the beginnings of the *Vaiśeṣika* or the *Nyāya* are pre-Buddhistic and they belong to a different metaphysical background, it was in the course of the philosophical duel sustained for over six centuries with the Dignāga School of Buddhism that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* attained its characteristic stamp as a consistent Realism closest to common sense. In this process, it also gained in clarity and depth. Many of its basic conceptions, such as Substance, Attribute, Universal (*Sāmānya*), Inherence (*Samavāya*), Causation and Perception underwent considerable modification and reformulation as a result of its conflict with Buddhism, and no less from the internal criticism of the schools of *Mīmāṁsā.* One of the chief merits of the present work is that Dr. Shastri shows, with a wealth of detail and sound reasoning, the nature of the changes made and why the changes were made. He has also

not hesitated to draw the implications of these changes, however odd they may appear to the accepted interpretation. The reader may be referred to the author's treatment of Substance and Causation and of Perception and the doctrine of *Apoha* as examples of his incisive analysis. With his immense and accurate scholarship not only of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* but also of Buddhism and *Mīmāṁsā*, Dr. Shastri has thrown new light on the understanding of their epistemological problems.

"The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theories developed as a result of the conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga school. They have been presented in this work against the background of that conflict, and therefore not only do some of them acquire a new significance, but a number of implications of the basic *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theories have been revealed for the first time. Such implications were not unknown to the scholiasts of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, but they were lost in the later tradition." This claim of the writer is, in my opinion, well-grounded. I have pleasure in commending Dr. Shastri's scholarly work as a significant contribution towards our understanding of an important phase of Indian thought.

May 15, 1964. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

"भूतार्थपक्षपातो हि बुद्धेः स्वभावः"

वाचस्पतिमिश्र NVT. p. 80.

Knowledge by its very nature is disposed to Truth

"सर्वधियां यथार्थपरिच्छेदकत्वस्य कुलधर्मत्वात्"

श्रीधर NK. p. 200.

Right comprehension is the genetic trait of all cognitions

SALUTATIONS

To Those of Yore Who Carved the Path

1. Dignāga, a great Buddhist teacher, enunciated the principle of distinction between unique particulars (objective reality) and the universals (subjective reality).
2. Śrī Vācaspatimiśra, well-versed in all the schools of philosophy, illumined the whole range of philosophical literature with the candles of his commentaries.
3. Stcherbatsky, a Russian savant who was a versatile scholar of Buddhist philosophy, restored from oblivion the school of Dignāga.
4.* After saluting these three sages, and studying their works, I wrote this dissertation on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist theories.
5. This trio of jewels is the ornamental mark of Indian philosophy; to them I dedicate this work, being overwhelmed with adoration.

* After the manner of the benedictory verse of Bhaṭṭojidikṣita.

नमः

"पूर्वेभ्यः पथिकृद्भ्यः"

ऋक् X. 14. 15.

स्व-लक्षणस्य सामान्य-लक्षणस्य च भेदकम् ।
तत्त्वं साक्षात्कृतं येन **दिग्नागो** बौद्धदेशिकः ॥ १ ॥

श्री-वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण सर्वशास्त्रार्थदर्शिना ।
टीकादीपैः समस्ताऽपि द्योतिता तर्कभारती ॥ २ ॥

पुनरप्युद्धृतं येन लुप्तं दिग्नागदर्शनम् ।
श्चेर्वात्स्की रूसदेशीयः बौद्धशास्त्रविचक्षणः ॥ ३ ॥

मुनित्रयमिदं नत्वा तद्ग्रन्थान् परिभाव्य च ।
न्यायबौद्धीयसिद्धान्तनिबन्धोऽयं विरच्यते ॥ ४ ॥

त्रिरत्नं भारतीयस्य दर्शनस्य विशेषकम् ।
तस्मै समर्पितो ग्रन्थः श्रद्धाऽऽवर्जितचेतसा ॥ ५ ॥

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

अ a, आ ā, इ i, ई ī, उ u, ऊ ū, ऋ ṛ, ए e, ऐ ai, ओ o, औ au,

क् k	ख् kh	ग् g	घ् gh	ङ् ṅ
च् c	छ् ch	ज् j	झ् jh	ञ् ñ
ट् ṭ	ठ् ṭh	ड् ḍ	ढ् ḍh	ण् ṇ
त् t	थ् th	द् d	ध् dh	न् n
प् p	फ् ph	ब् b	भ् bh	म् m
य् y	र् r	ल् l	व् v	
श् ś	ष् ṣ	स् s	ह् h	
ं ṁ	: ḥ			

USE OF ITALICS

According to usual practice, Sanskrit words are given in Italics, but in the footnotes, this could not be done for want of diacritical marks in the Press.

PREFACE

The present work was planned in 1944-45 when I stayed for over a year at Banaras, the traditional seat of Sanskrit learning.

It had often struck me as a young student of Indian philosophy that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school had undergone some significant changes in the course of its development. There was, besides, the old tradition of a protracted conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga school based on Uddyotakara's remark that he wrote his great work, *Nyāya-vārtika*, "in order to dispel the darkness caused by pseudo-philosophers (i.e., Dignāga and others)". I decided to work on the ambitious plan of attempting at a picture of that conflict between the two most important schools, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which stands at the base of the fabric of Indian philosophy and the Dignāga school which marks the culmination of the development of Buddhist philosophy. This conflict lasting for six long centuries (from the 5th to the 11th) is essentially one between Realism and Idealism which is the basic problem of all philosophy. It would be evident that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school developed and formulated most of its theories with a view to defending realism.

This study presenting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, for the first time, in the light of its conflict with the Dignāga school, not

only brings that system into a new perspective but also gives an account of the contribution of the Indian thinkers to epistemology and of their approach to the problems of Realism *versus* Idealism.

This work which now appears under the title, *Critique of Indian Realism,* embodies my thesis submitted for the D.Litt. degree of the Agra University in 1956 under the title "*A Study of the Conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism and the Buddhist Dignāga School*", which is now the subsidiary title of the present work. The remarks of two eminent scholars of Indian philosophy to the effect that this "work is comparable, in a fairly large measure to Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic" and that "it is an extensive work, quite unique of its type which can be compared to the Buddhist Logic of Professor Stcherbatsky", were in fact a real reward for my labour over twelve long years. I am, of course, fully conscious that my humble work can hardly bear any comparison to the monumental work of that scholar.

When I set upon my task at Banaras, my first step was to discuss my plan of work with some of the scholars there. Among them was Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the Doyen of Indian philosophy, who was then Vice-Chancellor of the Banaras Hindu University. Not only did he give his blessings for the proposed work, but he also gave valuable suggestions which proved immensely helpful in my study. It is a matter of great joy to see that today when this work is going to see the light of the day, Dr. Radhakrishnan happens to be the President of our country which has its Upaniṣadic tradition of philosopher-kings like Janaka. The other scholar whom I consulted was Dr. Gopi Nath Kaviraj, a savant of encyclopædic learning who continued to guide me throughout my stay at Banaras. My friend Dr. T. R. V. Murti of Banaras Hindu University was always available for discussion on a number of crucial points; it is difficult to say how much I owe him.

For a study of the conflict between the two schools, I took up first the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts such as Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārtika*, Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* and Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī* and others.

I wanted to study these texts with the help of pandits of orthodox traditional learning. The portions of these texts with which I was chiefly concerned were those which were related to Buddhist theories—their exposition and their refutation. The orthodox pandits having no background of the Buddhist theories could not make headway in the interpretation of these texts; and what was worse still, they honestly believed that they understood those passages and tried to explain them. I felt miserably disappointed. Sometime afterwards, I read in the preface to one of the Buddhist works edited by the late Śri Rahul Sankrityayan that when he went to Banaras to study the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, he also found that none of the pandits was conversant with those works which had been outside the scope of traditional study. Had I read this before, I should have been spared so much waste of time and effort and strain on my nerves.

It then occurred to me that I should start the other way round and should study the theories of the Dignāga school first. I tried a number of expositions of Buddhist philosophy and especially those of Dignāga school, but I did not succeed in assimilating the theories of that system. At this juncture, I came across Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic.* Although that book has now been republished, it was not easily available in 1944, and it was with great difficulty that I could procure a copy of the first volume from one library, and that of the second volume from another.

The discovery of Stcherbatsky proved a red-letter day in my study of Indian philosophy. Although I had studied Indian philosophy on orthodox lines from my boyhood, for almost thirty years then, I realized only after the study of *Buddhist Logic* and other works of Stcherbatsky that orthodox Indian philosophy could not be properly understood without the back-ground of Buddhist philosophy. Especially, the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was meaningless without the understanding of the Dignāga school. I have unreservedly acknowledged my indebtedness to Stcherbatsky (p. 28). Not only did his works help me in grasping the theories of the Dignāga school, but they also paved the way for interpreting the difficult passages of the texts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. In the second volume of *Buddhist*

Logic, Stcherbatsky has appended an annotated English translation of some of the difficult portions of the texts of Sanskrit philosophical works relating to the controversy between the orthodox schools and the Buddhists, including some of the portions of the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra for the understanding of which I had formerly made desparate efforts with the help of the pandits. Now, with the help of Stcherbatsky's translation, I succeeded in grasping those parts of Sanskrit texts, and I decided to embark upon their study once again.

Despite my previous disappointment with the orthodox pandits, I felt that they could be of great help in making headway in the interpretation of these difficult texts; they were conversant with their peculiar idiom. Luckily, I met one scholar, Pandit Padma Prasad Bhatarai, the head Pandit of the Nyāya at Goenka Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, Banaras (now Principal, Government Sanskrit College Kathmandu, Nepal), who plainly confessed to me that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works in question were outside the scope of orthodox studies, but that he would be willing to try them studiously. This filled me with great hope. We made a plan of studying a particular portion of one of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works separately, and then to meet and exchange notes. This went on for a number of months; I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Pandit Bhatarai. I also studied some texts in collaboration with Pandit Raghu Nath ji, now Professor in Sanskrit University, Varanasi and Pandit Vibhuti Bhushan Bhattacharya of the same University. Later, I came to know that the same method of studying in collaboration with orthodox Pandits was followed more or less by Stcherbatsky also.

In order to present a picture of the conflict between the two schools, I made an exhaustive and extensive study of the four basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works already named. These works present a faithful picture of the Buddhist side as well. Besides, I have drawn upon some of the principal works of the Dignāga school, viz., *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* of Dignāga (*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa* only), *Nyāya-bindu* and *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti, *Tattva-saṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with its commentary by Kamalaśīla,

and the *Six Buddhist Tracts* published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. I have also discussed the theories of Kumārila and Prabhākara whose contribution to the orthodox theory of realism is as great as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts. Other works on Indian philosophy, ancient as well as modern, to which reference has been made in the present work, are listed in the bibliography.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories having been presented here in a new perspective, I have arrived at some bold conclusions about which difference of opinion may naturally be expected. In the concluding chapter entitled, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theories in a New Perspective,* I have given a *résumé* of my conclusions. It might be advisable to read this chapter first to appraise how far these conclusions have been substantiated in the body of this work. Far from claiming any originality for this, I am reminded of the characteristic humility of the great Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer Jayanta who said, "How should I be capable of striking an original idea? My work may be regarded merely as a new mode of exposition".[1] What I maintain is simply this, that, as a result of the study of the conflict between the two schools, these theories have been presented in a new light altogether.

The work is divided into thirteen chapters. The first chapter is in the form of an introduction giving the nature and scope of the work. The second and third chapters deal respectively with the problems of realism in general and its treatment in other Indian schools. The fourth chapter gives a brief historical survey of the literature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school including a brief notice of the thinkers of the opposite camp of Dignāga school. The fifth chapter deals with the general problem of the nature of reality. The first five chapters may thus be regarded as of an introductory character; they have also been published in a separate volume for the general reader who is not likely to be interested in the abstruse polemic that follows. The conflict between the two schools has been presented in the order of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories. The sixth chapter deals with the defence of the substance, and the seventh with the theory

1 See *infra*, p. 114. n. 137.

of causation. The next four chapters, from the eighth to eleventh, deal with the problems associated with the remaining Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories. The twelfth chapter deals with some epistemological problems which have a bearing on the theory of realism. The thirteenth and concluding chapter entitled *the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theories in a New Perspective* gives a *résumé* of this work. A Glossary of technical terms is also given at the end which will prove useful, especially to lay readers.

Indian scholiasts evolved for philosophical discourse a special idiom of Sanskrit which is marked by brevity and precision. To translate the abstruse polemic of Indian philosophy into English or for the matter of that in any other modern language presents, therefore, a peculiar difficulty. The idiom of a current language could be retained, in some cases, only at the cost of clarity. The author has cared more for clarity of the subject matter than for the idiom of the language. In some cases, these translations are, more or less, literal; in others, they are rather free; while in still others, only the substance of the passages has been given. As for the extracts from the Sanskrit texts, the smaller ones are given in Indo-Roman script with diacritical marks, but the longer ones from the sixth chapter onward (when we enter into the arguments of the two schools) are given at the end in Text-Appendix in Devanāgarī script in a serial order of the chapters and pages. In some cases, however, where Sanskrit texts are not quoted in full, references to them are invariably given.

Of the important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works from which I have quoted copiously, the *Nyāya-kandalī* has been translated into English by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha; and some important passages of that book have also been translated by Faddegon, a Dutch scholar, in his *Vaiśeṣika System*. These translations were not of much help to me, and my own renderings are quite independent of them. At places, I found them inaccurate—which fact I have pointed out in some instances. Stcherbatsky's translation of two important portions of the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, stands, however, on a different footing and is immensely helpful.

A great difficulty in the way of understanding these

abstruse philosophical texts is that they have been printed without being properly edited; there are mistakes practically on every page. Whosoever works on these texts intelligently should be able to suggest a number of emendations as Stcherbatsky has done. It appears that he had access to some manuscripts not hitherto utilized. A new edition of the *Nyāya-darśana*, with *Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-vārtika* and *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, appeared in 1936 A.D. from Calcutta. The editor of that work does not seem even to be conversant with the fact that Stcherbatsky has done so much work to improve the text. It is a pity that the work of that great Russian savant of Indian Philosophy has practically remained unknown in this country[1]. I have also made some emendations in the text which are pointed out at their proper places.

Besides expressing my indebtedness to the scholars already mentioned, I can hardly find words to express my gratitude to Dr. S. Datta, author and scholar (formerly Professor of English in Delhi University), who went steadily and meticulously through the whole of this work. I am deeply indebted to my friend Prof. Sadhu Ram who not only helped me in the revision, but also in the correction of proofs. My student, Sri G. S. Gupta also worked very hard, especially in preparing the Index. My students, Dr. Shiva Raj Shastri, Dr. Bharat Singh, Dr. Śri Niwas Shastri, and Śri K. N. Gupta were helpful in a number of ways. I also take this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to the Agra University—to its former Vice-Chancellor, Dr. K. P. Bhatnagar and to its present Vice-Chancellor, Col. P. D. Gupta—for undertaking the publication of this work, and also to the University Grants Commission for making a grant for its publication. I am also grateful to the New Age Press which undertook the printing of this work despite its many preoccupations.

Kurukshetra University,
August 15, 1963.

Dharmendra Nath Shastri

1 *Infra*, p. 27.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER VII. NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF CAUSATION

CHAPTER VIII. QUALITIES AND MOVEMENTS AS OBJECTIVE REALITIES

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES

Abhidharma-koṣa by Vasubandhu, Banaras.

Apoha-siddhi included in the Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts.

ATV. Ātmatattva-viveka by Udayanācārya (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1939).

Avayavi-Nirākaraṇa by Paṇḍita Aśoka, published in the Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1910).

Brahmasūtra-śāṁkarabhāṣya or Śārīrakabhāṣya with the commentaries, Ratnaprabhā, Bhāmatī and a commentary by Ānandagiri (Bombay, 1909).

Bṛhatī of Prabhākaramiśra (Madras University, 1934).

H. Ui, Daśapadārtha-śāstra edited by H. Ui (Royal Asiatic Society London, 1918).

Dinakarī a commentary on Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī.

Dīpikā, a commentary on Tarkasaṁgraha.

	Hetubindu-ṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary Āloka (Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1949).
Kir.	Kiraṇāvalī, edited by M. M. Vindyeśvari Prasad Dvivedi (Banaras, 1919).
	Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara by Padmanābhamiśra.
	Kiraṇāvali-prakāśa Part I (Banaras, 1933).
	Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi of Ratnakīrti, included in The Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts (See SBNT.).
	Kusumāñjali (Calcutta).
MS.	Mīmāṁsā-sūtra.
NB.	Nyāyabindu, edited by Peterson (Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 1929).
NBT.	Nyāya-binduṭīkā of Dharmottara included in NB.
NBh.	Nyāyadarśana with Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya- (containing Uddyotakara's Vārtika, Vācaspatimiśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti—two volumes), Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944.
NK.	Nyāya-Kandalī or Śrīdhara with Praśastapāda-bhāṣya (Banaras, 1895).
	Nyāyakoṣa, by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar Bombay, 1893).
	Nyāya-līlāvatī by Vallabhācārya (Nirnaya Sagar edition).
NM.	Nyāya-mañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, edited by Pt. Surya Narayan Shukla (Banaras, 1936).
	Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña (Poona, 1922).
NSM.	Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī (Kārikāvalī) Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.
NS.	Nyāyasūtra (See NBh.).
NV.	Nyāya-vārtika (See NBh.).

NVT. Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā (See NBh.).

N-V. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School.

Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā-pariśuddhi of Udayanācārya (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911).

Padārthatattva-nirūpaṇa by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

PP. Praśastapāda-bhāṣya (Banaras, 1895, see NK.).

SDSm. Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya by Haribhadra, with the commentary of Guṇaratna.

SK. Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu.

SPS. Sāṁkhyapravacana-sūtra.

STK. Sāṁkhyatattva-kaumudī with the commentary of Bālarāma Udāsīna.

Saptapadārthī edited by V. S. Ghate (Bombay, 1919).

SDS. Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha of Mādhava, edited by Abhyankara (Poona, 1924).

SBNT. Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by M. M. Har Prasad Shastri, M.A. (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1910).

SV. Ślokavārtika by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series).

TB. Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamiśra (Poona, 1937).

TK. Tarka-kaumudī of Laugākṣibhāskara (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1928).

Tarkāmṛta by Jagdīśa Bhaṭṭācārya.

Tarka-saṁgraha (Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. LV., 1918).

Tārkika-rakṣā by Varadarāja, Banaras, 1903.

TC. Tattva-cintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa (Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa) published by Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1884.

TS. Tattvasaṁgraha by Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla (Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. XXX, Baroda, 1926).

TSP. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla (See TS.).

Vaiśeṣikadarśana-praśastapāda-bhāṣya with Upaskāra of Śaṁkaramiśra (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1923).

VS. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra.

Vedānta-sāra of Sadānanda, edited by Colonel G. A. Jacob (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1926).

VV. Vyomavatī, a commentary on Praśastpāda-bhāṣya by Vyomaśivācārya.

YS. Yoga-sūtra.

II. Modern Works

Bhaduri, S.: Studies in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, (Poona, 1947).

Bhattacharya, V. S.: The Basic Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta University, 1934).

Bodas — Bodas, M. R.: A Historical Survey of Indian Logic (JBBRAS, Vol. XIX).

Chatterjee, S. C.: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge (Calcutta University, 1939).

Dasgupta, S. N.: History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, 1932).

Dvivedi, V. P.: Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1895).

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, edited by Hastings.

Faddegon — Faddegon: Vaiśeṣika System (Amsterdam, 1918).

Gopīnātha, Kavirāja: History and Bibliography

of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature (Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, Vol. III.).

Hall, Fitzward: Index to the Bibliography of the Hindu Philosophical Systems.

Hiriyanna, M.: Outlines of Indian Philosophy.

Jacobi: (*i*) Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brāhmaṇas (JAOS. XXXI, 1911).
(*ii*) Early History of Indian Philosophy (Indian Antiquary, April 1918).
(*iii*) Indische Logik.

Jha, Ganganath: The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā.

JAOS. — Journal of American Oriental Society.

JBBRAS. — Journal of Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

Jwala Prasad (Dr.): Indian Epistemology (Lahore, 1939).

ILA. — Keith, A.B.: Indian Logic and Atomism.

Mookerjee, Satkari: Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta University, 1935).

Murti, T. R. V.: Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London, 1955.

Radhakrishnan, S.: History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. (London, 1941.).

Randle, — Randle: Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford, 1930.

Russell, Bertrand: Problems of Philosophy.

SBS. — Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, Vol. III.

Seal, B. N.: Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus.

Shastri, D. N.: (*i*) Distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception (ABORI. Vol. XXXII. 1952).

(ii) Stcherbatsky's Contribution to Indian Philosophy Modern Review, February, 1953).

Sinha, J. N.: Indian Psychology-Perception (London, 1934).

Sogen, Yamakami: Systems of Buddhist Thought.

Buddhist Logic, tcherbatsky: (i) Buddhist Logic (two Vols.), Leningrad, 1930.

Central Conception, (ii) Central Conception of Buddhism (London, 1923).

Nirvāṇa, (iii) Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa (Leningrad, 1927).

(iv) Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the later Buddhists.

Thomas, E. J.: History of Buddhist Thought.

H. Ui, Ui, H. The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, also containing Daśapadārthaśāstra (See H. Ui).

HIL. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, S. C.: History of Indian Logic (Calcutta University, 1921).

Indian Literature, Winternitz, M.: History of Indian Literature, Vol. II (Calcutta University, 1927).

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE ADVENT OF DIGNĀGA[1]

Sometime during the fifth century A.D., there appeared in the firmament of Indian philosophy a brilliant star in the person of Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Regarded by the Tibetans as *an ornament of Jambūdvīpa,*[2] he was one of the greatest thinkers that India has ever produced. Subsequent philosophical thought in India was dominated by him directly or indirectly for six long centuries. He revolutionized Indian philosophy by introducing into it the theory of radical distinction between two mutually exclusive sources of knowledge—'direct sense-apprehension' (*grahaṇa*) and 'intellect' or 'thought' (*vikalpa* or *adhyavasāya*)[3], which may be compared

1 Both the forms 'Dignāga' and 'Diṅnāga' are correct. Although the latter is more in vogue amongst Sanskrit scholiasts, the form 'Dignāga' has been preferred being easy of pronunciation.

2 The trio, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Asaṅga, together with the trio, Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, are regarded by the Tibetans as the six ornaments of Jambūdvīpa (India), *cf.* Winternitz : *Indian Literature,* Vol. II. p. 363. n. 3.

3 The terms used for these two sources of knowledge by the Dignāga school are 'perception' and 'inference' (pratyakṣa and anumāna), but that is according to the usage in Logic. Epistemologically, however, 'pratyakṣa' of Dignāga is pure sense-apprehension or sensation, and 'anumāna' is used in a wider and broader sense than ordinarily understood by that term. It includes all forms of thought—all intellection (see pp. 62-63).

to *sensibility* and *understanding* of Kant. The new approach introduced by Kant in western philosophy was compared by Kant himself to the Copernican revolution in Astronomy. Before Copernicus, it was assumed that the heavenly bodies were in movement, and that the earth (from which a spectator observed these heavenly bodies) was stationary. Copernicus reversed the notion and declared that the earth itself was moving. Before Kant, it was assumed that our knowledge must conform to objects of experience, but Kant reversed the order and declared that it was the object that conformed to knowledge.

Kant holds that the formless sense-data are received *a posteriori* through the senses to which forms are given *a priori* by the intellect. These forms are of two kinds. In the first instance, the data supplied by the sense are presented in the form of Space and Time. Space and Time are not, according to Kant, objective realities, but are only the subjective ways in which we cognize realities. Realities in themselves are non-spatial and non-temporal. The other kind of subjective forms are the categories of understanding, which are classified under four heads–quantity, quality, relation and modality. We are here concerned, however, only with the broad fact that, according to Kant, the objects of our experience receive their form from the intellect, i.e., they conform to our thought. There does exist an external reality, but it is transcendent. The world of our experience does not exist externally in the form in which it appears to us. It is the result of the working of our thought on the material supplied from the external source, the transcendent external reality. Kant thus stands midway between the *naïve* realist who holds that the external world exists exactly in the form in which it appears to us, and the idealist who holds that it is nothing but an external projection of our ideas.

Dignāga, likewise, holds that the external reality, which is in the form of unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*), has no extension in terms of *space*, and no duration in terms of *time;* it is devoid of all attributes, determinations or relations. It has no form, and is therefore transcendent (thing-in-itself). It is grasped through pure sensation, and in terms of our thought we are never conscious of it as it is *in itself*. But a pure sensa-

tion is immediately followed by another form of knowledge called judgment or determinate knowledge (*adhyavasāya*) which is of the form of the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The universal is only a generalized form imposed by our mind on the data (*sva-lakṣaṇas* or unique particulars) grasped in pure sensation. Form is given to objects of experience by the intellect, for, according to Dignāga, the universal or the generalized form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is no external reality, but a mere mental construction[4]. Comprehension of objects, as having extension in space and duration in time, is nothing but generalization (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The extension of an object means imagining a 'whole' (*avayavin*) or a substance which is common to all its parts, i.e., many reals (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) which are contiguous. And the duration of an object means imagining an abiding object which is common to many reals (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) coming in momentary succession. There is, in both cases, a generalization which is purely subjective and has no counterpart in the external world. Similarly, all attributes such as qualities, movements, etc., are nothing but generalizations. A pure sensation (*pratyakṣa* or *grahaṇa*), that grasps the transcendent reality as it is in the form of unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*), is followed by determinate knowledge (*adhya-vasāya*). And it is this that gives a generalized form to the data of pure sensation (*grahaṇa*) and converts it into a conscious experience. All our conscious knowledge, according to Dignāga, is thus restricted to the generalized form which is the work of the intellect. It never touches the reality which is transcendent.

4 Cf. the following extract from Kant with the one from Dignāga :

"There are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, N. K. Smith's Translation, 1856 edition, p. 61.)

Atra pramāṇaṁ dvividham eva, kutaś cet, dvi-lakṣaṇaṁ prameyaṁ, sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyāṁ bhinna-lakṣaṇaṁ prameyāntaraṁ nāsti (PS. p. 4). The Ṭikā of Jinendrabuddhi adds : sva-lakṣaṇa-viṣayakaṁ pratyakṣam eva, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayakaṁ anumānam eva. *Ibid*. p. 6. Dharmakīrti says : tasya (pratyakṣasya) viṣayaḥ sva-lakṣaṇam......tad eva paramārtha-sat, anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṁ so'numānasya viṣayaḥ. (NB. last portion of Chap. I.)

The so-called determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is for Dignāga only a pseudo-perception, because it comprehends a generalized form (which is merely a mental factor) as an external real object. Determinate perception, however, has a core of reality, for it follows immediately in the wake of a sensation[5] which grasps the external transcendent reality (*sva-lakṣaṇa*).[6]

It is thus clear that Dignāga, like Kant, occupies a position midway between the *naïve* realists (e.g., of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school) and the idealists (e.g., the Buddhist Yogācāra school). It would thus appear that, although in the details of their metaphysical analysis, Dignāga and Kant naturally differ, similarity between them is not superficial; it is based on the intrinsic structure of their epistemology. Surprisingly enough, even the terms used by both the thinkers for ultimate reality have a similar connotation; the term *sva-lakṣaṇa* used by Dignāga connotes, 'of its own kind' or 'as it is', and the expression *thing-in-itself* (*ding an sich*) also means 'as it is.' Such a striking similarity between the key-words used by two thinkers so remote in time and place is a proof positive that both of them had struck upon a great metaphysical truth. It shows how human mind moves in the same grooves in reaching an eternal truth. This striking similarity of the connotation of the two words escaped the notice of Stcherbatsky who was the first to point out the resemblance between the two thinkers.[7] Not only is there a close similarity in their epistemology, but even the background of the two thinkers, so remote in time and place, is strinkingly alike. Kant came when the subjective idealism of Berkeley had discarded the reality of the external world, and the scepticism of Hume had challenged all the basic human concepts such as those of Self, Substance and Causality. Dignāga was preceded by the schools of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika

5 Pratyakṣa-pṛṣṭha-bhāvitvāt.

6 The theory of Dignāga is further discussed in II. 1. (vi); IX. 12-13; and XII. 6.

7 Resemblance between the theories of Dignāga and Kant, which is quite obvious, was pointed out by Prof. Stcherbatsky, the modern exponent of Dignāga in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 200.

whose similarity with Berkeley and Hume respectively cannot be missed by any student of comparative philosophy.

On the ontological side, Kant and Dignāga differ with regard to the nature of ultimate reality. Dignāga, in conformity with the general Buddhist doctrine, maintains that reality or the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa* or *kṣaṇa*) is being born every moment and dying the very next. His theory was diametrically opposed to the static conception of the realist schools which conceived the universe as composed of stationary and isolated objects. Against them, Dignāga posited his kinetic conception of the universe as a constant forward movement of interlinked and interrelated point-instants of reality (*saṁskṛta dharmas*). Thus, while in his theory of knowledge, Dignāga anticipated Kant who came thirteen hundred years later, in his ontology, he almost foreshadowed, in one of its aspects, modern Marxist materialism which holds that all things are interlinked and interrelated and are "in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change."[8] So far as Indian philosophy is concerned, Dignāga's contribution is unique. Before him the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had developed a realistic structure based on common sense or rather common experience (see section 7 of this chapter). Dignāga focussed on it the search-light of criticism, and shattered it to pieces. In these pages it has been shown that the Buddhist theories of evanescence and causation are just a logical culmination of the basic principles accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The scholiasts of the latter school fought a desperate battle to defend themselves against the Dignāga school. The present work contains ample evidence to show that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school lost that battle.

The advent of Dignāga is indeed one of the greatest events in the history of Indian philosophy. He can as a matter of right claim a place among those pioneers of human thought who discovered an eternal truth and made a lasting contribution to human knowledge.

8 F. Engels: *Dialectics of Nature*, quoted in *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Stalin, p. 5.

2. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL AND THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISM

In his *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Dignāga propounded his new doctrine and also attacked the *naïve* realism of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He refuted the *Nyāya-sūtra* and the commentary of Vātsyāyana on it. For a time, the orthodox realism reeled before the onslaught of Dignāga and his successors. Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja, about the close of the sixth century, took up the gauntlet on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and wrote his famous work, *Nyāya-vārtika*, with "the object of dispelling the darkness caused by the pseudo-philosophers",[9] by which he meant those of the Dignāga school. Uddyotakara's defence of the Nyāya[10] was hailed as a great event, for Subandhu (seventh century A.D.), one of the pioneers among Sanskrit prose-writers, refers to Uddyotakara as "the embodiment of the defence of the Nyāya position."[11] A battle róyal ensued between the Buddhists of the Dignāga school on one side and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools of orthodox realism on the other. It lasted for a long period of some six hundred years, i.e., up to the eleventh century when the Buddhists practically disappeared.

Dharmakīrti, the great continuator of the work of Dignāga (first half of the seventh century), also one of *the six ornaments* of *Jambūdvīpa*, answered Uddyotakara. Dharmakīrti was followed by his commentator Dharmottara and by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and a host of others. The Nyāya school, however, produced its greatest exponent, Vācaspatimiśra, roughly 250 years after Uddyotakara. During the interval, the crusade against the Buddhists was carried on by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, an ally of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in the battle against the former. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school produced two of the greatest luminaries of Indian philosophy, namely, Kumārila and Prabhākara. Concerned mainly with sacrificial matters, this

9 Kutārkikājñāna-nivṛttihetuḥ. NV. opening stanza. Kutārkikair Dignāga-prabhṛtibhiḥ. NVT. p. 2.

10 The term Nyāya stands for the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (see section 3 of this chapter).

11 Nyāya-sthitim iva Uddyotakara-svarūpām. (Vāsavadattā, Hall's edition, p. 235.)

school had not much to do with metaphysics or epistemology. Its realistic structure was more or less the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from which it was adopted. There is little doubt that the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā developed its epistemology under the stimulus given by the Dignāga school, and that its object was to defend orthodox realism. Prabhākara and Kumārila, however, in the course of their defence of realism, evolved certain epistemological theories which were strikingly bold and original in conception. Of these two great thinkers, Prabhākara has been called a 'bastard son of Buddhism' by Stcherbatsky,[12] because he was influenced by the Buddhists to a great extent. He is, therefore, still more interesting for our study. For an understanding of the conflict of the orthodox realists with the Buddhists, the study of Kumārila and Prabhākara, so far as they deal with topics relating to the theory of realism, is essential.

During the ninth and tenth centuries, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school produced four or five eminent scholiasts. The greatest of them is Vācaspatimiśra who occupies the highest position as an exponent not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, but of all other systems of Indian philosophy, the Buddhist not excluded.[13]

Vācaspatimiśra laid the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism on a firm foundation. In his *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism reaches its high watermark. Jayanta, whose priority or posteriority to Vācaspatimiśra is uncertain, is marked, more than any other ancient writer on Indian philosophy, by his rare wit, sharp repartee and delightful lucidity. Next to them come two great masters, Udayana and Śrīdhara, both commentators on Praśastapāda. The former is also the author of several independent treatises. Both of them belong to the close of the tenth century. These thinkers are among the luminaries of the brightest period of Indian philosophy which covers some six hundred years, i.e., from the fifth to the tenth or eleventh century. During this period, as a result of protracted

12 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 51.

13 Vācaspatimiśra wrote treatises on all principal systems of orthodox philosophy. See *infra*, IV. 8(v). Although he has not written any independent work on any system of Buddhist philosophy, his exposition of numerous Buddhist theories, scattered over all of his works, is meticulously faithful and unsurpassed in lucidity even by Buddhist writers.

conflict between the Buddhists and the orthodox realists, Indian genius reached its zenith in the development of metaphysics and epistemology. As far as the problem of realism *versus* idealism is concerned, the philosophers of the two schools left no possible avenue of thought unexplored.[14]

3. THE SYNCRETIC NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

Of all Indian philosophical systems, the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is the chief exponent of realism. The two schools, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, were separate in their origin as well as in the early course of their development. The former, although a metaphysical school, was chiefly concerned with the method of debate and syllogism. The latter formulated its ontological structure on the basis of the six categories which have been accepted as the basis of realism not only by the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, but also by other orthodox realist schools with slight modifications. A close liaison between the two schools seems to have existed from the earliest times; they have always been held to be allied systems *(samāna-tantra)*. In formulating the six-fold division of sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*), Uddyotakara has freely used the Vaiśeṣika terminology.[15] From the tenth century onwards, we have treatises in which the subject matter of both the systems has been formally amalgamated.

The two schools were complementary to each other. While the Vaiśeṣika represents the positive, constructive or creative side of the combined school, the Nyāya represents its defensive side. As noted above, the Vaiśeṣika supplied the ontological structure to the syncretic system. So far as the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* and its earliest commentary by Praśastapāda (which is, in fact, an independent treatise) are concerned, they contain no controversial matter by way of refutation of other schools. Controversies with other schools make their appearance only in the

14 For detailed information about the authors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and the allied ones, see Chap. IV.

15 For example, saṁyoga, saṁyukta-samavāya, and saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya, etc. (NV. pp. 94-95), are the terms of the Vaiśeṣika conception.

commentaries on Praśastapāda, such as *Nyāya-kandalī* and *Kiraṇāvalī*, which belong to a period when the Vaiśeṣika had already combined with the Nyāya school. On the other hand, in the case of the latter, we find the refutation of other schools right from the *Nyāya-sūtra*,[16] and the same continues in its great commentary by Vātsyāyana and in all the Nyāya treatises such as *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī* and Udayana's *Pariśuddhi*.

The syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is usually designated, specially in the later period, as *Nyāya*, and an adherent of the school as *naiyāyika*.[17] For example, Śrīdhara's commentary on Praśastapāda's treatise, a purely Vaiśeṣika work, is named *Nyāya-kandalī*; and likewise, the *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* is primarily a manual of the Vaiśeṣika system. It should not, however, be overlooked that the realistic structure based on the six categories belongs to the Vaiśeṣika which, for that reason, is more important than the Nyāya for a study of realism of the combined school. It is therefore appropriate that the syncretic school should be designated as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—a term not much in vogue in Indian tradition.

The syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school occupies a unique position in the development of Indian philosophical thought. The terminology of this school has played an important rôle in giving shape to Indian philosophical thinking in general. A preliminary study of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual like *Tarka-saṁgraha* or *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* is considered essential for introduction to any other system of Indian philosophy. Nyāya phraseology, and to some extent even ideology, seem to have influenced all other schools.[18] The study of Nyāya-Vai-

16 For example, there is refutation of the Buddhist Mādhyamika theory in the Nyāya-sūtra (NS. IV. i. 37ff.).

17 For the use of the term 'nyāya' in different senses, see *infra*, III.14.

18 As an instance of the domination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideology over other systems, the following may be pointed out: Vijñānabhikṣu, describing the nature of the three constituents of prakṛti, sattva, etc., says: 'sattvādīni dravyāṇi, na vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ' (SPB. I. 61). He is perfectly right that sattva, etc., are not the guṇas (qualities) of the Vaiśeṣika conception, but to say that they are dravyas is to introduce a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception into the Sāṁkhya system to which it is quite foreign.

śeṣika realism is, therefore, of great importance for the understanding of Indian philosophy.

4. THREE-FOLD CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

There are three main divisions of the subject matter of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: (i) logic and the method of debate, (ii) physico-chemical theories relating to the four atomic elements, and (iii) metaphysics based on the six categories. It would appear that the first of these divisions, viz., logic, is the principal subject of the Nyāya, while the remaining two chiefly belong to the Vaiśeṣika school. But in the manuals of the syncretic school, whether primarily belonging to the Nyāya or to the Vaiśeṣika school, all the three topics are treated.

Of the three divisions of the subject matter, logic alone has been in vogue in the traditional study of the syncretic school since the advent of Gaṅgeśa in the twelfth century. Ignoring metaphysics, he concentrated on logic and developed very subtle conceptions and definitions of the components of inference, such as 'inferential mark' (*liṅga*), or 'invariable concomitance' (*vyāpti*). It is only this line of development of logic called *Navya-nyāya* which, to the complete exclusion of metaphysics, has been in vogue since the time of Gaṅgeśa. It is primarily for this reason that the syncretic school came to be known as the Nyāya school, and the term *Vaiśeṣika* was dropped. The second branch of the subject matter, viz., the physico-chemical theories of the Vaiśeṣika, is in the nature of early attempts at the understanding of the physical world. Such attempts are now only of historical interest to us. There may be found some valuable data relating to this branch, which have been collected and assessed by Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal in his admirable work, *The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*. We are, however, concerned only with the third division of the subject matter, viz., the metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika as developed in the syncretic school. This branch, adopting western nomenclature, may be designated as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. It is this branch with which we are concerned in our present study. It has a lasting value and can make a positive contribution to philosophy in general. This branch has generally been neglected in traditional study. The

imperative need of Indian philosophy is that the pure metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school be separated from other material with which it is mixed.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are four means of knowledge: (i) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (ii) inference (*anumāna*), (iii) analogy (*upamāna*) and (iv) verbal testimony (*śabda*). Of these, the last three are included in logic. But the first one, viz., perception, having a direct bearing on the theory of realism, will be dealt with in this work.

5. THREE PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Historians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, notably Bodas and Vidyābhūṣaṇa, have divided the history of the school in different ways. The division of periods, as accepted by them, is based not on the organic growth of thought, but merely on the extraneous factor of form; it is, therefore, unscientific. The question of proper and correct division of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will be discussed at some length in the chapter on the historical survey of the school. At this stage, we shall only state the conclusions arrived at there.

In accordance with the recognized dictum of Indian philosophy that every object passes through three stages, (i) origin, (ii) development and (iii) decay, the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school may be divided into the following three periods:

I. *The Period of Origin or the Pre-Dignāga Period.* Commencing from the earliest times (which cannot be definitely fixed), this period extends to the fifth century A.D., i.e., the time of the advent of Dignāga. Placed in chronological order: (i) the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra,* (ii) the *Nyāya-sūtra,* (iii) Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* and (iv) Praśastapāda's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra,* belong to this period. Praśastapāda occupies a unique position in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. Although a preliminary structure of realistic categories was laid down by Kaṇāda, it is Praśastapāda who is the real author of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. The development took place through an unfolding of the implications of the basic

principles enunciated by Praśastapāda. He flourished before Dignāga, but there seems to be little doubt, as we shall see in the sequel, that he was influenced by Buddhist ideas.

II. The Period of Development or the Period of Conflict with the Dignāga School. This period, extending from the fifth to the eleventh century, is the brightest period, not only in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, but also in that of Indian philosophy in general. To this period belongs the galaxy of thinkers such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Śāntarakṣita of the Buddhist camp, and Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Udayana and Śrīdhara on the orthodox realist side. Śaṁkara, the founder of Vedānta monism, also belongs to this period. It was during this period that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism developed as a result of constant conflict with the Buddhist, and it is with this period that we are chiefly concerned in our present study.

III. The Period of Decay or the Post-Buddhist Period. This period commences from the eleventh century, or rather with the advent of Gaṅgeśa in the twelfth century. Navya-nyāya founded by Gaṅgeśa and its further development are the principal contents of the period. Further, a large number of manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to which reference will be made in this work belong to this period. These manuals are usually regarded as belonging to the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (*prācīna-nyāya*) by the followers of the Navya-nyāya school. This period is unproductive so far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is concerned.

6. DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

Philosophical thought in India has flowed mainly in two divergent channels: (i) the orthodox thought which has its source in the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniṣads, and (ii) Buddhist thought which springs from the no-soul theory (*anātma-vāda*) of Buddhist scriptures. The two camps had been influencing and reacting on each other, and in the process they grew richer and richer. The process continued up to the eleventh century or so, when the Buddhists as a force disappeared from this country. And with them also disappeared their sys-

tems of philosophy. Whatever may be the assessment of the consequences of their exit in regard to other spheres of life, it was undoubtedly a misfortune for Indian philosophy. All philosophical thought after their departure became stagnant and stereotyped, and all intellectual activity was concentrated on the hair-splitting jugglery of the Navya-nyāya. Something worse happened. In the absence of the stimulus provided by Buddhist thought, even the orthodox systems began to be neglected. It was but natural, for the full significance and deeper implications of the orthodox theories could be understood and appreciated only by a comparison with the counter-theories of the Buddhist systems. Seldom has it been realized that most of the important theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, as they stand in their latest form, have been formulated as a result of their conflict with the Dignāga school.

As a matter of fact, what the Vedānta monism (*advaita-vāda*) owes to Nāgārjuna, the orthodox realist schools owe to Dignāga and his successors. There is, however, a difference. While the theory of the Void (*śūnyatā*) propounded by Nāgārjuna was adapted by Śaṁkara in such a way as to fit into the Upaniṣadic theory of *Brahman*, the epistemological theories of Dignāga were neither adopted nor adapted by the realist schools. The Dignāga school acted simply as a fillip which stimulated thinkers of the realist schools and effected changes in their epistemological doctrines.

The fact of modifications in the orthodox theories as a result of the Buddhist influence has been noted by the orthodox writers themselves. Although no orthodox school would acknowledge its own indebtedness to that influence, it would freely accuse other systems of having been influenced by it or of having adopted certain theories under the impact of the Buddhist attack.[19] It may be noted that the nature of this influence is radically different in the case of the two Pūrva-

19 Śaṁkara calls the Vaiśeṣika school 'ardha-vaināśika', i.e., semi-Buddhist (Śārīraka-bhāṣya II. ii. 18). But Śaṁkara himself, in turn, was dubbed as 'pracchanna-bauddha,' i.e., a Buddhist in disguise (māyā-vādam asac-chāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddham eva ca—a stanza from Padma-purāṇa quoted in the introduction to the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya.)

Mīmāṁsā schools on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other. The former formulated their epistemological theories with the object of effectively defending realism against the Buddhists. Jayanta has actually flung cavils at Kumārila that it was through sheer fear of the Buddhists that he formulated his theory of cognition not being directly perceived but only inferred.[20]

Prabhākara, as already noted, was influenced by Buddhist ideology even more. In connection with Prabhākara's repudiation of non-existence (*abhāva*) as a reality, Śrīdhara addresses him thus: "What, according to you, is the object-support (*ālambana*) of the cognition of non-existence? If nothing, then you yourself have lent support to Mahāyāna Buddhists (idealist Yogācāra school) who hold that cognitions have no object-support."[21] The obvious hint is that a realist should not adopt a theory which may be helpful to the Buddhist opponent. In connection with Prabhākara's explanation of error as being due to non-discrimination between what is perceived and what is remembered (*akhyāti-vāda*), Jayanta, addressing Prabhākara, says, "We know, you have stolen this theory from the house of Dharmakīrti."[22] The strategy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was different. They stuck to their position with obstinate rigidity. Never did they condescend to adapt a Buddhist view in order to rationalize their own position. Yet modifications in their doctrines did occur under the influence of the Buddhists, but they occurred only indirectly.

Briefly stated, the reactions of the orthodox realist schools to the Buddhist opposition are as follows: (i) the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopted a rigid attitude, but new ideas appeared and changes occurred in that school in the course of the unfolding of implications of its basic theories; (ii) Kumārila adopted a more rational attitude and formulated his epistemological theo-

20 Aho bata ime kebhyo bibhyataḥ śrotriyāḥ paraṁ kim api vaiklavyam upāgatāḥ. NM. part I. p. 16. For full discussion and context, see *infra*, IX. 17.

21 Nāstīti saṁvidaḥ kim ālambanam ? Yadi na kiñcid, dattaḥ svahasto nirālambanaṁ vijñānam icchatāṁ mahāyānikānām. NK. p. 229. line 1.

22 Śrutam idaṁ yad atra bhavadbhir Dharmakīrti-gṛhād āhṛtam. NM. Part 1. p. 167 (For the full context and discussion of Prabhākara's theory of error, see *infra*, XII. 14).

ries in such a way that his school could meet the Buddhist criticism and (iii) Prabhākara, being not so orthodox, borrowed freely from Buddhist ideology.

The story of the protracted conflict between the realist schools and the Dignāga school, in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the chief combatant on the orthodox side, is one of the most fascinating chapters of Indian philosophy. The conflict lasted for some six hundred years, from the fifth century A.D. to the eleventh.

7. THE CORNER-STONE OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISM

Belief in the reality of the external world independent of its knowledge by a knower is ingrained in the unsophisticated human mind. Whatever we experience directly must have an external existence. Starting from this fundamental idea, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika laid down a basic and guiding principle that 'experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of the reality of external objects.'[23] It should not be the function of philosophy to challenge the common experience of all mankind which accepts the reality of the external world. The function of philosophy is rather to analyse that experience and evolve a coherent system out of that analysis. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics undertakes just that analysis and bases its metaphysical structure thereon.

Our common experience presents a world consisting of separate individual objects which are called substances (*dravyas*). They appear as substrata of certain properties. Substances being the substrata of properties, the two appear in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhārādheya-bhāva*), and therefore the two cannot be identical; they must be different *in their essence*. For instance, in the case of the experience of a *white cloth*, the white colour is experienced as a property which resides in the substratum, cloth; and, therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essence. *Essential* differentiation between the substratum and its properties (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*)[24] is the corner-stone of the structure of realism. The six

23 Saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam. NVT. p. 506. For the origin of this dictum, see *infra*, IV. 8 (v).

24 Dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhidyate. NVT. p. 843. line 18. It means that a property in its essence is different from its substratum.

categories accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika follow as corollaries from that basic principle.

Substratum (*dharmin*) is always in the form of a substance (*dravya*). But the properties (*dharmas*) residing in a substratum are found, on further analysis, to be of various kinds. Some properties like colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes of their substrata. They are called qualities (*guṇas*). Others are of an evanescent nature, for example, the motion of a body. They are called movements (*karman*). We, thus, arrive at the first three categories: (i) *dravya*, (ii) *guṇa* and (iii) *karman*. Of the numerous objects of our experience, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must therefore be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing was regarded as the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*), which is the fourth category of the school. In the case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called *viśeṣa* residing in the atoms, which was later on extended to other eternal substances also.[25] *Viśeṣa* is the fifth category of the school. Of the five categories, the last four, viz., quality (*guṇa*), etc., being of the nature of properties (*dharmas*), are only found to be residing in their substratum (*dharmin*) which is the first category, i.e., substance. The universal (*sāmānya*) is held to be residing in *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*. Although the properties, *guṇa*, etc., are different in essence from *dravya*, they cannot exist as separate from, or independent of, a *dravya*. Therefore, the relation between the former and the latter cannot be an ordinary one, called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*), which obtains between the two substances that can be connected and separated at will. A sixth category, therefore, in the form of a special relation called *samavāya* was assumed. To these six categories, originally accepted by the school, a seventh one, namely, *abhāva* (non-existence) was added at a later date.

The theory of causation is held in Indian philosophy to be the

25 *Infra*, IX. 4.

pivot theory of the metaphysical structure of a system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation also rests on the same basic principle, the differentiation between the properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*). An effect like cloth, which is experienced as produced in its cause,[26] viz., the threads, is like a property of the threads which are its substrata. It would thus appear that a property is not only in the form of qualities or actions, etc., but it may also be in the form of a substance. A substratum and its property being different *in essence*, according to the above-mentioned principle, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, true to its principle, declared that the *essence* of cloth was different from that of threads. Thus the principle of differentiation between properties and their substrata (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the corner-stone of the structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

8. COROLLARIES FROM THE BASIC NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PRINCIPLES

It has been stated that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school did not adopt new theories in order to meet the Buddhist argument as was done by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Changes, however, occurred in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics in the form of acceptance of new propositions which were forced upon the school by its opponents as corollaries of the basic stand of that system. These propositions, howsoever absurd they may appear, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school accepted with its typical boldness. Bertrand Russell says, "Whosoever wishes to be a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities."[27] This is only too true in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Vācaspatimiśra meeting a Buddhist objection in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the universal gives expression to the same idea when he says, "Those who know that a reality is based on proof are not frightened by such objections."[28] With regard to this process of development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, a characteristic observation by Stcherbatsky deserves mention:

26 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system an effect is produced not *out of* its cause, but *in* its cause.

27 *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 31.

28 Vastugatiṁ prāmāṇikīṁ vidvāṁso nāsmād dūṣaṇād bibhyati. NVT. p. 512.

"Driven by the powerful logic of their opponents these realists retreated into the remotest recesses of consequent realism, into its quite absurd, but logically unavoidable, consequences. They thus with perfect *bona fides* reduced realism *ad absurdum*. They demonstrated practically that whosoever resolves to remain a realist to the end, must unavoidably people the universe with such a wealth of objective realities that life in such a realistic home must become quite uncomfortable."[29]

By way of illustration of what has been said above, the following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories may be cited:

(i) Qualities and actions were conceived as entities separate from their substratum, i.e., the substance, even by Kaṇāda; but the fact that the two are so different in their essence that they have a separate set of causes, that they are not produced simultaneously, and that the production of a substance precedes, by a moment, the production of its qualities, was the conception of a later period. It would appear that the conception of the objectivity of qualities and actions became more and more rigid in course of time. Further, the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*), which were conceived at the early stage only as intellectual entities,[30] were later on held as full-fledged external objective realities. The relation (*samavāya*) by which all these attributes—qualities, actions, the universal and the particular—reside in their substrata, was also held as a separate external objective reality. And at a still later period, in accordance with the dictum that whatever is experienced must have its counterpart in the external world, even the non-existence was held as a reality, i.e., existent. Throughout the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the number of objective realities continues to be on the increase.

(ii) The limit of heaping objective realities, one upon another, is, however, reached in the later development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. According to it, the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of an effect is in the form of its 'parts'

29 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 48.
30 Sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam. VS. I. ii. 3.

(*avayava*), and the effect in the form of the 'whole' (*avayavin*) of those parts, the two being different in their *essence*, and existing simultaneously side by side. For example, the threads are the cause of a piece of cloth; threads and cloth are two different substances having separate essence and separate qualities, and both of them have simultaneous existence, but they occupy the same space. The idea of two material substances occupying the same space, however, militates against the very conception of a material substance. It is the very nature of matter to be resistant to another matter occupying the same space. The Buddhists point out that *sapratighatva*, which means impenetrability or resistance to another matter occupying the same space, is the nature of *rūpa* (matter). But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, not only two substances, but innumerable substances, occupy the same space. Thus the space occupied by a piece of cloth is not only occupied by its material cause, the threads, but also by the material cause of the latter, i.e., the filaments of the threads, and so on. It means that from the state of atoms up to that of a piece of cloth, there are innumerable intervening substances all occupying the same space. This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics has never been noticed in modern expositions of that system, although it is not only implied in the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, but explicitly given by pioneer writers like Udyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra.[31] The miracle of numerous substances occupying the same space is sought to be explained by means of the relation called *samavāya* (inherence) which is a unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept. But there arose insurmountable difficulties in maintaining the theory of many substances occupying the same space, which baffled the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. According to that theory, all these substances occupy the same space, and yet, having separate qualities, they have their separate weights. The weight of a piece of cloth and the weight of its cause, i.e., the threads, are separate, and so of others in the series of causes. The oppo-

31 Yad idaṁ bhavatā manyate dvipalaṁ pañcapalam iti nātra kārya-kāraṇa-gurutve avadhāryete kintv-ācaramād ā ca paramāṇor dravya-samāhāra unmīyate. NV. p. 494. line 7. Commenting on this, Vācaspatimiśra says: Dravya-samāhāra iti kārya-kāraṇa-dravya-samāhāraḥ, mṛtkaṇa-mṛccūrṇa-śarkarā-kapāla-kumbha-samāhāra ity arthaḥ. NVT. p. 494. line 22.

nents pointed out that, as soon as a new effect-substance is produced in a material cause, the weight should increase inasmuch as there are now two substances having separate weights. This predicament the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers tried to meet in divers ways, but none proved satisfactory.[32]

(iii) The differentiation of qualities from their substratum, i.e., the substance, led the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to many queer corollaries. If the colour of a jar is an entity different from the jar, the causes of the two should also be different. The threads, being the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of the cloth could not be the material cause of its colour as well. Inasmuch as the colour of a cloth resides in it by *samavāya* relation, the cloth is itself conceived as the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of its colour, which implies that the cloth, being the cause, should precede its effect, i.e., colour, and for the matter of that, all other qualities. It means that a substance and its qualities are not produced simultaneously. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, undeterred by the obvious absurdity of the proposition, actually held that all effect-substances, in the first moment of their origin, were devoid of all qualities. It was pointed out by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts that no practical difficulty would arise by holding that view because substances were devoid of qualities only *for a moment*, and their comprehension at the very first moment of their origin was not possible in any way. But the question is whether a substance devoid of all qualities can even be conceived.

If at the time of their origin substances had to be taken as devoid of qualities for one moment, by the same logic of differentiation of substances and their qualities (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*), the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was driven to the position that at the time of the destruction of substances also, the qualities exist for one moment without their substances. The destruction of a cause, e.g., of cloth, would be the cause of the destruction of its effect, e.g., the colour of cloth. The destruction of colour, being an effect, would come about one moment later than its cause, i.e., the destruction of cloth; it means that the colour of cloth would exist for one moment even when the cloth has already been destroyed.

32 *Infra*, V. 2.

(iv) One more corollary to which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was driven by the force of its logic may be noticed here. It was held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that whenever a new constituent part was added to or subtracted from an effect-substance, the latter was destroyed, and a new substance was produced in its place. In the case of an embryo, Śrīdhara declared that inasmuch as it was growing with additions of new parts, it was being destroyed, and a new one was being produced in its place every day.[33] Obviously, we have to say *every moment* in place of *every day,* because the process of growth goes on constantly. And this would apply not only to an embryo, but to all organic things which are subject to growth and decay.

Furthermore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, colour, etc., are qualities of such a nature that they last as long as the substance in which they reside lasts.[34] It implies that whenever there is any change in the qualities, colour, etc., the substance itself is destroyed, and a new one comes into existence in its place. It was for this reason that the Vaiśeṣika school maintains the theory of *pīlupāka* according to which a jar, when it is baked and changes its colour from blue to red, is destroyed and a new one comes in its place. It would imply that even in the case of an inorganic substance, whenever there is any change in its qualities, it is destroyed and a new substance appears. It is clear that, owing to the effect of heat or other factors, a change in colour and other qualities is constantly going on in the case of even inorganic substances. Of course, the change becomes apparent only after some time, but, as a matter of fact, the change has been going on constantly in an imperceptible manner. Secondly, even inorganic substances, in course of time, suffer loss of weight of their particles, howsoever infinitesimal it may be. This means the constant destruction of every existing substance and the substitution of a new one in its place, not only because some of its component parts have been subtracted, but also because a quality, i.e., weight (*gurutva*) which is co-existent with the substance has changed.

In the case of inorganic substances, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school may contend that the change is not constant but

33 NK. p. 34, lines 1-4. Also *infra*, VI. 31 and VII. 14.

34 Yāvad-dravya-bhāvitvam. PP. p. 103.

only occasional. In organic substances, however, the change is going on every moment, and it is, therefore, evident that all organic substances are being destroyed and replaced by new ones every moment, and the notion of their identity is only an illusion. Similarly, in the case of inorganic substances also, granted that the changes have been only occasional, it will have to be admitted that they have been destroyed and replaced by new ones many a time, and the recognition of their identity is, therefore, a mere illusion. The main object of the scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was to demolish the Buddhist theory of evanescence (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vāda*), and their main argument was the direct recognition of the continuous identity of objects. Now, it transpires from the corollaries which directly flow from the basic principle formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself that the so-called stable substances are in fact constantly dying and being replaced by new ones, and the recognition of their identity is a mere illusion.

It would thus appear that the basic dicta of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which started with common sense as their main plank, when worked out to their ultimate logical consequences, lead in many cases either to conclusions which are outrageous to common sense, or to the establishment of the theories of their opponents. Fuller implications of the basic principles of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were not worked out, because the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics came to an abrupt end with the disappearance of their chief opponents, the Buddhists, from the scene.

9. UNTENABILITY OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISM

Of the principal scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jayanta is the only one who adheres to realism to the end, and is never swayed by the idealist systems. Of Vācaspatimiśra, who has given us perhaps the most authoritative exposition of all the principal systems of orthodox philosophy, it may be said that he becomes a faithful adherent of any one system at the time he expounds it. He realised like a true philosopher that there was no finality in philosophical thinking, and any one of the philosophical approaches might be most appealing in a particular setting. But other thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

school, especially Śrīdhara, who is second to none in upholding the realism of that school, could not resist the influence of the idealist systems.

In one of his introductory stanzas, Śrīdhara offers salutation to the Divinity 'which has eternal consciousness as its nature',[35] or which is 'one without a second'[36]—pure Vedāntic ideas which should have no place in a treatise of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Speaking of the nature of self-realization which brings final emancipation, he quotes a verse from the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* according to which "true knowledge of self consists in realizing that the soul is free from all adjuncts of knowing, feeling and acting."[37] Obviously, this is in contradiction to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. In the same context he declares, "One who thinks that the soul is an actor or enjoyer is ignorant,"[38]—again a Sāṁkhya idea which is opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. In the context of the means of freeing oneself from the feelings of attachment and hatred, he approvingly quotes a verse of Dharmakīrti which says, "If the theory of the soul (self) is accepted, there arises the idea of the *other*, and differentiation between the self and others causes attachment and hatred."[39] This is again a denial of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the soul, and that too by falling into the trap of the Buddhist, the hated enemy. Similarly, Udayana, the great champion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in the course of his refutation of the Buddhist Yogācāra theory of idealism, declares that if somehow Yogācāra succeeds in proving that difference in cognition is not caused by the difference in the cognized objects, it will only lead to the establishment of the powerful Vedānta theory.[40] He forgets that the latter theory is as much damaging to the doctrine of realism as that of the Yogācāra.

35 Nitya-vijñāna-vigraham. NK. p. 1.

36 Kam api nirmalam advitīyam. Ibid.

37 Evaṁ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity apariśeṣam.
Aviparyayād viśuddhaṁ kevalam utpadyate jñānam. SK. verse 64, quoted in NK. p. 279.

38 Yaḥ kartā-bhoktā 'stīty ātmānam abhimanyate......so avidvān. NK. p. 281.

39 Ātmani sati para-saṁjñā sva-para-vibhāgāt parigraha-dveṣau. PV. 1. 221, quoted in NK. p. 279.

40 Na grāhya-bhedam avadhūya dhiyo 'sti vṛttis
Tad-bādhane balini vedanaye jayaśrīḥ. ATV. p. 529.

There is a reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts felt shy of their realism, especially in the context of the theory of emancipation. According to the idealist systems of the Vedānta as well as of the Buddhists, it is held that our mundane state is due to ignorance, a kind of primordial error; and emancipation comes about when that error is set aside by true knowledge. The idea is so deeply rooted in the Indian mind that even a realist system, where it should have no place, succumbed to it. Such a theory cannot fit in at all with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics according to which the world, exactly in the form it is experienced, is real, and all attributes like knowledge, desire, hatred, effort, etc., pertain to the soul as a matter of reality. But that theory of emancipation seems to have been adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school from the earliest times, for it is found in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and its commentary by Vātsyāyana.

10. THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL AFTER GAṄGEŚA

Gaṅgeśa, who belongs to the closing part of the twelfth century, must have realized, more than Śrīdhara and Udayana, the futility of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and the theory of realism. He turned the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school from metaphysics to logic and epistemology exclusively. The original contribution of that school is in the form of subtle, sharp and exquisitely minute distinctions in the connotations of logical terms. Gaṅgeśa was the pioneer of a unique system of logical subtleties without a parallel in any other system of logic. Gaṅgeśa must be hailed as one of the greatest intellectual giants of our country. He is the hero of the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He has practically dominated the intellectual activity of that school from his time up to date, i.e., for more than seven centuries. Dozens of commentaries and sub-commentaries were written on his work, *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, making the methodology of the school subtler and subtler. There is hardly any example of an intellectual activity protracted for such a long period but devoid of any positive contents. It is nothing but intellectual gymnastics; it is the typical product of a decadent people who still retained their intellectual acumen but were spiritually devitalized.

The new turn given to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by Gaṅgeśa put

an end to the development of the metaphysical theories of that school. So far as pure metaphysics is concerned, there is hardly any significant contribution of the post-Buddhist period to the thought of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. With the exit of the Buddhist opponents, there was left no interest in disputation on Realism *versus* Idealism. The results of the previous period of development were crystallized and stereotyped in the numerous manuals of the school which continued to be studied as an introduction to the study of the Navya-nyāya. It seems, however, that some interest in the old works lingered up to the seventeenth century. Saṁkaramiśra wrote a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* in the fifteenth century,[41] and Viśvanātha on the *Nyāya-sūtras* in the seventeenth. There is, however, no evidence to show that the significance of the theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, which had developed in the conflict with the Buddhists, was appreciated during this period. The Buddhists, of course, totally disappeared not only from the physical environment, but also from the metaphysical arena. The writers of the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school seem to have had no knowledge of the Buddhist systems, especially of the Dignāga school. It was, therefore, impossible for them to appreciate the full implications and intricacies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. A feature of the third period which clearly marks it off from the second period is that the principal adversary in all the disputations is no more the Buddhist, but the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, especially the Prabhākara school. In the second period, which was a period of conflict with the Buddhists, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school was regarded as an allied school.[42]

In the eighteenth century, however, all the works of the pre-Gaṅgeśa period seem to have gone out of vogue in traditional study, as evidenced by the despatches sent during that century by Portuguese Jesuits who were collecting manuscripts for the King's Library at Paris. Apart from the works of the Navya-nyāya school, most of the ancient works of Indian philosophy, especially those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, were not easily available, so much so that even the *Nyāya-sūtra* of

41 This is the oldest extant commentary on Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika-sūtra. Older Vaiśeṣika commentaries are all on Praśastapāda's commentary.

42 As '*sva*-tantra'. NVT. p. 95.

Gotama could not be traced in that period.[43] The important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises have now been brought to light as a result of the efforts of the western scholars of Sanskrit during the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth.

11. DIGNĀGA SCHOOL AND THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS

Indian philosophy is basically divided in two camps: the Vedic orthodox camp owing its inspiration to the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniṣads, and the heterodox Buddhist camp owing its inspiration to the no-soul-theory (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist scriptures. Acceptance or denial of the soul being the line of demarcation, Jaina philosophy, although heterodox, should rather go with the former at least so far as it subscribes to the soul-theory. Although both camps had their primary inspiration from the authority of their respective scriptures, the orthodox systems had always an authoritarian bias, while the Buddhist systems a rational one. For that reason, it was the Buddhist thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Dignāga and a host of others who made a bolder and more original contribution to Indian philosophical thought, which, as already noted, directly or indirectly, influenced the orthodox systems too. With the exit of the Buddhists, their philosophy also disappeared from India. It was preserved in far-off lands, especially in China and Tibet, but it could not retain its vitality and vigour in an alien soil. Orthodox and Buddhist philosophical systems had grown side by side, reacting upon and influencing each other. One cannot be fully understood and appreciated without the background of the other. Hence it is that, although the treatises of Buddhist philosophy were current in China and Tibet, their full significance was hardly grasped in those countries. And, although there was an uninterrupted tradition of the orthodox systems in India, the background of many of their tenets was lost. This is even more

43 One of the missionaries wrote in these despatches, "The founder of the Nyāya School...... is called Gautama......Whatever research I made, I could not get his principles or aphorisms." He further wrote, "Gaṅgeśa's dialectics have caused people to forget all the other parts of philosophy and to neglect the best authors, who are almost unknown since the decadence of letters under the Mogola." HIL. p. 488-9.

true of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Since the renaissance of Sanskrit towards the close of the eighteenth century, Buddhist works have been coming to light and have been placed against their original background of orthodox philosophy. When Buddhist philosophy is reconstructed, and when as a result thereof the full significance of the orthodox systems is also grasped, Indian philosophy will come into its own and will regain its rightful place in the philosophical thought of the world.

Although many important treatises of different schools of Buddhist philosophy have recently been published in India and abroad, information regarding the Buddhist systems is usually based on the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha,* a compendium of Indian philosophy. This work belongs to the fourteenth century when Buddhist philosophy was already forgotten. The account of the Buddhist systems of philosophy as contained in that work is imperfect, and in many instances even erroneous. So far as the Dignāga school is concerned, its account in that work is wholly confused and mixed up with that of other schools.[44] The Dignāga school is not only the culmination of the development of Buddhist philosophical thought, but it is also the *sine qua non* for the understanding of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, headed by Gaṅgeśa and his Navya-nyāya, the metaphysics of the Dignāga school was entirely forgotten, and, as a natural consequence thereof, the pioneer works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself were not properly understood and appreciated.

12. STCHERBATSKY AS AN EXPOSITOR OF THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

Fortunately, the hidden treasures of the Dignāga school have been laid bare in a monumental work, entitled *Buddhist Logic,*[45] by the late professor Stcherbatsky of Leningrad. His contribution to the elucidation of other systems of Buddhist philosophy is by no means inconspicuous,[46] but *Buddhist Logic* is his

44 *Infra,* III. 6.

45 *Buddhist Logic* in two volumes by Th. Stcherbatsky published in Bibliotheca Buddhica Series of Leningrad, (No. XXVI, vol. I. 1932 and vol. II. 1930).

46 In his short and pithy treatise, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word Dharma* (published by The Royal Asiatic

principal work and it is a masterly exposition of the Dignāga school. As the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is bound up with the Dignāga school, Stcherbatsky's work, throwing an illuminating and critical sidelight on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, has opened a new avenue for its understanding. The present writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Stcherbatsky without whose pioneer work this study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system could not have been undertaken. According to several competent judges, his *Buddhist Logic* is the greatest work on Indian philosophy in recent years. It is unfortunate that this great work has not yet received the attention it deserves from students of Indian philosophy. I have seldom come across a reference to this work in books, theses or articles on Indian philosophy. In 1942, on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee celebration, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute published an account of the *Progress of Indic Studies* during the preceding quarter century.[47] In the section dealing with Indian philosophy, many books, good and bad, have been noticed. Some of the books of Stcherbatsky also are mentioned. But his principal work, *Buddhist Logic*, is not referred to even by name, although it appeared during the period covered. His English translation of the *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti and its commentary by Dharmottara, together with his masterly explanatory notes (included in *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II), is another great aid to the study of the Dignāga school. He has also critically edited the *Nyāya-bindu* (published in Russia), but unfortunately that edition is not available. There is evidence of Stcherbatsky's having studied and explored the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school like *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī* and *Nyāya-kandalī*. These works have not received the same close attention at the hands of any other scholar. There is little doubt that the study of these works must have helped Stcherbatsky in

Society, London, 1923), he has given the quintessence of Vasubandhu's famous work, Abhidharma-kośa, and in his work, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa (published by the Academy of Science of the USSR, Leningrad, 1927), he has dealt with the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna.

47 *Progress of Indic Studies*, (1917-1942), Government Oriental Series, class B, No. 8. Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

understanding the philosophy of the Dignāga school.[48] The study of these Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works is as important for the understanding of the Dignāga school as that of the works of that school itself. While Stcherbatsky is the principal expositor of the Dignāga school, there have been some other attempts also for the study of that school.[49]

13. PRESENT CONDITION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA STUDIES

There has been in a sense an uninterrupted tradition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school up to the present time. Although, as already stated, interest in the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school ceased since the advent of Gaṅgeśa, the dialectics of the Navya-nyāya school founded by him grew within the framework of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. A basic study of a manual of the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, like *Tarka-saṁgraha* or *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī*, has always been in vogue in the traditional study of the Navya-nyāya school. The manuals contain only bare outlines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. They are studied without much insight into the metaphysical structure of the school, or without adequate understanding of the implications of its theories. No doubt there has been an uninterrupted tradition of the school, but it has been a blind tradition. It could not have been otherwise, because when Buddhist philosophy, especially of the Dignāga school, was forgotten, interest in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics which had developed in conflict with the Dignāga school could not be sustained. A drama from which all incidents relating to the counter-hero (*prati-nāyaka*) have been expunged is bound to be insipid. The same has been the fate of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school in its traditional study. The pioneer works of the school were

48 For fuller account of Stcherbatsky's work on Buddhist philosophy, see an article on *Stcherbatsky's Contribution to Indian Philosophy* by the present writer published in the *Modern Review*, Calcutta, Feb. 1953.

49 An important work dealing with the tenets of the Dignāga school is *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* by Dr. Satkari Mukherjee. Late Acharya Narendradeva has made an important contribution by writing a work on Buddhist philosophy in Hindi which includes a chapter on the Dignāga school. Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Dignāga (only one chapter) has been edited by H.R.R. Iyengar, Mysore, 1930. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-vārtika with Manorathanandin's commentary has been edited by Rahula Sankrityayana.

neglected more and more during the Gaṅgeśa period, till in the eighteenth century, as already stated, those works, including even the Sūtras, went underground and were nowhere available.

Although the pioneer works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have now been published, they continue even now to be outside the scope of studies at the orthodox centres like Banaras. The philosophical portions of the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara have also suffered the same fate. In the first place, these works have not been properly edited, and their interpretation, already difficult on account of the break in tradition, is rendered all the more difficult, owing to mistakes occurring on every page of the printed text. Orthodox pandits, though conversant with the philosophical language of these works, cannot make headway in their study owing to complete ignorance of the system of the Dignāga school. There is not a single scholar to be met with in Banaras or elsewhere who can claim to have mastered the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works like *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī* or *Nyāya-kandalī* or the philosophical portions of the works of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school like *Śloka-vārtika* or *Bṛhatī*. There has, therefore, been an uninterrupted tradition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only in the sense that the school continues in the form of dialectics of the Navya-nyāya. But the tradition has been wholly broken so far as the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as developed in the works referred to above, is concerned.

Besides the orthodox pandits, there are those who study the systems of Indian philosophy on modern critical lines. Some good progress has been made so far as other systems of orthodox philosophy are concerned. But the condition of the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, even in this circle, is as deplorable as in the orthodox circle. Lack of acquaintance with the Dignāga school is as noticeable here as among orthodox scholars. Apart from the expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in the histories of Indian philosophy which, being bare outlines of the system, cannot be expected to be critical or deep, there have appeared some treatises exclusively dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. It is not proposed to examine these works here, but a few words regarding their scope and nature are necessary in this context.

The earliest work dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that of Suali,[50] an Italian scholar. That work being in Italian, I am not in a position to assess its value. Another work written in English by a Dutch scholar, Faddegon, is *The Vaiśeṣika System.*[51] He studies the system by comparing the accounts of its various theories as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* and *Nyāya-kandalī.* He has collected a good deal of material from these works, but he does not trace the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, nor does he give a critical exposition of the structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. He has translated some important portions of the *Nyāya-kandalī.* The translation is, however, unintelligible and inaccurate at some places.

Two other works dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by two scholars of the Calcutta University have appeared recently. One of them dealing principally with the epistemology of the school is *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* by Dr. S. C. Chatterjee.[52] The work is not confined to the Nyāya system; it deals with the latest form of the theories which developed in the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. This work, as a lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology, is indeed admirable and supersedes all the previous works on the subject. But the problems have been studied without reference to the Dignāga system. Another work, which seems to have been conceived as complementary to the former, is *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* by Dr. Sadananda Bhaduri.[53] It deals chiefly with the material aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; it does not deal at all with metaphysics proper. So far as the pure metaphysics of the school is concerned, it has been just touched upon only in the last two chapters on *Whole and Part,* and *Causality.* Theories relating to these topics were developed in conflict with the counter-theories of the Dignāga school. The author does make some stray references to Buddhist theories, but when the structure of the Dig-

50 Suali. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (In Italian).

51 Dr. B. Faddegon: The Vaiśeṣika System (Amsterdom 1918).

52 S. C. Chatterjee: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. (Calcutta University, 1939).

53 Sadananda Bhaduri: Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics. (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1947).

nāga system as a whole is not grasped, there occur errors not only in these references to Buddhist theories, but in the understanding of the corresponding theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself. This work is not free from such errors.[54] Of course, it is to be greatly commended as a neat and lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika materialistic theories. Some other works on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system have also appeared. It is not necessary to notice them all.

It would thus be clear that the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system by the modern type of scholars suffers as much from the

54 Dealing with the Buddhist theory that *extendedness* does not belong to atoms, but is only an attribute of the cognition of a large number of atoms (pratibhāsa-dharma), the author, in the first instance, falls into the error of rendering the term pratibhāsa-dharma as 'the characteristic of the presented sense-datum, or sensum', and this leads him to a palpably wrong conclusion that "an extended body, according to the Buddhist, is absolutely independent of a percipient." (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, p. 252.) In the treatise of the Buddhist scholar Paṇḍita Aśoka to which the author refers (SBNT. p. 79), there is nothing to warrant this mistaken notion. The author seems to be under the impression that the term 'pratibhāsa' used by the Buddhist scholar means 'sense-datum or sensum' which is a wrong notion. That term in the context means 'understanding'. The author then proceeds to refute the Buddhist on the assumption that according to him '*extension is an objectively real* quality of an assemblage of atoms.' (Ibid. p. 254.) He indicates (p. 255) by referring to NVT. II. i. 36 (Lazarus edition p. 275) that his refutation of that assumed Buddhist theory is based on Vācaspatimiśra, which is wholly unwarranted. The latter never attributes that wrong view to the Buddhist.

Elsewhere, after himself giving the correct Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that the perception of many trees as *one* forest is false (p. 256), he gives a footnote to the effect that "to guard against a possible misunderstanding it must be stated that the Naiyāyika realist believes that a forest is a distinct entity. According to him, therefore, the perception of unity in a forest is veridical." (p. 256). This is all unwarranted and wrong. Every student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system knows that according to that school a forest is not a 'whole' (avayavin) of the trees, but only an aggregate (samudāya) which is not different from trees, and hence the perception of unity in a forest can never be veridical. Again, with regard to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causality, the author says, "Causality is held to be a categorical and universal feature of reality. There cannot be anything which is real and yet incapable of exercising causal function in some way or other." (p. 271). Now, obviously this is the Buddhist idea, and not that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which holds reality as independent of causality. (See *infra*, V. 10.)

lack of understanding of the Digṅāga system as that of the old orthodox Pandits. There is an additional disadvantage in the case of the former that they are not usually conversant with the abstruse technicality and phraseology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

There is yet another difficulty. The doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika underwent considerable changes at different stages of the development of the system. The modern expositions of the system do not, as a rule, mention the period with which they are concerned. Ordinarily, they may be supposed to present the theories of the school in the latest form of its development, but it appears that in some of these expositions the views accepted at an earlier stage have been confused with those of a later stage without a specific mention of their relative periods; and thus, some of these expositions are a confused hotchpotch of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics of different periods.[55]

14. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORIES MISSED

It has been pointed out that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika studies in both the circles, that of traditional orthodox pandits and that of modern scholars, have been pursued without reference to the

55 The exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school by Dr. Dasgupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy* illustrates this point clearly. He begins his exposition as based on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras and the Nyāya-sūtras, but then he mixes with them the theories that developed at a later period, not realizing that the two belong to two different periods, and they cannot make a coherent whole. Dealing with viśeṣa, he says, "through viśeṣa things are perceived as diverse" (Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy, p. 318).* This is the idea of Vaiśeṣika-sūtras where sāmānya and viśeṣa are regarded as co-relative, i.e., as generality and particularity. (*Infra,* IX. 3.) The author in the same breath proceeds to describe viśeṣa as the cause of differentiation in atoms, which is a later idea; and then in order to reconcile the two, he jumps to a wrong proposition that difference in the sensations of the two objects is "dûe to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves". (Ibid.) Now this is not at all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea. (See *infra,* IX. 4.) Elsewhere in the course of the same exposition he says: 'Dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva)'. (Ibid. p. 312.) But this is the view which developed in the later post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school; it does not belong to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras with which the author is obviously dealing.

Dignāga system. As a result thereof, many important corollaries, which follow directly and necessarily from the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, have not been elaborated in old orthodox treatises nor in modern expositions. These corollaries embody such important conclusions as the multiplicity of material objects occupying the same space, or the evanescence of all organic objects and of most of the inorganic ones.[56] It is proposed to give below some specific examples to show that as a result of the defective study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the full significance and full implications of many of its theories are not grasped, and sometimes they are even misunderstood.

(i) When a piece of cloth is produced from yarn, the latter, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, does not transform itself into cloth as held by the Sāṁkhya, and as usually understood by common sense. The material cause, viz., yarn, continues to exist as yarn side by side with its effect, cloth. Cloth is not produced, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, *out of* the yarn but it is produced *in* the yarn, which retains its own essence intact. The material cause thus does not transfer its essence to its effect. Where does the essence of an effect, which is a newly emerged substance existing side by side with its material cause, come from? This is a problem of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which has been examined in the chapter on causation.[57] The same problem of the essence of an effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*) also arises at the time of its destruction. When a piece of cloth is destroyed as a result of disconnection (*vibhāga*) of its parts, viz., threads, it is destroyed without leaving any residue of its essence. Of course, the yarn which remains after the destruction of cloth is an entity different from the cloth. Where does the essence of a material substance like cloth go? Explaining the remark of Saṁkarācārya that the Vaiśeṣika system is semi-nihilist (*ardha-vaināśika*), Vācaspatimiśra says that it is so because according to that system a substance is destroyed without continuity of its essence in any form, i.e., without leaving any residue (*niranvaya-vināśa*).[58] It would appear that the position

56 *Supra*, I. 8.

57 *Infra*, VII. 2.

58 Keṣāṁcin nityatvam abhyupetya, śeṣāṇāṁ niranvaya-vināśam upayanti tena te'rdha-vaināśikāḥ. Bhāmatī, II. ii. 18.

of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with regard to the theory of causation is midway between the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist theories. According to the former, a material cause is transformed into its effect, the essence of both being identical. The essence-stuff of a material cause persists in its effect, and in the effects of the effect. It never perishes. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that as soon as a unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is born, it is destroyed and followed by another. The preceding unique particular does not transfer its essence to the following one; it is destroyed *in toto*, without leaving any residue, and the next one is born with its own essence, and the series goes on. Inasmuch as the preceding moment (unique particular) does not transfer its essence to the next moment, the Buddhist theory of causation takes the form of 'inter-dependence' (*pratītya-samutpāda*) according to which the only relation between the preceding moment and the following one is that of necessary sequence, i.e., the one being there, the other follows. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as already stated, holds in common with the Buddhist school that a material cause does not transfer its essence to its effect, the chief difference between the two schools is that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cause continues to exist side by side with its effect, and the effect can exist only as residing in its cause. The ultimate material cause in the form of eternal atoms is the *raison d'être* of the series of causes and effects. In that sense the Nyāya-Vaiśesíka theory is nearer that of the Sāṁkhya. But as a cause (and ultimately an atom) according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory does not transfer its own essence to its effect, and as the latter, when destroyed, does not leave any residue of its essence, that theory is akin to the Buddhist theory. When full implications of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory are worked out, it appears nearer to the Buddhist than to the Sāṁkhya. This very important aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation has never been fully brought out.

(ii) Although the theory of the 'whole' (*avayavin*) being different from 'parts' (*avayavas*) is usually mentioned in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika expositions, its intimate relation to the theory of causation of that school (explained in detail in this work elsewhere)[59] is not fully appreciated.

59 *Infra*, VI. 33 and VII. 2-3.

(iii) The Buddhist theory regarding restriction of the sphere of pramāṇas (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) is opposed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which holds the theory of intermixture of pramāṇas (*pramāṇa-samplava*). According to the latter theory the same object can be grasped by any of the *pramāṇas* under different conditions. These theories are usually mentioned in expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, but they can be fully understood only against the background of the basic structure of the metaphysics of the Dignāga system.[60]

(iv) The theory of the validity of determinate perception was maintained, against the Buddhist one, with great tenacity by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers.[61] Its significance for the theory of realism, and the fact that the acceptance of the objective reality of the universal (*sāmānya*) is the basis of the validity of determinate perception, are seldom explained in these expositions.

(v) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that an external object is comprehended by senses only when they come in contact with the object. For instance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the sense of vision actually goes out in the form of a ray to its object, and by reaching and contacting the object, our visual sense comprehends it.[62] The Buddhist refutes this view. There has been a lot of argument on this point between the two schools. The significance of this controversy can only be understood in the context of the theory of realism *versus* idealism, as we shall see.

(vi) The explanation of the psychological phenomenon of recognition, as expounded in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises, and the development of the theory of Transcendental Contact, (called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* in the latter period) can be understood only in the light of the controversy on the theory of evanescence. The process of the development of the theory of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* can actually be seen at work in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises of the period of the conflict with the Dignāga school.[63]

60 *Infra*, XII. 2.

61 See for instance the remarks of Jayanta: Naiyāyikānāṁ ca savikalpa-pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ. NM. Part I. p. 81. See also: Jīvanty amī savikalpaka-prāmāṇya-vādinaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 32.

62 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu-prāpya-prakāśa-kāritva-niyamaḥ.

63 See *infra*, XII. 12.

Instances of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, which developed in conflict with the Dignāga school, and whose significance is missed in the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may be multiplied.

15. THE AIM AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK

It has been made clear in the foregoing pages that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system can be studied and appreciated only in the context of its conflict with the Dignāga system. A picture of the nature of that conflict and the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories as a result thereof is presented in the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Dignāga school, and also in the philosophical parts of the treatises of the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools. After the advent of Gaṅgeśa towards the close of the twelfth century, not only did the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, so far as its metaphysics is concerned, cease to develop further, but even the study of the works of the old masters was given up.

In this situation Stcherbatsky's exposition of the Dignāga system has thrown a most welcome sidelight on the problems of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, and has paved the way for a critical and comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The present work may be regarded as a continuation or a complement of Stcherbatsky's work. His principal concern is the exposition of Buddhist logic and epistemology for which he has utilized not only the works of the Dignāga school, but has freely drawn on the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. The object of the present work is a comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system with the metaphysics of the Dignāga school. All the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works have been thoroughly ransacked for a fuller exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as it developed in conflict with the Dignāga school.

It may be said that the present study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is the first of its kind in the sense that it is a comparative study of that system with that of Dignāga. It is also historical in that it traces the development of some of the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets which chiefly took place in conflict between the two schools. The principal theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, their beginning as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, their initial development as represented chiefly by Praśastapāda, their conflict with the Buddhist epistemology as found

in the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, as well as the works of the Dignāga school, and the form in which those theories finally emerged as a result of that conflict—all these aspects of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system have been presented in a comprehensive form. It is not only a reconstruction of the history of the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, but it also throws a sidelight on the other systems of Indian philosophy, especially on the epistemology of the Dignāga school.

A hundred battles have been fought between Realism and Idealism at different times and in different places, and in divergent contexts, but the conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and the Dignāga school protracted roughly over a period of six hundred years is a unique and fascinating chapter in the history of philosophy. The battle between Realism and Idealism in India was principally fought in the context of three topics (i) the theory of substance which implies the theory of *avayavin* (the 'whole' as different from its parts), (ii) the theory of *sāmānya* (universal) and (iii) epistemology principally based on these two theories. On these topics the thinkers of the two camps practically exhausted all the avenues in which human mind could possibly move. A complete picture of that conflict, besides being a reconstruction of a hidden chapter of Indian philosophy, should make no mean contribution to the theory of realism and epistemology in general.

Chapter II

REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

1. THEORIES REGARDING THE NATURE OF REALITY

The foremost problem of philosophy is to enquire into the nature of reality. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches in philosophy fundamentally opposed to each other which are known as Realism and Idealism. Realism holds that the external world is real and exists in the form in which it is experienced, and that it exists in the same form independently of our experience. Idealism, on the other hand, holds that the external world as such does not exist independently of our knowledge; the objects of our experience are mind-dependent. In between these two doctrines, there are various theories, or rather various approaches to this problem.

Some of the principal theories with regard to the Nature of Reality are stated below:

(i) *Realism.* Realism holds, as already noted, that the mind apprehends an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by the mind. It is not created in any way by the mind, nor is it modified by its act of perceiving. It is common to all perceiving minds. It exists even when it is not perceived. Moreover, the perception of it is direct and immediate, and not through the mediacy of an idea or *sensum* as the

representationist holds. Of the Indian systems of thought, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools, the Sāṁkhya, the Mādhva and the Jaina represent the realistic approach. The Vaibhāṣika is also—although wrongly—supposed to hold this theory.[1] There are, of course, differences in the details of these theories regarding the nature of reality and its perception. For example, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, being a thorough-going realist, holds perception to be absolutely direct, whereas, according to the Sāṁkhya view, it is through the agency of a mental image called *buddhi-vṛtti*. But it may be noted that the Sāṁkhya view has nothing in common with the representationist theory of western philosophy, for it is never suggested in the Sāṁkhya that the mind apprehends only a mental state (*buddhi-vṛtti*), and not the external object.

(ii) *Materialism.* Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that even the subject, the soul, is an *object* of knowledge, yet it emphatically maintains that the soul is not material (*bhautika*), but a non-material eternal substance having knowledge as its quality. Knowledge is not its essence. The soul, in its essential nature, is 'not-knowledge' (*ajñāna*)[2]. Knowledge, however, is a quality of the soul, and not the product of matter. Materialism, on the other hand, asserts that knowledge is as much an attribute of matter, as smell, taste, colour, or touch are. The knower as well as knowledge are therefore both material. According to the materialist, our physical body itself is the knower. The knower is not, as usually held by philosophers, something non-material and different from the body. Karl Marx, one of the latest exponents of the theory of materialism says: "The material, sensuously perceptible world, to which we ourselves belong is the only reality.... Our consciousness and thinking, however, supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of consciousness, but consciousness itself is merely the highest pro-

1 See *infra*, III. 6.

2 Although writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school do not hold soul to be ajñāna, it is really so according to their theory. Their critics like the Vedāntins often refer to the ātman of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception as ajñāna. Cf. Prābhākara-tārkikau...ajñānam ātmeti vadataḥ. Vedānta-sāra, section 19.

duct of matter."[3] In Indian philosophy a similar theory was held by the Cārvāka school, also called the Lokāyata, i.e., based on the view of common people. This doctrine, being advocated by modern scientists and placed on a scientific basis, assumed great importance in the nineteenth century.

(iii) *Representationism.* This is a form of realism which stands midway between realism and idealism and paves the way for subjective idealism. According to this theory, external objects are not apprehended directly and immediately, but through the cognitions of these objects. The objects transfer their forms to their cognitions, and the cognitions, having thus acquired the forms of external objects, become their representatives. We have thus a representative perception of objects, and not a direct one. Hence the theory is called representationism. External objects, not being perceived directly, are only inferred from their cognitions to which they impart their forms. Orthodox Indian writers, in their compendia of philosophical systems, have ascribed this theory to the Buddhist Sautrāntika school.[4] According to that theory, "an object coming in contact with the sense produces a cognition to which the object transfers its form, and it is from this form of the object transferred to the cognition that the existence of that object is inferred."[5] This doctrine is called *nityānumeya-bāhyārtha-vāda,*[6] i.e., the theory which holds that external objects are only inferable. It is also called *sākāra-jñāna-vāda,*[7] i.e., the theory that cognitions have forms; and that it is the forms of cognitions which are directly apprehended in our perception. A cognition is thus both perception (*grāhaka*) and percept (*grāhya*).[8] It may be noted that no school of Indian thought

3 Karl Marx: *Selected Works,* Russian edition, Vol. 1. p. 332, quoted n J. Stalin: Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p. 12.

4 The ascription of this view to the Sautrāntika school does not seem to be warranted by any original Buddhist authority. This point is further discussed in the next chap. III. 10-11.

5 Indriya-sannikṛṣṭasya viṣayasya utpādye jñāne svākāra-samarpakatayā samarpitena cākāreṇa tasyārthasyānumeyatopapatteḥ. SDS. p. 36.

6 Cf. Nityānumeya-bāhyārthavādī jñānaṁ kva dṛṣṭavān. NM. Part I. p. 15.

7 Arthas tu, sākāra-jñāna-vādino na samasty eva. NM. Part I. p. 15. Also, Sākāra-jñāna-vāda-nirākaraṇāt. TB. p. 79.

8 Cf. Ekam eva sākāraṁ jñānaṁ grāhyaṁ grāhakaṁ ca. NM. Part I. p. 15.

except the Sautrāntika (to which the theory is perhaps wrongly ascribed) subscribes to the theory of representationism. Even the Vedānta, according to which immediate apprehension (*aparokṣānubhūti*) is possible only of the self, holds that the perception of an external object is direct and not representative. Of course, perception of an external object, according to the Vedānta theory, may not be direct and immediate in the same way as that of the self.

In western thought Locke is the chief advocate of the theory of representationism. His view may be succinctly stated in his own words:

"Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."[9] And further, "The mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of ideas it has of them".[10]

(iv) *Subjective Idealism.* Representationism as already observed leads inevitably to subjective idealism. Once it is conceded that in our perception of the external world, we are directly concerned only with our ideas, we lose touch with the external world; and its reality is jeopardised. If the form, size, shape and colour, which our common sense attributes to external objects, belong to our ideas or cognitions, as the *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* (the theory that cognitions have forms) holds, then the inference of the existence of external objects from these cognitions would be a far cry. Jayanta points out that for a *sākāra-jñāna-vādin*, it is not possible to prove the existence of external objects. They can neither be perceived nor inferred.[11] Representationism thus necessarily leads to the theory of subjective idealism. Subjective idealism consists in the assertion that there are no other things than thinking beings; that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the ideas of thinking beings. In short, the theory holds that there is no objective world independent of the perceiving mind. *Esse is percipi* is the basic dictum of this school. In order to distin-

9 *Essay*, IV. 1. 2.
10 Ibid. IV. 4. 3.
11 NM. Part I. p. 15.

guish it from objective idealism which we shall presently notice, this theory of idealism is designated as Subjective Idealism. In Indian philosophy it is represented by the Yogācāra school of the Buddhists. In western thought, Berkeley is the chief representative of subjective idealism. The theory known as *dṛṣṭa-sṛṣṭi-vāda,* developed in the post-Śaṁkara Vedānta, is strikingly similar to the idealism of Berkeley.

(v) *Objective Idealism.* Usually the word *idealism* stands for Subjective Idealism which we have just noticed. But sometimes a theory which may be called *Objective Idealism* is also included in the category of idealism. According to this view, the external objects do exist, but they are the expressions of the universal mind. They are not material, but spiritual in their essence. This theory maintains that the universe is the construction or expression of the universal mind. The Upaniṣadic monism according to which *ātman* is the basis of all reality is a kind of objective idealism.

(vi) *Transcendental Idealism.* The common-sense view that our cognitions conform to external objects finds its expression in the theory of representationism which holds, as stated above, that external objects transfer their forms to their cognitions. Now, if the form reflected in cognitions belonged to themselves and not to the objects, there would be no need of those external objects. The result, as already noted, would be full-fledged idealism. It was in this context that Kant brought about a Copernican revolution to which a reference has already been made in the beginning of this work. Instead of assuming that our knowledge conforms to objects, as was done in all philosophical systems before him, Kant reversed the order and declared that the objects themselves conform to our knowledge. It is the knower who gives form to the world of appearance, but the material to which the knower gives form is an external reality, which Kant calls the *thing-in-itself.* According to the Kantian theory, the sense-data are given to us *a posteriori,* and they come from the things-in-themselves, while the forms or categories are a *priori,* i.e., already existing in the mind. Sense-data and forms are both essential factors of our knowledge. "Percepts are blind without concepts; concepts are empty without percepts." Kant

designated his theory as *Transcendental Idealism* because, according to him, the formal element in experience, the categories of thought, are transcendentally ideal, i.e., subjective. The theory is idealistic because the *forms* or moulds in terms of which alone empirical objects are experienced do not belong to *things-in-themselves;* they are subjective. These forms, however, are not derived from experience (as Hume wrongly supposed), because experience itself is not possible without these forms which are not *a posteriori*, but *a priori*, i.e., transcendental. But at the same time the theory is also realistic because the contents of experience, in the last analysis, are derived from *things-in-themselves* which are the ultimate reals. In a sense the theory is the opposite of representationism. According to the latter, the external world gives form to our thought, while according to the former, it is our thought which gives form to the external reality.

As already noted, the epistemology of Kant, in its basic principle, was anticipated in India by Dignāga in the fifth century. One of the greatest discoveries of all times in the domain of epistemology was made when Dignāga declared in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* that there are only two types of comprehensible objects (*prameyas*) — the 'unique particulars' (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which are the ultimate reals (*paramārtha-sat*) and the 'universals' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) which do not exist as external reals, but are only thought-forms which consist of generalization (*sāmānya*). The *sāmānya* is nothing but differentiation of one object from all others (*apoha* or *atad-vyāvṛtti*). The theory of Dignāga, like that of Kant, may be designated as Transcendental Idealism.

(vii) *Dialecticism of the Mādhyamika.* There is yet another line of approach which is radically different from all those mentioned above. It is that of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna. According to this view, the nature of reality, so far as its phenomenal aspect is concerned, is refractory to all treatment, realistic or idealistic, and all the attempts of philosophy in this direction are therefore foredoomed to failure. Nāgārjuna demonstrated that all our basic concepts as those of substance, causality, etc., when closely examined, are found to be inherently contradictory to the principles of our reasoning,

and therefore whatever statement we make with regard to the nature of reality, would be self-contradictory. It is declared in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* that "as soon as the search-light of reasoning is directed to examine the nature of objects, they vanish out of existence",[12] and further "when objects are closely scrutinized by reasoning, their nature cannot be determined and they are therefore indescribable and void in their nature."[13] The object of the Mādhyamika is to show the futility of all philosophical systems in their attempt to determine the nature of reality. This Nāgārjuna does by a logical method, perfected by himself, which may be called dialectical, and hence the approach of the Mādhyamika has been designated here as *dialecticism*. Unfortunately, the approach of the Mādhyamika has not been properly appreciated; it was perhaps misunderstood even in ancient times. He is contemptuously called a *vaitaṇḍika*, i.e., one who without holding any position of his own is concerned only with the refutation of others,[14] and not anxious to arrive at truth. The fact, however, that he advances no theory of his own with regard to the nature of reality is quite consistent with the Mādhyamika position that the world of objective reality is a mere void and all theorising about its nature is futile. Criticism of philosophy is the very essence of the Mādhyamika school. A thinker holding such a view may be as great a votary of truth as any other thinker. The Mādhyamika's is a unique standpoint which has been usually misrepresented, because it has not been studied from the original sources.[15]

These theories are not, however, exclusive of one another.

12 Yathā yathārthāś cintyante viśiryante tathā tathā.

13 Buddhyā vivicyamānānāṁ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate.
Ato nirabhilapyās te niḥsvabhāvāś ca darśitāḥ.

This verse and the previous one (n. 12.) from Laṅkāvatāra are quoted in Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha in course of the exposition of the Mādhyamika doctrine. Laṅkāvatāra is presumably the Mahāyāna-sūtra on which the school of Yogācāra is based. But it appears that Laṅkāvatāra expounded the doctrine of void as well, and the general position accepted in this work is not different from that of the Mādhyamika school.

14 NBh. I. i. 1.

15 Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa by Stcherbatsky may be regarded as the pioneer modern work of this school. Recently, Dr. T. R. V. Murti of the Banaras Hindu University has given a lucid exposition of the Mādhyamika system in his admirable work, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*.

For example, materialism is only a particular form of realism. Further, these standpoints are by no means exhaustive; there are numerous shades of difference even in the schools which have adopted one of the above seven standpoints. All these seven approaches may be grouped under the two main heads of realism and idealism–the first three under the former and the remaining four under the latter.

2. REALISM AND IDEALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Although the theories covered under the terms idealism and realism are as much discussed in Indian philosophy as in the western, there are no exact equivalents in Sanskrit terminology for these two terms which carry the same connotation. As these terms are used for Indian theories, a clarification is necessary. *Bāhyārtha-vāda*, a theory upholding the reality of external objects, would be the exact Sanskrit equivalent for the term *realism*, while *vijñāna-vāda* is the term actually in use for *idealism* or rather for the *subjective idealism* of the Buddhist Yogācāra school. The term *vijñāna-vāda*, however, is not used in a wider sense like the term *idealism*, and does not cover, like the latter, the theory of objective idealism or of transcendental idealism. As for the term *bāhyārtha-vāda*, it is not in vogue at all, although it would be an appropriate designation for a realistic system. A common name designating the theories of the two realist Buddhist schools, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, is *sarvāsti-vāda*,[16] a term denoting a well-known Buddhist sect of which the Vaibhāṣikas were a branch. And for that reason the term *sarvāsti-vāda* cannot be used for an orthodox realistic system like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Neither are the theories of these schools designated as *bāhyārtha-vāda*, although, in their later development, they are principally concerned with the defence of realism against the Buddhists. Even on the Buddhist side, the term *sarvāsti-vāda* does not connote realism in its usual sense.[17]

16 In his Śārīraka-bhāṣya (I. ii. 18), Śaṁkara has used the term sarvāsti-vāda for both the schools as explained in Bhāmatī.

17 Sarvāsti-vāda literally means a theory of the existence of all objects (external as well as internal). Śaṁkara has used this term in that sense, i. e., in the sense of realism. But in reality the word sarvāsti-vāda was used in Buddhist philosophy in quite a different sense.

The question arises why there should be no term in Sanskrit having the same connotation as the term *realism*. The reason seems to be this: all the orthodox philosophical systems, with the exception of the Vedānta, are realistic. Even the Vedānta is realistic from the phenomenal standpoint of reality.[18] If they are all realists, the need for a special term to differentiate them does not arise. In western thought also, in the Greek and the mediaeval period, all the systems were realistic and there was therefore no problem of realism *versus* idealism. It was only since the time of Descartes that this problem came to the fore. Similarly, in ancient Indian thought the existence of the external world was taken for granted by all the systems. The need for proving the reality of the external world did not arise even after the appearance of *vijñāna-vāda*. It became an acute point of controversy only when the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was challenged by Dignāga. In the ancient period the difference between realistic and idealistic schools was, however, demarcated in another way. Usually the realistic theories are pluralistic, while the idealistic ones inevitably incline to monism. The term *advaita-vāda* (monism) is used to differentiate the idealistic Vedānta from the realistic systems which uphold *dvaita-vāda* (pluralism). But here again it may be noted that the term *dvaita-vāda* is specially used for the Mādhva school of the Vedānta in order to emphasize the fact that that school, although a Vedāntist one, is realistic. But surely, all the realist systems, using Indian terminology, may be designated as *dvaita-vādins*. Thus, while in the West they speak of idealism *versus* realism, we in India talk of *advaita-vāda versus dvaita-vāda*. But in accordance with the current western terminology, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine has been designated here as realism.

3. TWO DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE TERM REALISM

The word *realism* has been used in two different senses in western thought. In early Greek and mediaeval philosophy, the term stood for the theory that the universals residing in particulars have their independent reality. This is entirely different from the sense in which the term is at present used, viz.,

18 Vyāvahārikī sattā.

the theory that external objects have their reality independently of our knowledge of them. *Realism* in the sense of a theory upholding independent reality of the universals is contrasted with the theory of *nominalism* or *conceptualism* which holds that the universals have no independent reality, but exist only in the mind as general concepts. For instance, the universal cow-*ness* has no independent external reality, but it is only a mental concept produced by the repeated cognitions of a cow, and brought forth before our mind by the force of the word *cow.* Just as in modern thought the conflict is realism *versus* idealism, so in the Greek or mediaeval period of western philosophy the conflict was realism *versus* nominalism or conceptualism. Realism in the latter sense may not be opposed to idealism. For example, Plato holds that the universals (termed by him as *Ideas*) alone are real, while the particulars are unreal. This theory is realistic in the sense that it is opposed to conceptualism, but in the context of the conflict between realism and idealism, Plato's theory will come under objective idealism.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, strangely enough, the two meanings of realism coincide. The reality of external objects (the current meaning of the theory of realism) is, among other arguments, based on the theory that a universal has an external reality which is different from that of its particulars (i.e., the other meaning of the term realism). Whether a universal has an independent reality or not is one of the principal bones of contention amongst Indian schools, and especially between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists. The latter are conceptualists or nominalists, and hold the view that universals have no external existence and consist only in the exclusion of other objects from the concept of one object, e.g., cow-*ness* means the exclusion of non-cows, i.e., horses, etc., from the cow.[19] Exclusion which is the essence of the universal is a mere thought-construction.[20] The universal being only a thought-form, there can be no question of its being an independent reality.

19 Atad-vyāvṛtti or apoha.

20 Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ.
Kārya-kāraṇatā teṣāṁ nārthaṁ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api.
The verse widely quoted in the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises is attributed by Stcherbatsky to Dignāga. (Buddhist Logic, Vol. II. p. 405. n. 1)

Chapter III

SOME REALIST SCHOOLS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: TWO BROAD DIVISIONS

In order to bring Nyāya realism into its true perspective, it would be proper to make a brief survey of the Indian philosophical systems from the standpoint of their treatment of the problem of reality. Indian philosophical schools, as already pointed out, are not usually grouped as realistic or idealistic. Ancient Indian writers divide the systems of philosophy into two broad groups: the orthodox and the heterodox.[1] The division is based on the fact that the orthodox schools bow to the autho-

[1] Āstika-darśana and Nāstika-darśana. Modern western writers, besides using the terms orthodox and heterodox for these two divisions, designate them as the Brāhmanic and non-Brāhmanic schools, which usage, although widely current, is not quite happy. Firstly, for a student of the history of Sanskrit literature, the term 'Brāhmaṇa' is associated with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda (see n. 2. below) rather than with a caste, and therefore, the term 'Brāhmanic' should mean sacrifice and ritualism treated of in the Brāhmaṇas. But usually the term 'Brāhmanic' refers to caste, and it is further supposed that the orthodox systems originated amongst authors belonging to the first caste (Brāhmaṇa) as distinguished from the Jaina and the Buddhist systems which originated amongst the Kṣatriyas, the second caste, and were, therefore, called non-Brāhmanic. The two

rity of the *Śruti*, i.e., the Vedas,[2] while the latter owe no such allegiance.

The six orthodox systems (*āstika-darśanas*) are well-known. The three heterodox schools (*nāstika-darśanas*)[3] usually noticed are—the Cārvāka, the Jaina and the Buddhist. Of these systems, the Cārvāka is the sole representative of materialism in Indian thought. Hardly any literature on it is extant. Our knowledge of this school is chiefly confined to what is given in philosophical compendia.[4] The Jainas produced copious philosophical literature, and their contribution especially to logic is of no mean order. But by far the most important of the heterodox schools is the Buddhist school.

2. DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE BUDDHIST AND THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS

What is the line of demarcation between these two independent channels of thought? The fact that one owes allegiance to Vedic scriptures and the other does not, is merely an

orthodox schools, known as the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta, however, draw inspiration from the Upaniṣads which represent a revolt against Brāhmaṇas. The Upaniṣads originated chiefly among Kṣatriyas, but they are never, for that reason, regarded as non-Brāhmanic. Secondly, the contrast between Brāhmanic and non-Brāhmanic is un-Indian. The usage is not current in that sense anywhere in our literature. Only the terms 'āstika' and 'nāstika' are used to differentiate the orthodox from the heterodox schools.

2 The word 'Śruti' or 'Veda' stands for the entire revealed scripture, consisting of (i) Saṁhitās, (ii) Brāhmaṇas and (iii) Upaniṣads. Of these, only the last named, viz., the Upaniṣads, are meant when we speak of 'Śruti' as the source of inspiration for orthodox philosophy.

3 The literal meaning of the words 'āstika' and 'nāstika' is : "Those who believe that there exists the next world, and those who believe that it does not." (Pāṇini: Aṣṭādhyāyī, IV. 4. 60.) Ordinarily, one who has faith in the existence of God is called 'āstika' and one who does not have, 'nāstika'. But the old meaning, as given by Pāṇini, refers to the faith in the world beyond which is the fruit of good or bad deeds; in other words, it refers to the faith in the moral order of the universe. (Kāśikā, IV. 4. 60, and also Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya). Taking the terms in this sense, the Buddhists and the Jainas did not regard themselves as nāstikas, although they were dubbed as such by orthodox people. Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, and its commentator Guṇaratna regard the systems of Jainas and of the Buddhists as āstika-darśanas.

4 Recently a new work dealing with the Cārvāka school, named 'Tattvopaplava siṁha' by Bhaṭṭa Jayarāśi has been published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series.

extraneous factor. In fact, just as the orthodox systems drew inspiration from the Upaniṣads, so did the Buddhist schools, from the sermons and dialogues of the Buddha, as preserved in the Buddhist scriptures. Is there any other clear-cut distinction between the two groups based on their doctrinal differences? The hall-mark of all the philosophical discourses of the Upaniṣads is the theory of the soul (*ātma-vāda*). On the other hand, it is just the negation of the soul (*anātma-vāda*) which is the crux of the teaching of the Buddha. The term *ātman* is used by the Buddhists in a wider sense. According to them, there is not only no permanent entity called *soul* in human beings or in other living creatures, but there is no *soul* even in other inanimate external objects, which means that there is no *substance* in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) residing in its parts. Thus the *no-substance* theory (*adravya-vāda*) is implied in the 'no-soul' theory.[5] The no-soul theory is the pivot on which hinge not only all the religious Buddhist theories, but also the later epistemological doctrines of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It is this theory which constitutes the dividing line between the Buddhist schools on the one hand, and the orthodox schools on the other.

3. FOUR BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

Amid the unending and complicated series of philosophical schools, sects and subsects of Buddhism, the orthodox writers have noted four principal systems of the Buddhist philosophy, viz., the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. Is the selection of these four from amongst all the Buddhist schools based on some Buddhist authority[6]? Of the four schools, the first two, viz., the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, belong to the Hīnayāna sect, and they are held to be realists.[7] The other two schools, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, belong to the Mahāyāna. The Yogācāra school, which

5 Sarvam anātmam.

6 Yamakami Sogen says, "The works of the Buddhists, so far as I am aware, know of no such fourfold classification." (*Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 102.)

7 As we would presently see, the Sautrāntika is not in fact a realist, and the realism of the Vaibhāṣika is also of a peculiar type and quite different from the theory of realism as usually conceived.

advocates the theory of subjective idealism, drew inspiration from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, one of the nine Mahāyāna sūtras called *Dharmas.* It was founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.[8] Maitreyanātha,[9] whose works were commented upon by Asaṅga, is said to be one of the pioneers of the school. The Mādhyamika school, which propounded the theory of critical dialecticism, owes its origin to *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā* which is also one of the nine *Dharmas* of the Mahāyāna. The school was founded by Nāgārjuna whose famous disciple Deva was another great exponent of the school.[10]

So far as the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamika* are concerned, their position has been more or less correctly represented in the works of the orthodox writers, and it fairly agrees with the basic works of those schools which have now come to light. The orthodox writers even of a later period seem to be fairly acquainted with the doctrines of these schools. The reason perhaps was that Śaṁkara and the post-Śaṁkara writers of the Vedānta school freely drew upon the theories of these two schools. The position in regard to the first two schools, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, is not, however, equally satisfactory. There is a good deal of confusion about their doctrines as set forth by the orthodox writers.

4. THE VAIBHĀṢIKA SCHOOL

It is now admitted on all hands that the Vaibhāṣikas were a branch of the *Sarvāstivādin* school which is one of the oldest

8 An important work of the Yogācāra school which sets forth the doctrine of the Vijñāna-vāda is Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi. It comprises two small works by Vasubandhu: (i) Viṁśatikā with the author's own commentary and (ii) Triṁśikā with Sthiramati's commentary, edited by Sylvain Levi. Viṁśatikā has been translated into French by Poussin.

9 Maitreya or Pāli Metteyya is the mythical name given to a future incarnation of the Buddha. Hence the existence of a teacher of this name was regarded as doubtful; but now it is generally accepted that an historical person of that name did exist.

10 There are two principal works of the school: Mūla-mādhyamakakārikā (Mādhyamika-sūtra) by Nāgārjuna with the Prasanna-padā commentary of Candrakirti, edited by De La Vallee Poussin, St. Petersberg, 1903. (ii) Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva. Fragments edited by H. P. Shastri; Chapter VII, reconstructed and translated by V. S. Bhattacharya; and Chapters (VIII-XVI) reconstructed and translated by P. L. Vaidya.

schools of the Hīnayāna. Sarvāstivādins seceded from the Theravādins at an early stage, and had their own canon in Sanskrit as distinguished from the Pāli canon of the latter. About 100 A.D., a Buddhist council was held under the patronage of Kaniṣka, which Sarvāstivādins regard as the third Buddhist council, although that claim is disputed by the Theravādins. At this council which was the most important event in the history of the Sarvāstivādin school, commentaries were prepared in Sanskrit under the guidance of Vasumitra on all the three parts, Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin canon. The commentary on Abhidharma was called *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* or *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra*. The original Sanskrit work is lost, but a Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang survives. On *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra* was based the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu, one of the most important works in the whole range of Buddhist literature. This work sums up from the Sarvāstivādin point of view all Buddhist activities in the sphere of philosophy up to the time of Vasubandhu. It is one of the principal source of our information on the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin school. It is said that the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir especially studied the *Vibhāṣās*, i.e., the commentaries on Abhidharma, and therefore they were called Vaibhāṣikas.[11] There is little doubt that the name of the school is associated with the *Vibhāṣās*.

5. THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

The Sautrāntikas, the second of the four Buddhist philosophical schools, were dissenters from the Vaibhāṣikas whom they opposed on the principal doctrine of the Sarvāstivādin, viz., *everything exists*, the implication being that all elements exist. "The emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school derives its name".[12] "The Sautrāntikas denied the rea-

11 E. J. Thomas: *History of the Buddhist Thought*, pp. 175-76. Also note the last stanza of the Abhidharmakośa, p. 235.

Kāśmīra-vaibhāṣika-nītisiddhaḥ
Prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito'bhidharmaḥ.

12 *Central Conception*, p. 42.

lity of the past and the future in the direct sense, they admitted the reality only of the present".[13] There were other points on which they differed from the Vaibhāṣikas, but the difference noted above was fundamental and had a bearing on their epistemological theory. The name of the school Sautrāntika stands in contrast with that of the Vaibhāṣika. The former followed the *Sūtrānta* or the *Sūtra*, the original texts as opposed to the *Vibhāṣās*, the commentaries. The *Sūtrānta* may stand here for either the original Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin school of which *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* was a commentary, or for the *Sūtras* as accepted by the Sarvāstivādin school. The fanciful explanation of the names of the two schools given in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* shows how much removed from Buddhist tradition the orthodox writers were in the fourteenth century and onward.[14]

6. ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKA SCHOOL

The two schools, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, are usually described as realists by the orthodox writers of the later part of the post-Buddhist period. According to these writers, the Vaibhāṣika holds that the external objects are directly perceived, while the Sautrāntika holds that what is directly perceived is only our own idea which acquires the form of the object (*sākāra-jñāna*). Inasmuch as the diversity of forms in our ideas could only be caused by external objects, their existence is inferred from that diversity. In other words, the Vaibhāṣika's view may be called presentationist, and that of the Sautrāntika representationist. This kind of exposition of the

13 *Central Conception*, p. 42.

14 The explanation of the term Vaibhāṣika as given in the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha, (p. 43) is that those who pointed to the conflict in the theories (viruddhā bhāṣā) of the other three schools were called Vaibhāṣikas (seyaṁ viruddhā bhāṣeti varṇayantaḥ Vaibhāṣikākhyayā khyātāḥ. SDS. p. 43). According to the same work, the Sautrāntikas were so called because they enquired about the end of the Sūtra, i. e., the final opinion (anta) in the continuity (sūtra) of the various doctrines, and therefore Lord Buddha declared that they would, for that reason, be called Sautrāntikas (bhavantaś ca sūtrasyāntaṁ pṛṣṭavantaḥ sautrāntikā bhavantu. SDS. p. 43).

theories of the two schools is met with only in the works of the orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period.[15]

Now the question arises: on what Buddhist authority have these views been ascribed to the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika? Does the literature pertaining to these two schools lend any support to it? So far as the Vaibhāṣika is concerned, we have in *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu an authentic source of information with regard to its doctrines. The theory of perception as set forth in that work has been admirably summarised by Prof. Stcherbatsky in these words:

"A moment of colour (*rūpa*), a moment of the sense-of-vision-matter (*cakṣuḥ*), and a moment of pure consciousness (*citta*), arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (*sparśa*) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same laws never appears alone, but always supported by an object (*viṣaya*) and a receptive faculty (*indriya*)".[16]

It is clear that a system whose basic doctrine is the momentariness of objects, and in which the causal theory takes the form of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), cannot have anything like a realistic theory as conceived by the orthodox realist systems. With regard to the realistic position of these two Buddhist schools, Stcherbatsky observes:

"It has, in any case, a position of its own, very far from ordinary realism, resembling perhaps some modern theories which accept the reality of external as well as internal facts and a certain "co-ordination" between them, without the one "grasping" the other. The cinematographic representation of the world and the converting of all the facts of the inner and outer world composing an individual stream of life into a complex play of inter-connected momentary flashes, is anything but realism.[17]

15 This kind of exposition is found—to name only a few—in the following compendia of philosophy and in the works of other systems:—

(i) Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya by Haribhadrasūri.
(ii) Sarva-darśana-śiromaṇi ascribed to one Rāmānujācārya.
(iii) Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha.
(iv) Amalānanda: Vedānta-kalpataru. II. 2. 28.

16 *Central Conception*, p. 55.

17 Ibid. p. 65.

In the theory of perception as we find it in the *Abhidharmakośa*, there is no room for anything like grasping or seizing of an object by the senses, as held in the realistic systems,[18] nor even for the *apprehending* of an object by the intellect. It would appear that the account of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception as given by the orthodox writers is only a half-truth. Assuming that the Vaibhāṣika was a realist, the orthodox writers have ascribed to him a theory of perception which is, more or less, similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

A good deal of confusion is introduced in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* where, in course of the exposition of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception, the well-known definition of perception as given by Dharmakīrti is quoted.[19] Dignāga or Dharmakīrti cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to belong to the Vaibhāṣika school. It appears that the theory of perception of the Dignāga school was supposed by orthodox writers to have been held in common by all Buddhists. Some other orthodox writers also have committed the same error of confusing the theory of Dignāga with that of the Vaibhāṣikas. Guṇaratna, the commentator of Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, seems, however, to be better conversant with the Buddhist schools and their doctrines. He must, for that reason, be regarded as earlier than the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*. Guṇaratna also quotes Dignāga's definition of perception, but he ascribes it to Buddhist thought in general, and not to the Vaibhāṣika. This is, of course, less objectionable and less misleading. The author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, it appears, has not even grasped the sense of Dignāga's theory of perception. The Vaibhāṣika is represented by him as pointing out to the Sautrāntika that, in order to prove its theory that the external objects are not directly perceived but only inferred, the Sautrāntika must admit some external objects as directly perceived even for the purpose of establishing the concomitance required for inference.[20] This, however, cannot lie in the mouth of the Vaibhāṣika if Dignāga's theory of perception be ascribed to him. According to that

18 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu-prāpya-prakāśa-kāritvam, is one of the cardinal dicta of the realistic schools.
19 Kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. NB. p. 1.
20 SDS. p. 43.

theory, external objects as they appear to us, far from being directly perceived, are the creation of our understanding (*kalpanā*). Flagrantly absurd as is the ascription of Dignāga's theory to the Vaibhāṣika, the author of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* is not consistent even in that erroneous ascription. At the conclusion of his chapter on the Buddhist system, he gives an extensive quotation from the *Viveka-vilāsa* of Jinadatta (c. 13th century). In that quotation, the Vaibhāṣika is represented as holding the view that in the act of perception, external objects are accompanied by their cognition.[21] This may either imply a simple presentationist view, viz., that external objects are directly presented in our cognition, or it may suggest the theory of perception according to which the moments of colour and pure consciousness arise simultaneously. The latter, in all probability, seems to be the correct explanation of Jinadatta's words. It also shows that Jinadatta, belonging to an earlier period had a better grasp of the Vaibhāṣika theory. So far as the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* is concerned, it is clear that its author does not understand the meaning of the definition given by Jinadatta which he himself has quoted. His account of the Buddhist systems, particularly of the Vaibhāṣika school, is not only incoherent, but also an inconsistent jumble of various tenets, and it is exactly what is expected of a writer of so late a period as the fourteenth century A.D.

7. GUṆARATNA'S ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKA THEORY

Guṇaratna who shows better acquaintance with Buddhist thought gives a description of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception which is more or less in agreement with the account of the *Abhidharma-kośa*. He says that, according to the Vaibhāsika school (also called Ārya-sammitīya[22]), cognition which is formless and which is produced simultaneously with the object[23] is right knowledge with reference to that object. It is

21 Artho jñānānvito vaibhāṣikeṇa bahu manyate. SDS. p. 46.

22 Ārya-sammitīya associated with Sarvāsti-vāda was a subsect of the Vaibhāṣika school. The Vātsīputrīyas who were known for their belief in some sort of abiding self were a subbranch of the Ārya-sammitīya school. HIL. p. 246, and n. 2. on p. 247.

23 Note that, according to the Buddhist, a cognition is produced not *from* but *along with* the object. The realist schools hold that a cognition

so because cognition is dependent on the same collocation of causes as the object itself.[24] This requires a little explanation. According to the Vaibhāṣika (or the Sarvāstivādin) school, (i) object, (ii) sense and (iii) cognition are three simultaneous moments; and the question naturally arises as to why a particular cognition should refer to the object only, and not to the sense which is equally simultaneous with it. This difficulty is overcome in the *Abhidharma-kośa* by pointing to *sārūpya* between cognition and the object. But one cannot be too strongly warned not to take the word *sārūpya* to mean similarity between the object and the cognition.[25] It means a sort of "'co-ordination' (*sārūpya*), a relation which makes it possible that the complex phenomenon–the resulting cognition–is a cognition of colour and not of the visual sense."[26]

8. JAYANTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKA THEORY

Jayanta, while discussing how a cognition can be the right knowledge of an object, sets forth the Buddhist position thus: Momentary objects sustain worldly existence by producing the continuity of the successive moments as dependent upon the material and accessory causes. In the production of a cognition, the preceding cognition is the material cause, and the preceding object is the accessory cause; and in the production of an object, *vice versa*, the preceding object is the material cause, and the preceding cognition is the accessory cause. Thus, the cognition is produced by a cognition and an object, and the object is, similarly, produced by an object and a cognition. Inasmuch as a cognition is invariably produced by the same causes

is produced from an object which is a permanent entity. The orthodox writers who were in the habit of thinking in that way ascribed, erroneously, the same view to the Buddhist schools also.

24 Nirākāro bodho 'rtha-sahabhāvy-ekasāmagry-adhīnas tatrārthe pramāṇam. Tarkarahasya-dīpikā, a commentary by Guṇaratna on Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, p. 46.

25 The word 'sārūpya' is a crucial word in the history of Buddhist thought. It appears again in the epistemology of Dignāga where it plays an important role. We would refer to it in our detailed examination of the Buddhist theory of perception. (*Infra*, IX. 12.)

26 *Central Conception*, p. 56.

as an object,[27] that cognition constitutes the right knowledge of that object.[28]

This is indeed an ingenious explanation which postulates a simultaneously running double thread of causality to explain the relation of a cognition with its object. This kind of explanation becomes necessary in view of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and dependent origination. Although it seems difficult to point out the Buddhist source of this theory, there is little doubt that Jayanta, careful as he is in setting forth the theories of his opponents, must have taken it from some Buddhist source. It is not quite clear whether this is an alternative theory to, or an amplification of, the *sārūpya* theory of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.[29]

9. MISREPRESENTATION OF THE SCHOOL

It is now obvious that the orthodox writers of the later part of the post-Buddhist period are superficial, confused and even mistaken in their account of the Buddhist systems. The earlier

27 'Avyabhicarato jñānasya', literally means 'of the cognition which is never dissociated from the object'. See text below.

28 Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgiṣu padārtheṣu sahakāry-upādāna-kāraṇāpekṣa-kṣaṇāntara-saṁtati-jananena ca lokayātrām udvahatsu, jñāna-janmani jñānam upādāna-kāraṇam, arthaḥ sahakāri-kāraṇam, artha-janmani cārtha upādāna-kāraṇaṁ, jñānaṁ sahakāri-kāraṇam iti, jñānaṁ ca jñānārtha-janyam arthaś ca artha-jñāna-janyo bhavatīty evam eka-sāmagry-adhīna-tayā tam artham avyabhicarato jñānasya tatra prāmāṇyam iti. NM. Part I. p. 14.

29 The relation of a cognition with the external object has been one of the most refractory problems of the realist schools, ancient and modern, eastern and western. The difficulty is not confined to the Vaibhāṣika school alone. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is confronted with the same problem. According to it, an external object is directly presented in its cognition which in itself is formless (nirākāra). Now, the question arises: how is it that the cognition of a jar refers to the jar, and not to a cloth? Inasmuch as the cognition is formless, and no specific change has been brought about in it by the jar or the cloth, it is equally unrelated to both. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may reply that the cognition in question has been produced by the jar and not by the cloth, and that it refers, therefore, to the former and not to the latter. But the opponent would retort that, so far as production is concerned, the sense of vision has also been equally instrumental in producing the cognition in question, and the cognition should, therefore, refer to the sense as much as to the jar.

orthodox writers, however, exhibit a remarkable insight into the Buddhist theories. It is unfortunate that this fact has not been borne in mind by most of the modern expositors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. There may be some justification for these orthodox writers of the later period for their failure to represent Buddhist thought properly, but there is none for those who live at the present time which may be regarded as a period of the renaissance of Buddhist studies. Yet we find that most of the modern writers on Indian philosophy do not refer to the original Buddhist sources, or even to the earlier writers of the orthodox fold such as Udyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Kumārila and Prabhākara. They pick up their information from the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* and other books of the later period. The mis-representation of the Vaibhāṣika system found in writers of the later post-Buddhist period has almost bodily crept into the works of some of the modern writers on Indian philosophy.[30]

10. ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

It has been stated in the previous chapter[31] that, according to the later orthodox writers, the Sautrāntika holds the theory

30 Following the later orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period, most of these modern writers also mix up the theory of perception of the Dignāga school with that of the Vaibhāṣika. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had nothing to do with the Vaibhāṣika, nor were they full-fledged Sautrāntikas. Prof. Stcherbatsky holds, on the basis of their theory of transcendental idealism, that they belonged to a hybrid school of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras. (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 529.) But the later orthodox writers without grasping the full implications of the idealistic theory of Dignāga regarded them as Vaibhāṣikas. Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, strangely enough, says that Dignāga was either a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika. (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 120.) Making a jumble of different theories on the basis of the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, Prof. Hiriyanna makes an astounding assertion that "the chief exponents of the Vaibhāṣika views were Dignāga and Dharmakīrti". (*Indian Philosophy*, p. 198.) He makes this assertion on the authority of a very late treatise, the Nayana-prasādinī, a commentary on Citsukhī which has referred to Dignāga as 'Vaibhāṣikāṇāṁ sūtra-kṛto Dignāgasya'. (Quoted by Prof. Hiriyanna. Ibid. p. 198. n. 2.) The title 'sūtra-kṛt' may even suggest that Dignāga was the founder of the Vaibhāṣika school! This only shows how totally ignorant the orthodox writers of the later period were of Buddhist doctrines. Still more astounding is the assertion of Prof. Hiriyanna that the Abhidharma-kośa is a great authority on the school of Yogācāra. (Ibid. p. 199.)

31 *Supra*, II. 1. (iii.)

of representationism which postulates that external objects are not directly perceived but are only inferred. Is there any Buddhist authority for it? We know that the Sautrāntika school was closely associated with the Vaibhāṣikas. Yaśomitra, the commentator on the *Abhidharma-kośa* which is a Vaibhāṣika work, was a Sautrāntika. The school, it appears, was a connecting link between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. Unfortunately, the original works of the school are not extant, or, at any rate, not accessible yet. But copious references to the doctrines of the school are scattered throughout Buddhist literature. Prof. Stcherbatsky holds the view that "there is no great disagreement between the Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāsti-vādins) and the Sautrāntikas on the interpretation of the origin of cognition."[32] In a footnote in the same context, he adds that "the information about the Sautrāntika theory of cognition, contained in the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* and similar works (bāhyārthānumeyatva), reposes on a confusion by Brāhmanical authors between Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda, not seldom to be met with."[33] It is, however, not clear how confusion between the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda could lead the Brāhmanic writers to ascribe to the Sautrāntika the view that external objects were not directly perceived but only inferred. Does Stcherbatsky mean that there was a school of Vijñānavāda holding that kind of theory?

11. A PROBABLE EXPLANATION

It is a well-known fact that since his advent, Dignāga held the day in Indian philosophy. The orthodox writers were so much obsessed with his views that one of them, the author of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha,* as already noted, placed Dignāga's theory of perception in the mouth of the Vaibhāṣika;[34] and another made him the author of the aphorisms of the Vaibhāṣika school.[35] This being so, it is no wonder that the orthodox writers ascribed a theory of Dignāga to the Sautrāntika school also. As already pointed out, Dignāga belonged to a sort of composite Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school. According to him, the world of our experience consisting of external objects is not grasped by a

32 *Central Conception,* p. 63.
33 Ibid. p. 63. n. 5.
34 and 35 See *supra,* III. n. 30.

genuine perception. Determinate perception, on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika builds its whole structure of realism,[36] is, according to Dignāga, a pseudo-perception. The objects as presented in it are not as they exist in the external world, they are constructions of our imagination. Yet they are presented as *real* external objects. Of course, since a determinate perception follows in the wake of a sensation which grasps real external objects (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), it may be said to be based on reality. If determinate cognition is not true perception, what else can this cognition be? According to the Dignāga school, whatever is outside the purview of pure sensation, belongs to the sphere of *inference*. But they do not call a determinate perception an inference, but give it the appellation *savikalpaka* (constructed by imagination).

When, however, the term *inference* is taken in a broad sense, all the generalized forms (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), all determinate ideas, all judgments and all discursive thought come under inference. A close observation will reveal that the term *anumāna* (inference) has been used in two different senses by the Dignāga school. Usually, it is used in the narrow sense of the inference of pure logic, as when fire is inferred from smoke. But it is sometimes used in a broad sense, as explained above, when it means all kinds of discursive thought, all judgments, all generalized forms. Stcherbatsky rightly observes: "The originality of Dignāga's system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge, two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology."[37] Further, "Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted with direct cognition by the senses, as indirect cognition or inference. Dignāga's inference thus embraces, besides our inference, all that we would call judgment, intellection, ideation, thought, reason, etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensation."[38] When the term inference is used in that broad sense, the determinate perception (*savikalpaka-*

36 Cf. Jayanta: Naiyāyikānāṁ ca savikalpa-pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ. NM. Part. I. p. 81.

37 and 38 Nirvāṇa, p. 141. n. 1.

pratyakṣa) of the realist is also covered by the term *inference.*[39]

A welcome light on this complicated matter has come from a new source, *Hetubindu-ṭīkā* by Arcaṭa, which has recently been published. In that work, the author refers to an objection raised by Kumārila to the Buddhist theory of *anumāna.* The objection is to the effect that in the act of inference of fire from smoke, the smoke which is the inferential mark (*liṅga*), being of generalized nature (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), is also grasped, according to the Buddhist, by an inference for which another inferential mark (*liṅga*) will be required, and it will lead to a *regress ad infinitum.*[40] Arcaṭa replies to this objection by saying that the Buddhist does not hold that a universal or a generalized reality is grasped through inference alone. Even a determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*) which comes in the wake of a pure sensation apprehends a generalized reality or a universal; and similarly, another kind of *vikalpa* (memory) also grasps a generalized form. What he really holds is that an inference apprehends only a universal or a generalized reality and never a particular. But, *vice versa,* he does not hold that all generalized reality (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is grasped by inference alone.[41] It would appear that the statement of Arcaṭa that all generalized reality is not grasped by inference alone runs counter to the theory of the Dignāga school. Dharmakīrti says that "everything other than the extreme particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is generalization (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) which is comprehended by inference."[42] Devendrabuddhi makes it still more explicit when he says that, "it is *pratyakṣa* alone which comprehends extreme

39 "When a fire is present in the ken and cognized by the sense of vision, for the realist it is a case of sense-perception. When the same fire is beyond the ken and its existence cognized only indirectly, because some smoke is being perceived, fire is cognized by inference. For the Buddhist there is in both cases a part cognized by the senses and a part cognized by inference. The latter term is in this case a synonym of intellect, of a non-sensuous source of knowledge." (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 73.)

40 SV. V. 149-53.

41 Tatra naivam avadhāryate sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayam anumānam eveti, pratyakṣa-pṛṣṭhabhāvino vikalpasyāpi tad-viṣayatvāt tad anyasya ca vikalpasya. Kintu sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayam evānumānam ity avadhāryate svalakṣaṇa-viṣayatva-niṣedhārtham iti. Hetubindu-ṭīkā, p. 23.

42 Anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṁ so'numānasya viṣayaḥ. NB. last portion of chapter I.

particular, and it is inference alone which comprehends generalized reality."[43] Stcherbatsky's statement that all thought is covered under the term inference is in perfect accord with the statements quoted above. If determinate perception could not be regarded as inference, Kumārila, who was fully conversant with Buddhist logic, could not have raised the objection quoted by Arcaṭa. If, however, we take *inference* in a narrow sense of logic, a determinate cognition will not be included in inference, as Arcaṭa maintains.

It is now clear that our empirical world of external objects, which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds as cognized by determinate perception, is, according to Dignāga, constructed by our imagination, and may be said to be cognized by inference taken in a broad sense as explained above. It was, in all probability, in this sense that the Sautrāntika school (to which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were supposed to belong) was regarded as holding the view that external objects were not directly perceived but only inferred (*bāhyārthānumeyatva-vāda*). The later orthodox writers, not realizing the real significance of the term 'inference' (*anumāna*) as understood by the school of Dignāga, interpreted the inference of external objects in the ordinary sense with which they were familiar. They thus made the Sautrāntika theory appear as a simple representationist view, and contrasted it with the presentationism of the Vaibhāṣika.[44]

It may be pointed out that the theory of representationism, which the orthodox writers have ascribed to the Sautrāntika, is in reality quite different from the doctrine of Dignāga which has a close similarity with the transcendental idealism of Kant. In a sense, that theory is just the opposite of representationism. According to the latter, the external objects give form to our thoughts, while, according to the former, it is our thought (intellect or understanding) which gives form to the external world. But the orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period perhaps misunderstood the doctrine of Dignāga. Firstly, they misunderstood it to be a simple theory of representationism,

43 Svalakṣaṇa-viṣayakaṁ pratyakṣam eva, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayakam anumānam eva. Commentary by Devendrabuddhi on Pramāṇa-samuccaya, p. 6.

44 *Supra*, Chap. II. Sect. I (iii).

and, secondly, they wrongly ascribed it to the Sautrāntika school. Whether the original school of the Sautrāntikas held any epistemological doctrine similar to the theory of representationism is difficult to say in the present state of our knowledge.[45]

12. THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ SCHOOL AND REALISM

Although the evidence of speculative thinking by Indians is met with in their earliest literary creation, the Ṛgveda, systematic thinking on metaphysical problems commenced in the age of the Upaniṣads. It has been stated that the systems deriving their inspiration from the Upaniṣads belong to the orthodox fold of Indian philosophy. One of them, which was directly concerned with the Upaniṣadic doctrines and which produced a coherent system of isolated metaphysical doctrines scattered in the Upaniṣads is known as the Vedānta. In fact, the term *Vedānta* which means 'the end of the Veda' is an appellation of the Upaniṣads, because they are the concluding portions of the Veda. Usually, the term *Vedānta* designates the system expounded in the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. The *Brahma-sūtra*, besides systematizing the Upaniṣadic theories, also attempts to reconcile the conflicting passages in the Upaniṣads by construing them in such a way as to form a consistent system of doctrines.

While the Vedānta dealt with the Upaniṣadic theories, there was a sister school called *Mīmāṁsā*, or more precisely, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, founded by Jaimini, which concerned itself with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda. It dealt with sacrifices and rituals, and had nothing to do with philosophy. In the *sūtras* of Jaimini, there is not much philosophical matter. In the commentary of Śabara also the important philosophical polemic is contained only in a long passage which is a quotation from the *Vṛttikāra*. Regular metaphysics makes its appearance in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school only in the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara who belong to the seventh or eighth century. The question is, whether the metaphysics found in these two writers

45 The present writer has discussed this topic at length in a paper on 'The Sautrāntika Theory of Knowledge,' published in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XXXII. 1952.

is incidental, or there is some real relation of the school to metaphysical inquiry.

Of course, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school was directly concerned with sacrificial and ritual matters. In the age of the Brāhmaṇas, sacrifice had been the central point round which grew some of the sciences like Astronomy, Phonetics and Grammar. All these sciences were handmaids of the sacrificial science which could not be indifferent to metaphysics, the science of sciences. There was, in fact, a special reason for its interest in metaphysical inquiry. Ever since the sages of the Upaniṣads had revolted against the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas, there had been going on a conflict between *karma-kāṇḍa* (ritualism) and *jñāna-kāṇḍa* (knowledge). The Upaniṣadic doctrine of monism was steadily tending towards the idea of unreality of the universe. If the world is unreal, where is the scope for sacrifices and enjoyments resulting therefrom in this and the next life? It was, therefore, a sheer necessity for the Mīmāṁsakas to combat the idealism of the Upaniṣads. Implicit faith in the reality of the external world being ingrained in human nature, it would be enough if they formulated a realistic structure of metaphysics which could appeal to the common man.

13. THE VAIŚEṢIKA GREW IN THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ FOLD

Is there any trace of systematizing a realistic metaphysics in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* of Jaimini? Surely none. Of course, there are some rudimentary principles of epistemology (*pramāṇa-vāda*) in the *sūtras* of Jaimini. But that is the *sine qua non* of every philosophical system in India. Of the structure of realistic metaphysics, as distinguished from epistemology, there is not the slightest trace in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-sūtras*. What did, then, the Mīmāṁsakas do to meet the challenge of idealism? A probable explanation seems to be this: by the side of many sciences which were subsidiary to the science of sacrifice, there was formulated within the fold of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, a system of realistic categories. It was at some stage designated as the Vaiśeṣika system. The view that the system of Vaiśeṣika, which has absolutely nothing to do with sacrifice and ritualism, grew within the fold of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school would at first appear to be rather preposterous. But discerning scholars

have already suggested that the Vaiśeṣika represents an early school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. This becomes almost a certainty when we closely examine the first three aphorisms of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. These three aphorisms are typically Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-like in their form and spirit. The literal meaning of the first aphorism is: "Now, therefore, we shall explain *dharma*." The second aphorism defines *dharma*, and the third one lays down: "the authority of the Veda must be upheld because it treats of *dharma*."[46] Praśastapāda in his commentary leaves out altogether the first three aphorisms. It shows that Praśastapāda did not consider them as an integral part of the Vaiśeṣika proper. Even devout orthodox pandits, who are usually not inclined to criticize the writings of old sages, could not help feeling the incongruity of starting with *dharma*, and then treating of the six categories.[47] Bodas thinks that the fourth aphorism[48] which introduces the six Vaiśeṣika categories is a later interpolation.[49] If it be accepted, it will further corroborate that the original *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* must have proceeded in a Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-like manner. But the most important evidence on the point is afforded by the third aphorism of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* just referred to. Śaṁkaramiśra interprets that aphorism to mean that the authority of the Veda must be upheld because (*tad-vacanāt*) it is the word of *tad* (that), i.e., God.[50] Obviously, the pronoun *tad* cannot refer to God. The

46 The first three aphorisms of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra are:
(i) Athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.
(ii) Yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ.
(iii) Tad-vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam.

47 The following stanza is current amongst orthodox pandits:—
Dharmaṁ vyākhyātu-kāmasya ṣaṭ-padārthopavarṇanam,
Himavad-gantukāmasya sāgara-gamanopamam.
It means: "For one who intends to expound *dharma*, the description of the six categories is like the attempt of one who intending to go to the Himālaya directs his steps towards the sea."

48 Dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṁ tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasam. VS. I. i. 4.

49 Bodas: *A Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, a paper originally published in JBBRAS. Vol. XIX, reproduced in his edition of Tarka-saṁgraha, p. xxxvii.

50 Upaskāra, I. i. 3.

word *God* does not occur at all in the context; it can only refer to *dharma* of the second aphorism. Śaṁkaramiśra also realized the absurdity of introducing God, and proposed as an alternative that the pronoun *tad* might also refer to *dharma* which was proximate in the context.[51] He remarks: "The authority of the Veda must be upheld on account of the treatment of *dharma;* a statement which represents some truth (*prāmāṇikam artham*) is necessarily authoritative (*pramāṇa*)."[52] It would appear that Śaṁkaramiśra missed the true import of his second interpretation which is correct. To say that a statement is authoritative because it expresses some truth is mere tautology. The real import of this aphorism is that the authority of the Veda must be upheld because it is the Veda alone which enjoins *dharma* which is capable of being known from the Veda only. No other means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) can operate in the matter of *dharma.* This is clearly the meaning of the aphorism in question. It is rather strange that this meaning did not strike Śaṁkaramiśra. Establishing the authority of the Veda on the basis of its being the source of *dharma* is typically a Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā idea.[53] Praśastapāda says: "Final release is caused by merit (*dharma*) which is learnt from the injunction (*codanā*) of God".[54] He changes a crucial Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā term *codanā* into *īśvara-codanā,* which only shows that the Vaiśeṣika is a Mīmāṁsaka who accepts God also (*Seśvara-Mīmāṁsaka*). The over-bearing influence of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* is clearly discernible in Śrīdhara who takes pains to prove that the validity not only of the Veda but of *śabda-pramāṇa* in general is established independently of any other *pramāṇa.*[55] This is again a purely Mīmāṁsaka idea which should not be countenanced by a writer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. According to the latter, the validity of the Veda is established on rational grounds,[56] or

51 *Ibid.* I. i. 3.

52 Tathā ca dharmasya vacanād pratipādanād āmnāyasya vedasya prāmāṇyam, yad dhi vākyaṁ prāmāṇikam arthaṁ pratipādayati tat pramāṇam eva. Ibid.

53 Cf. Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, I. i. 4-5.

54 Tac ceśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmād eva. PP. p. 7.

55 NK. p. 4. line 16. ff.

56 VS. VI. i. 1.

on the analogy of the science of medicine.[57] This convincing evidence, coupled with the arguments already adduced by scholars,[58] unmistakably proves that the Vaiśeṣika system at first grew within the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā fold as its subsidiary branch.

14. PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ AND NYĀYA

While the connection between the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and the Vaiśeṣika has been noticed, the close association of the Nyāya with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā has not attracted the attention it deserves. If the sacrificial science required a metaphysical system as that of the Vaiśeṣika for its purpose, the need for some sort of logic for supporting its exegetical reasoning would be greater still. Although, so far as Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtra* is concerned, there seems to be no trace in it of any kind of link with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. The term *nyāya*, denoting some kind of reasoning, seems to be a word originally obtaining in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. In the older literature, *nyāya* is the designation of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā as shown by Bühler in two passages of the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* (II.4.8.13 and II.6.14.13).[59] It seems that primarily the rules of exegesis propounded in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school were called *nyāyas*. The term *nyāya*, as applied to popular maxims[60] (e.g., sūcīkaṭāha-nyāya),[61] seems to be used in the sense of the word current in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, rather than in its later meaning, viz., inference or syllogism of logic.

It appears that among the principles of exegesis that were being developed in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, inferential reasoning occupied an important position. Being of a general nature, as distinguished from a particular metaphysical system, the science of inferential reasoning as *illuminator of all sciences*[62] must have developed in other metaphysical schools also

57 NS. II. i. 68.
58 S. N. Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 280 ff.
59 Bühler: *Sacred Laws* (S.B.E.), Part I. Āpastamba, Introduction, p. XXVII.
60 These maxims have been collected by Col. Jacob in his work, Laukika-nyāyāñjali.
61 The maxim of 'the needle and the cauldron' implies that of the two things, a smith makes the needle (smaller and easier one) first.
62 Pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām. (Kauṭilya's Artha-śāstra, p. I. ii.)

side by side with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. At first, it seems, it was known as *ānvīkṣikī* which was also an appellation of philosophy in general.[63] The term *mīmāṁsā* was another appellation of philosophy in general, as we shall presently see. As the science of inferential reasoning developed and became systematized, it branched off from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, as it always happens in the case of subsidiary sciences. It appropriated from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school the appellation of *Nyāya* for itself in place of the term *ānvīkṣikī*. The logicians probably thought that of all the *nyāyas* (as the principles of exegesis were called in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school), inferential reasoning was the *nyāya par excellence*. But the use of the term *nyāya* continued in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school even after its appropriation by the Nyāya school. Many of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā works bear that word in their title.[64] The Nyāya was not a system of pure logic or epistemology dealing with inference and means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya-vāda*) alone; it also had a metaphysics which it mostly borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika. Besides, the adoption of the term *nyāya* from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, and the fact that the Nyāya is allied to the Vaiśeṣika (which, as stated above, originally grew in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā fold), there is a striking resemblance in the conception of the term *nyāya* in the two schools. In the Nyāya school, the word *nyāya* primarily means *anumāna* which is of two kinds: *svārthānumāna* (simple inference for one's own

63 Kauṭilya, for example, in the passage,—Sāṁkhyaṁ Yoga Lokāyataṁ cety ānvīkṣikī" (Arthaśāstra, I. ii.)—uses the term 'ānvīkṣikī' in the sense of general philosophy.

64 E. g., Nyāya-kaṇikā, Nyāya-ratnākara, Nyāya-ratnamālā, Jaiminīya-nyāyamālā, Nyāya-bindu (to be distinguished from the Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti), and Nyāya-sudhā, are some of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā works which bear the word nyāya in their titles. An interesting instance of how even good scholars forget this usage of the term (nyāya) has been pointed out by M. M. Pt. G. N. Kaviraj (*Saraswati Bhavana Studies*, Vol III. p. 102). Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *History of Indian Logic* makes a blundering statement with regard to the first of the works noted above. He says, "Vācaspati's Nyāya-kaṇikā, a work on Logic, is not now available." (p. 134). Nyāya-kaṇikā is, in fact, a Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā work, being a commentary on Vidhi-viveka of Maṇḍanamiśra. Besides, it is not a fact that the work is not available; it was published in the *Pandit* series long before Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa made that remark.

sake) and *parārthānumāna* (full discussion in the form of a syllogism of five constituents). In the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, it means either a simple exegetic rule or an *adhikaraṇa* (full topical discussion) which also consists of five parts (of course quite different from those of the syllogism). In all this, we have an unmistakable evidence of an early connection of the Nyāya with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school.

15. ORTHODOX SYSTEMS DIVIDED IN TWO GROUPS

It has been stated that the orthodox philosophical systems drew inspiration from the Upaniṣads. Of the six orthodox schools, the Vedānta, being directly concerned with the interpretation of Upaniṣadic passages, attempts to systematize the doctrines of the Upaniṣads. The Sāṁkhya and the Yoga, the two sister schools, also drew inspiration from the Upaniṣads. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school was, however, concerned with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda. But what is the connection of the remaining two schools, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya, with the Veda? Like all orthodox systems they also proclaim the supreme authority of the Veda from which they may be expected to have drawn some inspiration. But actually in their fundamental doctrines, they seem to have no connection with the Veda. These two schools seem to have been linked with it only indirectly, i.e., through the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school with which their close connection has just been pointed out. Thus the six orthodox systems may be divided in two groups:-

(i) The Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga which draw inspiration from the Upaniṣads, and

(ii) The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya of which only the first is concerned with the subject matter of the Brāhmaṇas, and the latter two are closely connected with the former.

The Vedānta and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā thus stand at the head of the two groups, and it is indeed interesting to note that in Indian tradition they are regarded as prior and posterior parts of one general system called Mīmāṁsā. Jaimini's Mīmāṁsā system is known as the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, and the Vedānta

as the *Uttara-Mīmāṁsā.*[65] The two schools, which not only have no affinity in their doctrines, but are totally different in their subject matter, are held as if they were two parts of one and the same system. The obvious reason for this common appellation is that while the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā deals with the earlier part (the Brāhmaṇa portion) of the Veda, the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā deals with the later part (the Upaniṣads). The word *mīmāṁsā,* which is derived from the root *man* (to think) and means 'critical thought' or 'close examination', seems to be a more appropriate appellation for philosophy than the term *darśana* derived from the root *dṛś* (to see), which means 'seeing' (directly), i.e., immediate and intuitive knowledge of a seer. *Thinking,* and not *intuition,* is the badge of a philosopher. It would therefore be not unreasonable to suggest that the term *mīmāṁsā* was originally used in the sense of philosophy in general. But as the two systems in question are called the prior and posterior parts of the Mīmāṁsā, they must have been two constituents of what is known as Mīmāṁsā. The first group comprising the Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga which base their doctrines on the Upaniṣads may be styled as the Upaniṣadic group, and the second, negatively non-Upaniṣadic. It would not be quite appropriate to call the latter group Brāhmanic, because the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya have nothing to do with the subject matter of the Brāhmaṇas. From the point of view of idealism *versus* realism, the systems of the two groups are:-

I.	(i)	Vedānta	Idealist.
	(ii)	Sāṁkhya	Realists, but tending to idealism.
	(iii)	Yoga	
II.	(i)	Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā	Realists.
	(ii)	Vaiśeṣika	
	(iii)	Nyāya	

It will thus be seen that while the first group is either idealistic and monistic or tending in that direction, the second group is realistic and pluralistic. The first group is spiritual in outlook

65 It may, however, be noted that when the term mīmāṁsā alone is used, it always stands for the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā of Jaimini.

and metaphysical in method; the second, secular[66] in outlook and scientific in method.[67]

16. MĀDHVA, THE REALIST SCHOOL OF THE VEDĀNTA

Besides the five principal orthodox realist schools – (i) the Sāṁkhya, (ii) the Yoga, (iii) the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, (iv) the Nyāya and (v) the Vaiśeṣika, there is the Mādhva school which, although belonging to the Vedānta, is a staunch realist. In the Vedānta fold, besides the school of Śaṁkara which is usually taken as the principal Vedānta school, there appeared others, viz., (i) the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānuja, (ii) the *Śuddhādvaita* of Vallabha, (iii) the *Dvaitādvaita* of Nimbārka and (iv) the *Dvaita* of Mādhva. As all of them, except Mādhva, maintain monism, they are all, in the last analysis, idealists. Mādhva, however, is a full-fledged realist like the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He does not propound any original metaphysical structure of realism, but mostly borrows the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideology. His scheme of realistic categories is very comprehensive, and is a mixture of the views of other realist schools. The Mādhva school accepts ten categories which are mainly the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories (with slight modifications) to which are added two categories accepted by Prabhākara, viz., *śakti* (power), and *sādṛśya* (similarity). In the enumeration of the first category, the *dravya* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, some of the *padārthas* of the Sāṁkhya school and a few others which are the Mādhva school's own concepts seem to be all mixed up. Mādhva's is a sort of eclectic realism. It lacks originality.

17. REALISM OF SĀṀKHYA

The Sāṁkhya school, as already stated, occupied an intermediate position between the idealist Vedānta and the realist

66 The use of the word *secular* in this context might appear rather queer, because the subject matter of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is sacrifice, and therefore religious; but the word *secular* is used here in contrast with *spiritual*, and not with *religious*.

67 The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā developed a new scientific system of interpretation; the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya also developed two sciences, viz., Ontology and Logic.

schools of the Pūrva-Mimāṁsā group. *Prima facie*, it is realistic and dualistic, for it holds matter (*prakṛti*) to be an ultimate reality by the side of *puruṣa* (pure consciousness). But a close examination of its tenets would reveal that its stand is very near to that of the Vedānta. It has been pointed out that the theory of causation (*kāraṇa-vāda*) occupies a pivot position in Indian philosophy; it is intrinsically related to the basic theory of realism or idealism as it is accepted in a system. According to the Sāṁkhya theory of causation (*pariṇāma-vāda*), an effect is not a new entity. It is already contained in its cause in an unmanifested state, and the production of an effect means merely its manifestation. Since an effect exists in its cause in an unmanifested state even before its appearance, it is said to be ever-existent (*sat*), and hence the Sāṁkhya theory of causation is known as *satkārya-vāda* (the theory of ever-existent effect). The manifestation of an effect is brought about by a change in the cause, and as this change is conceived as a *real change*,[68] the causal theory of the Sāṁkhya is called *pariṇāma-vāda* or *vikāra-vāda*, i.e., the theory of change, transformation or evolution from the cause. In other words, the cause-stuff persists, but a phase different from the previous one arises. The question arises, whether the so-called abiding stuff (*dharmin*) is identical with its phases or not? At this point the Sāṁkhya stumbles. Vyāsa, the commentator of the *Yoga-sūtra*, says that in the changed phase, although the existence becomes different, the substance does not change.[69] Can there be any difference, according to the Sāṁkhya school, between existence and substance? As the Sāṁkhya does not differentiate, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, between *dharma* and *dharmin*,[70] the change in the last analysis, will be unreal or illusory. We would thus easily glide from the *pariṇāma-vāda* of the Sāṁkhya to the *vivarta-vāda* (the theory of unreal causation) of the Vedānta.[71] We shall revert to this topic in our detailed examination of the theory of causation.

68 Satattvato 'nyathā-prathā vikāra ity udīritaḥ. Vedānta-sāra, Sec. 21.

69 Bhāvānyathātvaṁ bhavati na dravyānyathātvam. Vyāsa's commentary on the Yoga-sūtra, III. 13.

70 Dharma-dharmi-bheda.

71 Atattvato 'nyathā-prathā vivarta ity udīritaḥ. Vedānta-sāra, Sec. 21.

Suffice it to say at present that the Sāṁkhya theory of causation in the final analysis runs counter to the theory of realism.

A theory with regard to the nature of *self* held by a system is equally important in connection with the problem of realism *versus* idealism. The self (*puruṣa*) in the Sāṁkhya, is pure consciousness. All cognitions and mental states pertain to *buddhi* (or *mahat-tattva*) which is the first superfine evolute of *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* remains completely unaffected by the changing mental conditions. It is the *buddhi* which is in reality the doer of actions and enjoyer of fruits thereof. The function of the *puruṣa* is to illumine the *buddhi* which being a matter-stuff is by itself unconscious (*jaḍa*). But the function of illumination does not require any activity on the part of the *puruṣa*. It comes about by the very existence of the *puruṣa* who illumines the *buddhi* without himself undergoing the slightest modification or change. The later Sāṁkhya, as represented by the *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra* and its commentary by Vijñāna-bhikṣu, and distinguished from the earlier one (represented by the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*),[72] tends more and more towards the Vedānta. *Puruṣa*, in the later Sāṁkhya, is as immutable and unaffected by phenomenal operations (*saṁsāra*) as the *Brahman* of the Vedānta. The only difference is that according to the Sāṁkhya, there is plurality of *puruṣas*, while Brahman of the Vedānta is one indivisible Being. Now, if all the functions of phenomenal life belong to the *buddhi*, and if they only *seem* to belong to the *puruṣa* on account of illusion, the diversity of individuals can well be accounted for by the plurality of *buddhis*; and the assumption of the plurality of *puruṣas* becomes absolutely unnecessary. The plurality *of puruṣas* being dropped, the position of the Sāṁkhya becomes almost identical with that of the Vedānta. Again, the later Sāṁkhya, following in the footsteps of the Vedānta, holds that the *puruṣa*, being absolutely and eternally pure even in the phenomenal state, his bondage is only an illusion. It is held that the *puruṣa* in reality is eternally pure, eternally enlightened,

72 The earliest extant work of the Sāṁkhya school which is quoted by the ancient writers is the Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The Sāṁkhya-sūtra called Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra seems to be as late as the fourteenth century.

and eternally free.[73] *Prakṛti*, which is the cause of the bondage of *puruṣa*, can cause only a *seeming* bondage which being unreal is no bondage. It would thus appear that the realism of the Sāṁkhya school is only half-hearted.

18. CONTRIBUTION OF THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ TO REALISM

As already stated, it was comparatively late in the history of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school that Kumārila and Prabhākara emerged as champions of realism. It is noteworthy in this connection that they defend realism only against the Buddhist, and not against the idealism of the Vedānta. The reason perhaps was that from the phenomenal standpoint,[74] the Vedānta itself was realistic, its idealism being confined only to its ultimate standpoint.[75] The defence of realism against the Buddhist school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who had attacked the basic logic and epistemology of realism, was a crying need of the Realist camp. Kumārila and Prabhākara, as defenders of realism, are second to none in the history of Indian philosophy. In certain aspects, at any rate, their realism appears to be more radical than even that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.[76] But it will have to be admitted that the structure of realism on the basis of realistic categories was built by the Vaiśeṣika school, and the same realistic structure was adopted with some modifications by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and other realist schools. Both the schools of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā accept the first four categories (i.e., *dravya, guṇa, karma* and *sāmānya*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The fifth category, *viśeṣa*, has been discarded by both of them. *Samavāya* (under the name *para-tantratā*) is accepted only by Prabhākara, but in his view it is not one and ubiquitous reality as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The seventh category, viz., *abhāva*, was accepted by Kumārila, but not by Prabhākara. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is principally concerned with the interpretation of the passages of the Brāhmaṇas and sacrificial pro-

73 Na nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvasya tad-yogas tad-yogād ṛte. Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra, I. 19.

74 Vyāvahārikī dṛṣṭi.

75 Pāramārthikī dṛṣṭi.

76 Cf. Kumārila's theory of 'jñātatā' or Prabhākara's theory of error. For full discussion on their implication on realism, see *infra* XII. 13-14.

cedure. The categories or even the epistemological theories of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, which occupy such a significant position in the history of realism, have not been mentioned at all in popular manuals of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, such as the *Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa* or *Artha-saṁgraha*. As far as the categories are concerned, they do not find a systematic place even in such authoritative treatises of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, as *Śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila and *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara. Their views regarding the categories are to be culled from scattered statements in their works. Strangely enough, they have been found in a systematic form in a later compendium of philosophy, *Sarva-siddhānta-sāra-saṁgraha*,[77] wrongly ascribed to Śaṁkarācārya. Dr. Ganganath Jha, on the basis of a reference in *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*,[78] has suggested that there might have been a chapter in that work entitled *Prameya-pārāyaṇa* containing a discussion on the categories, like the chapter on *pramāṇas* with the title *Pramāṇa-pārāyaṇa*.[79] But this chapter, even if it ever existed, has been irretrievably lost. We therefore conclude that a structure of realistic categories was no serious concern of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*. It was borrowed in that system from the Vaiśeṣika.

19. REALISM BASED ON DHARMA-DHARMI-BHEDA

It has been stated that the basic point in the formulation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories is a clear-cut and sharp differentiation between properties and the substance in which they inhere. The substance and its properties are held to be two distinct and different entities with separate essences and separate sets of causes. Properties are subordinate to the substance only in the sense that the former are always found only as inhering in a substance. They cannot exist without the substratum of a substance; but despite this dependence, the properties are entities different from the substance *in essence*. Thus, the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is the theory of *dharma-dharmi-bheda*, i.e., the differentiation *in essence* between the substrata and their properties. In Indian philosophy, there are certain characteristic theories which fundamentally differ-

77 Edited by Raṅgācārya, published from Madras, 1909.
78 Prakaraṇa-pañcikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p. 110.
79 Dr. G. N. Jha: The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, p. 88.

entiate a system or a group of systems from others. Theories of causation and of the nature of the self, as already noted, are such characteristic theories; but the fundamental one on which the theories of causation and self, and, in fact, the whole structure of a system rests, is the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*, (the substance and its properties) as accepted in a system.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains *difference between dharma and dharmin.* It is the corner-stone of its structure. This basic conception once accepted, all the theories of the school follow as its natural corollaries. The dualism of *dharma and dharmin* is the dividing line between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* on the one hand, and all the idealistic schools, the Vedānta, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika on the other. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are two entities, *dharma* and *dharmin*, which are different in essence, the Vedānta refuses to accept them as two different entities. According to the Vedānta, only *dharmin* (substratum of attributes), which is *Brahman*, exists; all its attributes (*dharmas*) in the form of manifold phenomenal world (*prapañca*) are unreal. Thus only *dharmin* (substratum) exists, *dharmas* do not. Hence it is that the theory of causation held by the Vedānta school is called the theory of unreal causation (*vivarta-vāda*). The effects that emerge as the attributes (*dharmas*) of the *dharmin* (*Brahman*) are unreal. The Buddhist position, as held by the Dignāga school, is just the opposite. Only *dharmas*—the discrete moments (unique particulars)[80]—exist. *Dharmin* is only a mental construction and is unreal. As without substratum (*dharmin*), there can be no connection between these discrete bits of reality, called *dharmas*, and as without connection—causal connection—there can be no theory of causation at all, the Buddhist actually discards that theory, and replaces it by the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*),[81] which means that there

80 They are actually called 'dharmas' in the Buddhist philosophy. 'Dharma,' in fact, is the central conception of Buddhist thought. (*Central Conception*, Chap. I.)

81 The theory of causation takes the form of pratītya-samutpāda in Buddhism. It is regarded as one of 'the most precious jewels' of Buddhist philosophy. Its meaning developed with the growth of the Buddhist thought. For four meanings of this term, see *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1. pp. 134, ff,

being one thing, the next one follows, but the previous moment is not the cause (in the usual sense of the term) of the subsequent moment. The Vedānta and the Buddhist agree in holding that there is only one thing—*dharmin* according to the former, and *dharmas* according to the latter. They both are opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that the *dharmin* and the *dharmas* are two entities which are different *in essence.*

The position of the Sāṁkhya is midway between the two. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Sāṁkhya holds that there are two things, *dharmin* and *dharmas,* both of which are real. But unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya declares that *dharmas* are only different states or phases of the *dharmin,* their essence being identical. *Dharmas* change, but the *dharmin* is a sort of abiding stuff running through all the different phases.[82] It would appear that according to the Sāṁkhya, the *dharmas* and the *dharmin* are two aspects, though different, yet not different *in essence;* they are identical. From this follows the Sāṁkhya doctrine of causation, called *pariṇāma-vāda* (causation through change) or *satkārya-vāda* (causation of the effect already existent). One cannot, however, fail to note the contradiction involved in the theory that the *dharmin* and the *dharmas* are two *different* things (aspects) and yet they are *identical.* Therein lies the weakness of the Sāṁkhya position. It was pointed out that the Sāṁkhya theory of *pariṇāma-vāda* (causation through change) glides inevitably into the Vedānta theory of *vivarta-vāda* (unreal causation), and consequently, the Sāṁkhya realism leads to the idealism of the Vedānta.

It will thus be seen that the theory of causation of a system is based on the relation conceived in that system between *dharma* and *dharmin,* which is a pivotal concept of the schools of Indian philosophy. The position of different systems in regard to the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* may be summarized thus:

I. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: *dharmin* and *dharmas* are two entities different *in essence* from each other.

II. The Sāṁkhya school: *dharmas* are the changing phases of *dharmin,* though different, yet identical.

82 Dharmi-svarūpa-mātro hi dharmo, dharmi-vikriyaivaiṣā dharma-dvārā prapañcyata iti. Vyāsa's commentary on the Yogā-sūtra, III. 13.

III. The Vedānta school: only *dharmin* (which is *Brahman* and only one) exists; *dharmas* are merely unreal superimpositions on the *dharmin*.

IV. The Buddhist school: only *dharmas*, which are point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) and unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) exist. The *dharmin* is unreal—a mere mental construction.

Chapter IV

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA LITERATURE

1. PAUCITY OF CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

It is neither feasible nor necessary for our present purpose to attempt a full history or to discuss and formulate a definite chronological theory of the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Scholars like Jacobi,[1] Bodas,[2] Suali,[3] Stcherbatsky,[4] Faddegon,[5] H. Ui,[6] Keith,[7] S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa,[8] G. N. Kavi-

1 Jacobi: (i) Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brāhmaṇas, JAOS. 1911. (ii) *Indische Logik* (German). (iii) A contribution towards the *Early History of Indian Philosophy*, translated from original German in the *Indian Antiquary*, April, 1918.

2 Bodas: *A Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, JBBRAS. Vol. XIX. reproduced in the introduction of Tarka-saṁgraha edited by the same author.

3 Suali: *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Italian).

4 Stcherbatsky: (i) *Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists* (Russian), 1909.

5 Faddegon: The Vaiśeṣika System, 1918.

6 H. Ui: The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-śāstra with Chinese Text, Introduction, Translation and Notes, 1917, Tokyo.

7 Keith: *Indian Logic and Atomism*, 1921.

8 S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa: *A History of Indian Logic*, 1921.

rāja[9] and Randle[10] have already done pioneer work in this field.

In a work which deals with the development of the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, a brief survey of the literature of that school is, however, necessary in order to make it self-contained. Besides incorporating the results of the researches of scholars referred to above, this survey gives additional material which has since become available.

So far as the authors of the early period, especially of the *sūtras*, are concerned, all speculation about their time is mere conjecture. Fortunately, much chronological data have come to light in recent years regarding the authors of the second period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school beginning with Uddyotakara. About a hundred years ago, nothing was definitely known regarding these authors.[11] Even now most of the studies on the history of the school are concerned with mere bibliographical notes rather than with the development of thought. A fuller and more definite treatment of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school would be possible only when some definite chronological land-marks are established in a comprehensive view of the development of Indian philosophy as a whole. For our present purpose, it should suffice to give in a chronological order a brief survey of the extant literature of both the schools, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. With regard to the chronology, especially of the earlier period, it must frankly be admitted that all the dates, being tentative, are likely to be altered in the light of fresh evidence.

2. THE RELATIVE AGE OF THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS AND THE SŪTRAS

It should be borne in mind that the beginning of a philosophical school is quite different from its systematic exposition in

9 G. N. Kavirāja: History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature, Saraswati Bhavana Studies, Vols. III. IV. V. and VII. This is decidedly the most important work on the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Published in 1924, it is based on the study of some 1500 manuscripts in original, and presents all material on the subject available up to the date of its publication.

10 Randle: *Indian Logic in the Early Schools,* (1930).

11 This can be well illustrated by the fact that Fitzedward Hall in his Index to *Bibliography of the Hindu Philosophical Systems* (1859), identifies

the form of the *sūtras*. Hundreds of years may intervene between the two. The *sūtras*, far from being the starting point of a school as held by Indian tradition, are rather the conclusion of a long period of speculation. There is also a possibility that the earlier exposition of a school might have been superseded by a later one. So far as the Buddhist philosophical schools are concerned, we have now fairly definite ideas with regard to their dates. In fact, they have given us a clue to the dates of the works of the orthodox schools also.

Of the six orthodox systems, the Sāṁkhya as a school is generally accepted to be the earliest, but the *sūtras* of the school, called *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtras*, are decidedly the latest of all the philosophical *sūtras*, being probably as late as the fourteenth century. The earliest extant work of the school, *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, belonging probably to the third or fourth century A.D., is also relatively of a later date compared with the *sūtras* of other schools. Yoga as a school of mystical practices is very old, and definitely pre-Buddhistic. It seems to be earlier than any of the philosophical schools except perhaps the Sāṁkhya. But the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali are the latest of all the philosophical *sūtras* (except the *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtras*) as conclusively proved by Jacobi.[12] So far as the *sūtras*, as distinguished from the schools, are concerned, the *Brahma-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa and the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* of Jaimini seem to be the earliest. Containing cross references to each other, the two *sūtras*, in all probability, are contemporaneous. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā as a school may, however, be earlier than the Vedānta school. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, inasmuch as they seem to have borrowed terms such as *avidyā, liṅga, pratyag-ātman*, etc., from the *Brahma-sūtras*, may be later than the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras*.[13] But the Vaiśeṣika as a school, as we shall

Uddyotakara with Udayana whose age is separated from the former by about 300 years. (See Randle, p. 1.)

12 Jacobi: Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of Brāhmaṇas, JAOS. 1911.

13 Bodas: p. xxvii.

It is a great pity that a scholar like S. N. Dasgupta should have misunderstood Bodas and stated, "Bodas points out that Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras make allusions to the Vaiśeṣika doctrines and not to Nyāya. On this ground he (Bodas) thinks that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras were written before

presently see, is earlier than the two schools represented by the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras*. As for the Nyāya, it is posterior not only as a school to the Vaiśeṣika school, but the *Nyāya-sūtras* also are later than the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Thus, the chronological order of the philosophical schools and the *sūtras* stands as given below:

The Philosophical Schools

(i) Sāṁkhya
(ii) Yoga
(iii) Vaiśeṣika
(iv) Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā
(v) Vedānta
(vi) Nyāya

The Philosophical Sūtras

(i) Mīmāṁsā-sūtras } probably contemporary.
(ii) Brahma-sūtras }
(iii) Vaiśeṣika-sūtras
(iv) Nyāya-sūtras
(v) Yoga-sūtras
(vi) Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtras

3. EARLY AGE OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA AS A SCHOOL

In the Chinese collection of the Buddhist *Tri-piṭaka*, only two works of the orthodox systems of philosophy are included. One is the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the other is a Vaiśeṣika treatise, *Daśapadārtha-śāstra*.[14] Although none of these works is of a very early date, the fact of their inclusion indicates that the two schools represented by these works, viz.,

Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sūtras, whereas the Nyāya-sūtras were written later." (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 279). Bodas does hold that the Vaiśeṣika doctrines are noticed in Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sūtras, and on that ground he concludes that some Vaiśeṣika doctrines at least were promulgated before the composition of the Brahma-sūtras. But Bodas never says that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras were composed before the Brahma-sūtras. On the contrary, Bodas has taken pains to prove that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are posterior to the Brahma-sūtras. Obviously, Prof. Dasgupta was confused between the Vaiśeṣika doctrines and the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.

41 See chap. IV. n. 6.

the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, were held in great esteem by the Buddhists, and that they were, in all probability, pre-Buddhistic. Some of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, more notably the theory of the non-existence of an effect before its production (*asatkārya-vāda*), appear to be pre-Buddhistic. The latter might have suggested the Buddhist theory of 'dependent origination' (*pratītya-samutpāda*) which is, in a way, only a fuller and more rational corollary of the former.[15] It is also noteworthy that the Vaiśeṣika, like the Buddhists, accepts only two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, and it seems to be less orthodox and more rational than its ally, the Nyāya school.

Buddhist tradition itself regards the Vaiśeṣika school as very old. Ci-tsān's commentary on the *Śata-śāstra* of Deva states in reference to the Vaiśeṣika: (The founder's name) Ulūka means an 'owl'. The time when he lived was 800 years before the Buddha. By day he composed a work, and by night he wandered about for alms.... The *sūtra* composed by him is called the *Vaiśeṣika* (*sūtra*) and consists of 100,000 *ślokas*".[16] The earliest reference to the Vaiśeṣika school in Buddhist literature is met with in the *Milinda-pañha* where the king Milinda (Menander of Bactria, c. 150 B.C.) is said to have been versed in Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nīti and Vaiśeṣika.[17] The date of *Milinda-pañha* cannot be later than 100 A.D.[18] The next reference to the Vaiśeṣika school as maintaining five kinds of actions, ('throwing upwards', etc.,) is made in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* which was composed at the Buddhist council held under the patronage of Kaniṣka.[19]

Jaina tradition as preserved in *Āvaśyaka* (or *Āvassaya*), the second of the four *Mūla-sūtras* of Jainas, attributes certain theories to Rohagutta, which, as given there, are more or less the same as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*.[20] Rohagutta was the teacher of the sixth schism of Jainism, who lived 544 years after Vardhamāna. To credit him with the origination of the Vaiśe-

15 *Infra*, VII. 12.
16 H. Ui, p. 3.
17 Randle, p. 12.
18 Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 175.
19 H. Ui, p. 38-39.
20 ILA. p. 14, and H. Ui, p. 35.

ṣika theories suggests that these theories must have been time-honoured. Further, in the *Kalpanā-maṇḍitikā* of Kumāralāta which work under the name of *Sūtrālaṅkāra* was wrongly ascribed by Chinese scholars to Aśvaghoṣa, a story is related of a discussion between a Buddhist and a follower of the Vaiśeṣika. In that story the Buddhist compares the Buddha to the sun, and the Vaiśeṣika to an owl, the comparison obviously suggested by the word *Ulūka*, the name of the originator of the system.[21] Nāgārajuna whose doctrine of *Śūnya-vāda* is refuted in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and who, for that reason, must be earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, has referred to the Vaiśeṣika along with the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga in his *Daśabhūmi-vibhāṣā-śāstra*.[22] Much cannot be made out of a reference to the Vaiśeṣika doctrines in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* of Caraka who lived at the time of Kaniṣka. The *Caraka-saṁhitā* underwent, at a later stage, a redaction at the hands of Dṛḍhabala, and therefore the reference to the Vaiśeṣika doctrines might be a later accretion.

The fact that Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* includes under *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy), only the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga and the Lokāyata systems,[23] has been adduced by Jacobi to show that the Vaiśeṣika or the Nyāya as a school is later than 300 B.C., the date of the *Artha-śāstra*.[24] But as the date of the *Artha-śāstra* itself is doubtful, and many authorities hold it to be much later, exclusion of the Vaiśeṣika in that work must be due to other reasons. We have thus ample evidence to prove the antiquity of the Vaiśeṣika as a school.

4. THE ORIGIN OF THE NYĀYA SCHOOL

It has been stated that amongst the principles of exegesis that were developed in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, inferential reasoning occupied an important place,[25] and being of a general character, it must have developed as the principal part of

21 H. Ui, p. 41. Of course, Ui labouring under the usual error has named the work under reference as Sūtrālaṅkāra of Aśvaghoṣa.

22 Ibid. p. 46.

23 Sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyatañ cety ānvīkṣikī. Artha-śāstra, I. 2.

24 Jacobi: A contribution towards *The Early History of Indian Philosophy*, translated from original German in the Indian Antiquary, April, 1918, p. 109.

25 *Supra*, III. 14.

pramāṇa-vāda (theory of knowledge) in other metaphysical schools also. Every philosophical school in India has its own theory of knowledge. The chief ingredient of the Nyāya school, viz., inferential reasoning, was at first designated as *ānvīkṣikī*. As the science of reasoning developed and was systematized in a separate school of metaphysics, it appropriated the term *nyāya* from the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* school where this term was in use for general exegetical rules. Some sort of metaphysics and a theory of *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*) was the *sine qua non* of every philosophical school in India. The metaphysical structure of the Nyāya school was adopted from the allied school of the Vaiśeṣika, and there arose a full-fledged school of Nyāya having a separate individual entity. There is hardly any doubt that the Nyāya as a school is posterior to the Vaiśeṣika school.

Much confusion with regard to the origin of the Nyāya school has centred chiefly round the word *ānvīkṣikī*, and it has led to many unwarranted conjectures. Jacobi holds that according to Kauṭilya, *ānvīkṣikī* means philosophy, and the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical demonstration.[26] He says, "All the later writers are agreed, *as opposed to Kauṭilya* (italics mine), viz., in demanding that the *ānvīkṣikī* is at the same time *ātma-vidyā*."[27] He further remarks, "The author of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* requires of the *ānvīkṣikī* that it should not be merely an *ātma-vidyā*; but should have subject-matter peculiar to itself. Nevertheless he (author of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*) claims...... that the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only the *ānvīkṣikī* but also *adhyātma-vidyā*.... The idea obviously is that only that philosophy which at the same time is *ātma-vidyā* has a claim for recognition."[28] Jacobi has further shown that according to *Manu-smṛti* and *Kāmandakī-nīti-sāra*, *ātma-vidyā* was an essential part of the *ānvīkṣikī*, while it was not so at the time of Kauṭilya.[29] Thus, according to Jacobi, the sense of the term *ānvīkṣikī* underwent a change after the time of Kauṭilya, viz., 300 B.C. Prof. Dasgupta refers to the views of Jacobi,

26 Jacobi: A contribution towards the *Early History of Indian Philosophy*, Indian Antiquary, April, 1918. p. 102.

27 Ibid. p. 107.

28 Ibid. pp. 107-108.

29 Ibid. pp. 108-109.

and, after criticizing him on some points, remarks: "I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact, Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a *pṛthak-prasthāna* (separate branch)."[30] He further says, "Probably even in Kauṭilya's time, Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as *adhyātma-vidyā* and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. . . . it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention."[31]

The view expressed by Jacobi seems to be unwarranted, and Prof. Dasgupta has made confusion worse confounded. What is there to show that in Kauṭilya's time *ānvīkṣikī* did not include *ātma-vidyā*? Jacobi admits that *ānvīkṣikī* in the quotation from Kauṭilya means philosophy. And philosophy always includes *ātma-vidyā* (metaphysics). There is nothing to prove that in Kauṭilya's time *ānvīkṣikī* did not include *ātma-vidyā* which it did at a later period. If the word *ānvīkṣikī* underwent any change at all in its meaning, it was rather in the opposite direction. Far from the sense of *ātma-vidyā* being added to its connotation at a later stage, it was rather the sense of logical reasoning which came to be more and more emphasized in course of time. The word *ānvīkṣikī* continued to mean philosophy in general, but emphasis was laid on the other sense of the word, viz., *science of logic or inferential reasoning* which, of course, was always interlinked with philosophy. According to Vātsyāyana, *anvīkṣā* means *inference*, and *ānvīkṣikī*, science of reasoning.[32] Vātsyāyana says, "The categories, doubt, etc., are its peculiar subject matter; if they were not given separately, it (science of reasoning) would be merely *ātma-vidyā* like the Upaniṣads."[33] Emphasis is thus clearly on inferential reasoning of which the categories—doubt, etc.,—are essential constituents.

30 S. N. Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 278.

31 Ibid.

32 Pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumānaṁ sānvīkṣā...tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 39.

33 Tasyāḥ pṛthak-prasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ, teṣāṁ pṛthag-vacanam antareṇādhyātma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syād yathopaniṣadaḥ. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 35.

The statement attributed by Jacobi to Vātsyāyana that the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only *ānvīkṣikī,* but also *adhyātma-vidyā* is wholly unwarranted and even misleading. Jacobi seems to ascribe this statement to Vātsyāyana on account of a remark in his *Bhāṣya* which means a different thing altogether. The remark in question is to the effect that "the nature of real knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) for attaining the ultimate object differs according to the nature of different sciences; but here in *adhyātma-vidyā* (which is more or less a synonym used by Vātsyāyana for *ānvikṣikī*), real knowledge consists in the knowledge of soul, etc., and the ultimate object is the attainment of *mokṣa.*"[34] Uddyotakara explains this remark by pointing out that in the other three sciences, viz., *trayī* (scripture), *vārtā* (agriculture, etc.,) and *daṇḍa-nīti* (politics), real knowledge and ultimate objects are of different kinds, but in *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy), real knowledge is that of the *ātman,* etc., and the ultimate object is the attainment of *mokṣa* (summum bonum). Thus, far from holding that "the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only *ānvīkṣikī* but also adhyātma-vidyā" and differentiating *ātma-vidyā* from *ānvīkṣikī,* Vātsyāyana has actually used the word *ātma-vidyā* as a synonym for *ānvīkṣikī,* and that use is quite correct because both words mean the same thing, viz., philosophy.

If Jacobi has attributed to Vātsyāyana something which he does not say, Prof. Dasgupta has attributed to Jacobi an opinion which he has never expressed. Jacobi does nowhere say that the metaphysical portion of *Nyāya-śāstra* was a later addition. What Jacobi has said is simply this: the conception of *ātma-vidyā* as an essential part of *ānvīkṣikī* was a later development, which is not found in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra.* But Jacobi has never suggested that the metaphysical portion of the *Nyāya-śāstra* was a later addition in the *Nyāya-sūtras.* Prof. Dasgupta's statement that Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a *pṛthak-prasthāna* (separate branch) is again grossly misleading. Vātsyāyana's remark which has already been quoted is to the effect that *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy with special emphasis

34 Tadidaṁ tattva-jñānaṁ niḥśreyasādhigamārthaṁ yathā-vidyaṁ veditavyam, iha tv adhyātma-vidyāyām ātmādi-jñānaṁ tattva-jñānaṁ, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavarga-prāptiḥ. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 65.

on inferential science of logic) has categories, doubt, etc., as its peculiar subject matter. Vātsyāyana has nowhere said that *ānvīkṣikī* is a separate branch of the *Nyāya-śāstra*.[35] On the other hand, he has emphasized that *ānvīkṣikī* and *Nyāya-śāstra* mean one and the same thing.[36] Prof. Dasgupta's statement that in Kauṭilya's time, the Nyāya was composed of two branches, *adhyātma-vidyā* and the science of logic, is based on a gross misunderstanding of the well-known quotation from the *Artha-śāstra* in which three systems of *ānvīkṣikī* are enumerated.[37] Prof. Dasgupta goes to the extent of discovering a reason for this supposed later addition of the metaphysical portion to the Nyāya. It was done, according to him, in order to increase the popularity of the logical part. Such conjectures are not only unwarranted but also erroneous. There is no instance of a metaphysics being added, at a later stage, to a system of science. On the other hand, it is an historical truth that a science usually develops within the fold of metaphysics, and it is only after some time that it extricates itself from the latter and develops as a pure science. It has already been pointed out that the principles of inferential reasoning must have deve-

35 Pṛthak-prasthāna does not mean 'a separate branch' but a 'separate subject matter.'

36 Ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 39.

37 Kauṭilya enumerates four sciences (vidyās): "ānvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītiś ceti vidyāḥ" (Artha-śāstra, I. 2). Thus, according to Kauṭilya, the sciences are: (i) philosophy, (ii) three Vedas, (iii) science dealing with agriculture, etc., and (iv) politics. Then he enumerates the systems which are included in philosophy (ānvīkṣikī) "Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyatañ cety ānvīkṣikī" (Artha-śāstra. I. 2). It means Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata are the systems covered under philosophy (ānvīkṣikī). It is a simple unambiguous statement of four sciences, one of which is ānvīkṣikī, and then of the three systems which are included in the ānvīkṣikī. That such a simple and oft-quoted statement should have been misunderstood by Prof. Dasgupta, is surprising. He interprets the simple sentence, 'Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyatañ cety ānvīkṣikī' to mean that Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Lokāyata and ānvīkṣikī are four systems of philosophy. With this erroneous interpretation in his mind, he goes on to observe, "The fact that Kauṭilya was not satisfied by counting ānvīkṣikī as one of the four vidyās, but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with the Sāṁkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kauṭilya's time Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as adhyātma-vidyā and another as a science of logic or rather of debate." (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 278.)

loped, in the first instance, in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school and probably in other metaphysical schools inasmuch as *pramāṇa-vāda* (a theory of knowledge) was an essential part of all philosophical schools in India. Later on, it was systematized as a separate metaphysical school which was much influenced by the Vaiśeṣika theories. Metaphysics must have been its essential part from the very beginning. Only, it was in the post-Dignāga period, and perhaps under the influence of Dignāga and other Buddhist logicians, that a pure system of logic developed in the orthodox fold.

5. LIAISON BETWEEN THE NYĀYA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA

Although the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika were separate in their origin and in their early development, a link between the two schools seems to have existed from the very beginning, and might have even existed prior to the redaction of their doctrines in the form of *sūtras.* The earliest indication of their alliance is met with in the Mahābhārata, where Nārada is mentioned as proficient in the Nyāya; and although the Vaiśeṣika is not named, the subjects of Nārada's proficiency, besides those of the Nyāya proper, include such topics as unity, plurality, conjunction and inherence which belong to the Vaiśeṣika school. It means that they were regarded as included in the Nyāya.[38] The principles of the Nyāya and the categories of the Vaiśeṣika as given in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* indicate that the two systems were regarded by Caraka as supplementing each other.

There are good many *sūtras* in the Nyāya, especially relating to physical theories, which appear to have been borrowed from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.*[39] On the other hand, there are some *sūtras* in the latter which seem to have been suggested by the

38 Nyāyavid dharma-tattvajñaḥ ṣaḍaṅgavid anuttamaḥ
Aikya-saṁyoga-nānātva-samavāya-viśāradaḥ.

Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, Chap. 5. 3. Quoted in HIL. p. 43.

39 H. Ui has pointed out the following examples where the Nyāya-sūtras are based on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras:

NS. 3.1.36 = VS. 4.1.8.
NS. 2.1.54 = VS. 7.2.20.

Ui gives many other parallel sūtras. See H. Ui, p. 16.

Nyāya-sūtras.[40] The instances of mutual influence should not, however, be taken to suggest that the two *sūtras* are contemporary. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* are definitely anterior to the *Nyāya-sūtras,* which explains the borrowing in the *Nyāya-sūtras* from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Besides, the description of perception and other *pramāṇas* in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras,* when compared with that of the *Nyāya-sūtras,* unmistakably shows that the *Nyāya-sūtras* are later. The explanation of the fact that some of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* are suggested by the *Nyāya-sūtras* is that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* have been, more or less, in a fluid state. Discerning scholars have discovered in them later interpolations. There are some *sūtras* in the Vaiśeṣika which have not been explained by Praśastapāda—a fact which clearly indicates that they did not exist in his time.[41] The fact that some of these interpolated *sūtras* of the Vaiśeṣika were composed under the influence of the *Nyāya-sūtras* indicates the syncretic spirit existing in the two schools. Deva, the successor and disciple of Nāgārjuna, who probably belongs to the close of the second century A.D., has given many Vaiśeṣika theories which he has quoted from the Nyāya-sūtras, of course, without mentioning the latter.[42]

The same spirit of alliance continues and further develops at the time of Vātsyāyana who regards the Vaiśeṣika as an allied system. For instance, he says that the *manas* should be regarded as one of the senses in accordance with the theory of the other system (the Vaiśeṣika).[43] The two schools are technically said to be *samāna-tantra,* i.e., allied systems.[44] Furthermore, Vātsyāyana has approvingly quoted the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school.[45] In Uddyotakara the practice of introducing the Vaiśeṣika ideas and phraseology into the Nyāya seems to have been carried

40 Bodas thinks that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, III. 2. 4. (i. e., Prāṇāpāna-nimeṣa, etc.) is clearly an amplification of the Nyāya-sūtra, I. I. 10 (Icchā-dveṣa-prayatna, etc.). See Bodas, p. xxviii.

41 Bodas. p. xxix.

42 H. Ui, pp. 53-54.

43 Tantrāntara-samācārāc caitat pratyetavyam iti. NBh. I. i. 4. p. 129.

44 Cf. NS. I. i. 29.

45 Asty anyad api dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ prameyam. NBh. I. i. 9. p. 183.

further.[46] In the writings of Vācaspatimiśra, the process of developing the Nyāya position in collaboration with the Vaiśeṣika ideology is in full swing. Indian tradition regards Udayana as the first writer who conceived the idea of formally combining the two schools. The first work, however, in which the two systems are actually amalgamated is *Sapta-padārthī* by Śivāditya who probably belongs to the tenth century. The fact that Śrīdhara, whose work is dated 991 A.D., gives to his Vaiśeṣika work the title of *Nyāya-kandalī* indicates that the two schools were so much allied that the work of one system could bear in its title the name of the other system.[47] It is thus clear that the two schools had a close connection from the beginning. In the course of their development, they came closer and closer till they were amalgamated into a single syncretic system.

6. THREE PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA.

According to Bodas, the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is divided into three periods. The first period is of the *sūtras* in which he includes the work of *Praśastapāda* also; the second, of the commentaries beginning with Vātsyāyana and ending in the thirteenth century; and the third, of the independent treatises and commentaries thereon.[48] Obviously, such a division, based on an external factor like the form of the works and not on the development of the ideas, does not give a correct historical perspective. Moreover, the periods in this division overlap each other—a fact admitted by Bodas himself. For instance, Śaṁkaramiśra's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*

46 Phrases like 'saṁyukta-samavāya' or saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya' used by Udyotakara (NV. I. i. 4. pp. 94-95.) in naming the six kinds of sense-object-contact clearly belong to the Vaiśeṣika system.

47 Bodas advances rather a strange view that in the first period (viz., of the sūtras) the two schools were allied. "In the second period, (viz., of the commentaries), however, they become somewhat antagonistic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of alliance of the Vaiśeṣikas with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems." (Bodas, p. xxl.) Bodas has not elaborated this matter, and there is no evidence of any kind of antagonism between them in the period of commentaries. On the contrary, we notice the spirit of syncretism developing at every stage.

48 Bodas, p. xx ff.

belongs to the fifteenth century which is the period of independent treatises. Independent treatises like Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* or Udayana's *Kusumāñjali* were written during the period of commentaries. Even the work of Praśastapāda, which Bodas assigns to the first period, is an independent treatise. This division of Bodas is, therefore, unscientific and arbitrary.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa divides the history of Indian logic into three periods in a different way.[49] He calls the three periods as ancient, mediaeval and modern schools of logic. But here also the periods overlap each other. Under the ancient school by which he means orthodox logic, he includes treatises which are as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.[50] The mediaeval school in his scheme exclusively stands for the Jaina and the Buddhist logic under which he includes Jaina logicians like Umāsvāti belonging, according to himself, to the first century A.D., and the Buddhist pioneers of logic such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the third or the fourth century A.D. He traces the origin of these two systems of logic even to centuries before Christ. The modern school commencing about the eleventh century covers, on the one hand, manuals (*prakaraṇas*) like *Nyāya-sāra, Tārkika-rakṣā, Nyāya-līlāvatī, Tarka-bhāṣā, Tarka-saṁgraha, Bhāṣā-pariccheda,* etc., and on the other, the Navya-nyāya school founded by Gaṅgeśa. In the first place, naming the schools as ancient, mediaeval and modern is wholly misleading. The Buddhist and the Jaina schools cover more or less the same period as the orthodox schools. Only the beginning of the latter may be traced to a somewhat earlier age. The real objection to this division, however, is that it has no relation to chronology. It also fails to take note of the constant conflict between the orthodox and the Buddhist logic as well as developments of thought in both the schools. The Buddhists and the orthodox scholars did not live in watertight compartments; their ideologies vitally influenced and interacted on each other. It is, therefore, unscientific to divide the history of Indian logic or philosophy crosswise.

The rational division would, however, be to treat the contemporary systems of the orthodox and the Buddhist thought

49 HIL. Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.
50 E. g., Śrīkaṇṭha (before 1409 A.D.); HIL. p. 151.

under the same period. The division should be based not on any extraneous factor but on the development of thought. After the earliest beginnings of logic, the science was systematized by Gotama, and later on, rudimentary treatises of logic were also attempted by the Buddhist writers Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and others, and also by Jaina writers like Umāsvāti. The greatest event after the systematization of logic which revolutionised Indian logic and epistemology was the advent of Dignāga. Since his time, Buddhist logic and epistemology flowed in a radically different channel cut out by him. For a protracted period of six centuries, a battle raged between the two camps, the orthodox and the Buddhist, with unabated tempo. As a result of that conflict, the period in question is the most glorious in the history of Indian philosophy. In the eleventh century, the Buddhists disappeared from India, and their disappearance synchronises with the stagnation and sterility of Indian intellect. The typical creation of the post-Buddhist age is the Navya-nyāya school of Gaṅgeśa. With this picture of the historical development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school before us, the most rational and scientific division of the history of that school would be as given below:

I. The period of origin or the pre-Dignāga period.

II. The period of development or the period of conflict with the Dignāga school.

III. The period of decay or the post-Buddhist period.

In the present work we are chiefly concerned with the second period, the most brilliant one, not only in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school but in that of Indian philosophy in general.

7. THE PRE-DIGNĀGA PERIOD

The first period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school ended in the fifth century A.D., i.e., with the advent of Dignāga. As to its beginning, we can hardly make any conjecture. Only four works of this period have come down to us. In chronological order, they are:

(i) The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda.

(ii) The *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama or Gautama.

(iii) The commentary of Vātsyāyana on the *Nyāya-sūtras.*

(iv) *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* by Praśastapāda, better known by the name of the author himself.

(i) *Kaṇāda.* The dates of the *sūtras* of both the schools cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty. The founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, whom tradition identifies with the author of the *sūtras,* is known as *Kaṇāda, Kaṇabhuj* or *Kaṇabhakṣa* which all mean the same thing, i.e., *the eater of kaṇas.* The word *kaṇa,* according to Śrīdhara, means a grain. The founder was given this name because he was living on grains picked up from the road side.[51] Or more appropriately the word *kaṇa* may mean an atom, and the atom-eater as the nick-name of the founder would suggest his close association with the atomic theory.[52] *Aulūkya* is another name of the Vaiśeṣika system,[53] and, for that reason, according to the tradition preserved in Buddhist writings, the founder's name was *Ulūka* (owl). This name was given to him because "in the day-time he meditated in a dense forest, . . . and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food."[54] Rājaśekhara, a Jaina commentator of the *Nyāya-kandalī,* however, records another tradition which is to the effect that God himself, being pleased with the penances of the founder, appeared before him in the form of an owl and taught him the six categories. Hence the system is called *Aulūkya.*[55] *Aulūkya,* meaning 'son of *Ulūka*', has also been suggested as a name of Kaṇāda himself[56] instead of the system founded by him. Praśastapāda has referred to the founder as *Kāśyapa* which seems to be his family name.[57] Besides this

51 NK. p. 2.

52 Cf. H. Ui, p. 6. n. 1.

53 Amara-kośa gives 'Aulūkya' as a synonym of Vaiśeṣika. Kumārila (Śloka-vārtika, verse, 59 on I. i. 4.) has also used it in that sense. In the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha. 'Aulūkya-darśana' is the title of the chapter on the Vaiśeṣika system.

54 H. Ui, p. 5.

55 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 11. Praśastapāda also tells us that Kaṇāda wrote his system after having propitiated lord Maheśvara (PP. p. 329).

56 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 7.

57 PP. p. 200.

scrappy information, we know nothing of the personal history of the founder of the system.[58]

Vaiśeṣika, the name of the system, has been interpreted in two different ways. According to Chinese tradition, "the origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sāṁkhya." [59] One of the explanations is that the name is derived from the fifth category *viśeṣa* on which the conception of the atomic theory, one of the cardinal doctrines of the system, is based. A more probable explanation is that the name of the system is derived from *viśeṣa* used in the sense of *particularity*.[60]

(ii) *Gotama or Gautama.* He is the celebrated founder of the Nyāya school. He is also known as Akṣapāda or Akṣacaraṇa, both meaning 'having eyes on his feet'.[61] It has already been noted that the science of inferential reasoning, under the name of *ānvīkṣikī*, developed as a part of metaphysics which was also

58 Pandit V. P. Dvivedi in his Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī (p. 10) quotes the Vāyu-purāṇa, pūrva-khaṇḍa (Chap. XXIII. 202-203) in which the god Maheśvara says to Brahmā that in the 27th cycle of caturyugas, he would be incarnated at Prabhāsakṣetra (near Dvārakā) as a Brāhmaṇa, named Somaśarmā, to whom four sons—Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka and Vatsa—would be born. Obviously, this is a myth in which the two founders of the two allied systems have been bracketed together. The only useful hint suggested by this myth is that at the time of its author, Ulūka was supposed to be one of the pioneers of the Vaiśeṣika, and he was believed to be different from Kaṇāda. This confirms the Buddhist tradition referred to above. It is a pity that a scholar like Prof. Dasgupta should have based his account of Kaṇāda (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 306) on such a worthless myth. Besides mentioning Prabhāsa as the birth-place of Kaṇāda, he mentions Kaṇāda as a disciple of Somaśarmā, and not as his son as given in the Vāyu-purāṇa. In the same breath he also says that Kaṇāda was a son of Ulūka, forgetting that the Vāyu-purāṇa mentions Ulūka as a brother of Kaṇāda.

59 H. Ui, p. 4.

60 *Infra*, IX. 4.

61 One of the fanciful legends to explain this name or epithet is that the sage, once being absorbed in meditation, fell into a well, whereupon God taking mercy upon him provided him with an eye on his foot. According to another legend, the sage became so angry with his disciple Nyāsa, that he would not see him, but being propitiated by the latter, he condescended to see him, not with his natural eyes, but with the newly created eyes on his feet.

known by the same term.[62] When Gotama redacted the science in the form of systematic *sūtras*, it was given the appellation of Nyāya which term was appropriated from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa advanced a conjecture that Gotama, the founder of *ānvīkṣikī*, was different from Akṣapāda, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. He has not, however, given any reason to disregard the time-honoured tradition that the two are identical.[63]

For fixing the probable date of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the most important data are in the form of extensive references in the *Nyāya-sūtras* to the doctrines propounded in the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* of Nāgārjuna[64] whose date would, therefore, be the *terminus a quo* for the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The date of Nāgārjuna has been fixed in the middle or at the close of the second century

62 See *supra*, IV. 4.

63 Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks that Gautama Medhātithi or Medhātithi Gautama were the names of the same person who was different from Akṣapāda, and who founded the ānvīkṣikī. He flourished about 555 B.C. and belonged to Mithilā. For this, he mainly relies on a line in the Mahābhārata—Medhātithir mahāprājño Gautamas tapasi sthitaḥ (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 265. 45—reference as quoted in HIL., but reference according to Bhandarkar Institute edition, Śāntiparva, 253. 42), and a passage in Bhāsa's Pratimā-nāṭaka—Medhātither nyāya-śāstram, Act V. (HIL. p. 18). But there is nothing to show that the stanza in the Mahābhārata refers to the founder of the Nyāya school; and Bhāsa's reference, as suggested by Barnett, may be to a commentator of Manusmṛti of that name (Randle, p. 12). Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa says that Gotama lived in Mithilā, and that Akṣapāda at Prabhāsa in Saurāṣṭra (Kathiawad). Both the ascriptions are baseless, the latter, as already noted, is based on the unreliable evidence of the Vāyu-purāṇa, and the former on the fanciful evidence of a village, named Gotama-sthāna in Mithilā, which is still believed to be the birth-place of Gotama. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa actually visited that place, and found there a mud-hill supposed to be the hermitage of Gotama. On such a flimsy evidence he based his conclusion !

It is not improbable that the two names Gotama and Akṣapāda may even be identical. If 'pāda' in Akṣapāda, which may be honorific as in Bhaṭṭapāda, and the superlative affix 'tama' in Gotama be dropped, it would appear that the remaining portions 'akṣa' and 'go' mean the same thing, i.e., 'sense organ'. The term might have been associated with the founder of the Nyāya who was the propounder of the theory of perception as based on sense organ or the sense-object-contact.

64 HIL. p. 46.

A.D.[65] Vātsyāyana who was criticized by Dignāga could not have lived later than 300 A.D., because he must be earlier than Vasubandhu whom he does not mention. Vātsyāyana refers to Gotama as a ṛṣi, and offers, at places, alternative explanations of the *sūtras* of the Nyāya.[66] The time of Gotama must, therefore, be sufficiently removed from that of Vātsyāyana. In fact, this circumstance suggests an earlier age for Nāgārjuna also, i.e., the early part of the second century rather than the close of that century. In that case, the date of the *Nyāya-sūtras* may be put at the close of the second century.

Reference in the *Nyāya-sūtras* to the theory of *vijñāna-vāda* which was founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in the fourth century A.D., has been pointed out to prove a later date for the *Nyāya-sūtras*.[67] But the same can with better reason be interpreted as referring to the Mādhyamika doctrines. Secondly, it is now admitted that views similar to those of *vijñāna-vāda*, in some form or the other, existed at a much earlier period, and flourished side by side with *śūnya-vāda*. When, therefore, an authority like Vācaspatimiśra interprets a *sūtra* of Nyāya (IV. ii. 26) as referring to *vijñāna-vāda*, he might have been referring to an earlier school of *vijñāna-vāda*, and not to that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is also possible that Vācaspatimiśra, living at a time when *vijñāna-vāda* held the day, might have mistaken the refutation of *śūnya-vāda* for that of *vijñāna-vāda*, there being much similarity between the two doctrines. Jacobi has almost conclusively proved that the *Nyāya-sūtras* do not refer to the *vijñāna-vāda* of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.[68]

(iii) *Vātsyāyana*. The third great figure of the first period is Vātsyāyana, also known as Pakṣilasvāmin.[69] He is the first commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtras*. His date (about

65 H. Ui, p. 43, and Winternitz: *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 304.

66 N. Bh. I. i. 5. p. 152.

67 Stcherbatsky: *Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists*, p. 29.

68 Jacobi: Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of Brāhmaṇas, JAOS. 1911.

69 The name Pakṣilasvāmin for Vātsyāyana has been used by Vācaspatimiśra in the introductory remarks of the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā (p. 1), and also in the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha.

300 A.D.) has already been discussed. On the question whether or not he was preceded by some older commentators on the *Nyāya-sūtras*, there is a difference of opinion. His identification with Kauṭilya, on the strength of a stanza in Hemacandra's *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*,[70] is unwarranted, nor can he be held to be a Dravidian on the basis of the same unreliable source. Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Kāma-sūtra*, must also have been a different person. Dr. Vidyābhuṣaṇa's view that the passages in the *Nyāya-sūtras* which are parallel to the *Mādhyamika-sūtra* or the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* were interpolated by Vātsyāyana,[71] is without any ground. Of course, the *sūtra* of the Nyāya (IV. ii. 26),[72] supposed by him as referring to a *sūtra* in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, may in fact be referring to the Mādhyamika theory. The date of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* in its present form may be as late as the close of the fifth century A.D., and therefore reference to it in the *Nyāya-sūtras* is not possible.[73]

(iv) *Praśastapāda*. Importance of Praśastapāda for the Vaiśeṣika school is even greater than that of Vātsyāyana for the Nyāya school. While Vātsyāyana is the most authoritative and perhaps the first commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Praśastapāda is a reformer of the Vaiśeṣika school who almost rivals Kaṇāda, the founder. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda were practically superseded by the work of Praśastapāda called *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*. This work, although called a commentary, is not a running commentary in the usual sense of the word. It is an independent treatise based on the *sūtras*. The arrangement of this work was followed in the manuals (*prakaraṇas*) of the later period. In this arrangement, knowledge, being a quality of the soul, is treated under the section on qualities. The last

70 Vātsyāyano Mallanāgaḥ Kauṭilyaś Caṇakātmajaḥ.
Drāmilaḥ Pakṣilaḥ svāmī Viṣṇugupto 'ṅgulaś ca saḥ.
Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi, Martya-kāṇḍa, 517-518.

71 HIL. p. 46.

72 Buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānāṁ yāthātmyānupalabdhis tantv-apakarṣaṇe paṭa-sadbhāvānupalabdhivat tad-anupalabdhiḥ.

73 The earliest edition of the Nyāya-bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana, which was edited by Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, appeared in 1865 in Bib. Ind. Series. Another edition with extracts from the Nyāya-vārtika and the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā edited by Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī appeared in 1896 in Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.

three categories, *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya*, which appear to be only subjective entities in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda,[74] get in Praśastapāda the status of external objective realities. He also introduced twenty-four qualities instead of the original seventeen. In the theory of inference, too, he effected many improvements.

A comparison of the logical topics treated by Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda would at once reveal that Vātsyāyana was earlier than Praśastapāda.[75] Bodas, however, holds that Praśastapāda was earlier than Vātsyāyana.[76] This view has been controverted by Suali and Faddegon; the latter has quoted the former.[77] Bhīmācārya, the author of the *Nyāya-kośa*, also holds Praśastapāda to be later than Vātsyāyana.[78] Thus, there is preponderance of opinion in favour of Vātsyāyana being earlier than Praśastapāda. Praśastapāda is, however, definitely earlier than Uddyotakara (belonging to the close of the sixth century) who has frequently referred to him.[79] The Buddhist writers, Paramārtha (499-569 A.D.) and Dharmapāla (539-70 A.D.), have quoted the Vaiśeṣika doctrines from Praśastapāda.

The most disputed point, however, is the chronological position of Praśastapāda in relation to Dignāga. Stcherbatsky, in one of his early articles, tries to prove that Praśastapāda borrowed many ideas from Dignāga and unfairly tried to conceal his obligation.[80] Keith has also accepted Praśastapāda's indebtedness to Dignāga and discussed it at length in connection with the theory of *anumāna*.[81] Jacobi, on the other hand, holds just the opposite view, and says that Buddhist logic borrowed certain theories from the Vaiśeṣika. Later on, Stcherbatsky also changed his views on many points, and admitted the existence of a systematic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika work long before

74 *Infra*, V. 8.
75 Randle, p. 27. n. 4.
76 Bodas, p. xl.
77 Faddegon, p. 605.
78 Bhīmācārya in the Introduction to his Nyāya-kośa, p. 25.
79 Jacobi points out that Praśastapāda's theory of dvy-aṇuka has been referred to by Uddyotakara. (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. II. p. 201, and H. Ui, p. 17.)
80 le Museon, Vol. V. 1904, quoted by Faddegon, p. 15.
81 ILA. p. 27-28.

Vasubandhu's time.[82] H. Ui had already pointed out that Vasubandhu had refuted the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound in his work *Buddhagotra-śāstra.*[83] Stcherbatsky pointed out that the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of sound as comprising three moments, which was refuted by Vasubandhu, was not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, but found only in the work of Praśastapāda, and therefore he concluded that Praśastapāda was either a predecessor or a contemporary of Vasubandhu.[84] In the light of this, the whole position changes altogether. Praśastapāda, far from being a borrower from and posterior to Dignāga, is proved to be either a predecessor or a contemporary of Vasubandhu, the teacher of Dignāga. Usually Dignāga is held to belong to the fifth century A.D., and Vasubandhu to the close of the fourth century A.D. Praśastapāda, therefore, will have to be assigned to the fourth century. This date for Praśastapāda, which may appear to be rather early, fully accords with the Indian tradition which places Praśastapāda in the line of old sages (*ṛṣis*).[85]

Whatever the chronological position of Praśastapāda in relation to Dignāga, it seems certain on the basis of internal evidence that he remodelled the Vaiśeṣika in the light of Buddhist ideas. The present structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is more or less the same as was given to it by Praśastapāda. It seems almost certain that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure of realism was formulated by him in order to meet the Buddhist without entering into any controversy. All polemic was relegated to the Nyāya school. Although Praśastapāda is anterior to Dignāga, some of the ideas formulated by Dignāga must have been current at the time of Praśastapāda. Affinity with the Buddhist ideology may be seen, amongst others, in the

82 Stcherbatsky's Introduction to the German translation (by Otto Strauss) of his work "*Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists*" (1924), quoted by Randle, p. 29.

83 H. Ui, p. 73.

84 See n. 81 above; also Randle, p. 31.

85 Vācaspatimiśra refers to a quotation from Praśastapāda as 'paramārṣa-vacana' (i. e., the statement of a great sage), NVT. IV. ii. 25. p. 1065. Pandit Dvivedi, in his Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī (Vizianagram Sanskrit series), has given many references (pp. 12-13) to show that Praśastapāda was regarded as an ancient sage by Indian tradition.

asatkārya-vāda theory of Praśastapāda.[86] The last three categories (*sāmānya*, etc.,) were accepted as external realities perhaps in order to meet the Buddhist.

(v) *Predecessors of Vātsyāyana.* Besides these, there must have been many other writers in both the schools during the first period. And it is no wonder if, after a lapse of some fifteen centuries, only four works of that period have survived. As to the other works of this period, the first theory deserving our notice is that of Windisch who holds that there are in the Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana certain *sūtra*-like sentences[87] which Vātsyāyana comments upon. They appear like citations from some older commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras.*[88] But this view is hardly tenable, because it was a typical practice of ancient prose-writers to express an idea first in a pithy sentence, and then to explain it. We find the same style in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and in Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārtika* itself.

(vi) *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.* A Chinese tradition names Pañcaśikha as the first disciple of Ulūka or Kaṇāda. There is one Pañcaśikha, the disciple of Āsuri, in the Sāṁkhya tradition also. But in the Chinese tradition, there is no mention of any Vaiśeṣika work by Pañcaśikha. Keith thinks that Praśastapāda had many predecessors, and that probably it was from one of them that Dignāga borrowed the passages which have been cited by Stcherbatsky from Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya.*[89]

A sure evidence of a Vaiśeṣika work older than that of Praśastapāda is that of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* about which two references have been found. One of them is in the *Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara* of Padmanābhamiśra, which is a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana. Padmanābhamiśra lived in or about the sixteenth century. While explaining the prefix *pra* in *pravakṣyate* in the introductory stanza of the work of Praśastapāda, Udayana points

86 *Infra*, V. 2.

87 For example, the very opening sentence of the Nyāya-bhāṣya—Pramāṇato'rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād-arthavat pramāṇam—is sūtra-like.

88 Randle, p. 19.

89 ILA. p. 27. n. 1.

out in his *Kiraṇāvalī* that Praśastapāda composed his work because he wanted to introduce three excellences into it. Unlike the *sūtras* his work is lucid, and unlike a commentary it is concise, and unlike *prakaraṇas* it deals with the whole subject and not merely with a part of it.[90] The question is what commentary is referred to here? The answer is provided by Padmanābhamiśra who says that the commentary referred to here is that of Rāvaṇa.[91]

The other reference to *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is found in the *Prakaṭārtha*, a commentary on the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, where a statement of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is actually quoted. In course of setting forth a Vaiśeṣika theory, Śaṁkara says that a *catur-aṇuka* (aggregate of four atoms) is produced from two *dvy-aṇukas* (aggregate of two atoms).[92] The theory, as propounded by Praśastapāda and accepted by all the later Vaiśeṣika writers, however, is that after the production of a *dvy-aṇuka*, three *dvy-aṇukas* combine to form a *try-aṇuka* (aggregate of three *dvy-aṇukas*). The measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute (*aṇu*), but that of a *try-aṇuka* is large (*mahat*), i.e., having magnitude. The measure of a *try-aṇuka* cannot be produced by that of *dvy-aṇukas*, because in that case the former would be without magnitude like the latter. It is an accepted principle that the effect is similar to its cause. The measure of a *try-aṇuka* is held to be produced by plurality (*bahutva*, meaning the number three or more) residing in the three component *dvy-aṇukas*. Now, if, as given in Śaṁkara's account of the Vaiśeṣika, the two *dvy-aṇukas* produce a *catur-aṇuka*, the question arises as to how the large measure of a *catur-aṇuka* can be caused without plurality which can reside only in *three* or more, and not in *two dvy-aṇukas*. To get over this difficulty, *Ratna-prabhā*, a commentary on the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* makes the following reference to *Prakaṭārtha*: "The author of the *Prakaṭārtha* says that, according to the commentary written by Rāvaṇa, the cause of the magnitude (*mahattva*) of an effect produced from two *dvy-aṇukas* is *pracaya*, i.e., the

90 Kir. p. 5.

91 Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara, p. 12.

92 Yadāpi dve dve dvy-aṇuke catur-aṇukam ārabhete. Śarīraka-bhāṣya, II. ii. 11.

loose connection of parts. Therefore, the view in Śaṁkara's commentary is based on an older school of the Vaiśeṣika."[93]

Recently, the commentary called *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* which is another name of *Prakaṭārtha*, has been published,[94] and the passage quoted in *Ratna-prabhā* is actually found there with the addition, "the modern school, however, holds that a *try-aṇuka* is produced from three *dvy-aṇukas*."[95] As already stated, this is the view of Praśastapāda. He, therefore, belongs to the modern school. But Śaṁkarā has set forth the Vaiśeṣika doctrine according to the commentary of Rāvaṇa which belongs to the older school.

A serious error, leading to the opposite conclusion in connection with this matter, has crept in amongst many writers for which Bodas is originally responsible. He says, "The opinions ascribed by Śaṁkarācārya to the Kaṇāda school are all found in Praśastapāda's work. Śrīcaraṇa,[96] in his commentary on *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* called *Prakaṭārtha*, says that a particular view criticised by Śaṁkara belongs to the older school of Vaiśeṣikas though opposed to that contained in *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. The view referred to is propounded by Praśastapāda who must, therefore, be older than Rāvaṇa."[97]

It appears that Bodas, without caring to study Praśastapāda, took it for granted that the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika, as given by Śaṁkara is from Praśastapāda. Labouring under that error, he twisted and misconstrued the passage of *Ratna-prabhā* so as to give it the opposite meaning.[98] It is indeed a great pity

93 Prakaṭārthakārās tu yad dvābhyāṁ dvy-aṇukābhyāṁ ārabdhaṁ kārye mahattvaṁ dṛśyate, tasya hetuḥ pracayo nāma praśithilāvayava-saṁyoga iti Rāvaṇa-praṇīte bhāṣye dṛśyata iti cirantana-vaiśeṣika dṛṣṭye-daṁ bhāṣyam ity āhuḥ. Ratna-prabhā, II. ii. 11.

94 Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa edited by T. R. Cintāmaṇi, published by Madras University, 1935. In the colophons it is named as Prakaṭārtha as well as Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa. Its age seems to be 1000-1200 A. D.

95 Ādhunikās tu varṇayanti tribhir eva dvy-aṇukais try-aṇukam ārabhyate. Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa, II. ii. 11.

96 The author's name as Śrīcaraṇa is wrong. In the expression occurring at some places as 'Prakaṭārthakāra-śrīcaraṇa', the last part is only an honorific title.

97 Bodas, p. xl.

98 The passage of Ratna-prabhā quoted above first gives the view of Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya and then says 'iti cirantana-vaiśeṣika-dṛṣṭyedaṁ bhāṣyam'

that other scholars blindly followed Bodas. For example, Keith suggests that *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* might have been a commentary on *Kaṇāda-sūtras* or on *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*.[99] But references in *Kiraṇāvalī* as well as in *Prakaṭārtha* or *Ratna-prabhā* make it clear, beyond a shadow of doubt, that *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, far from being a commentary on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, was older than the latter; and the two differed in their views. H. Ui has also followed Bodas in his error and remarks, "Śrīcaraṇa in his *Prakaṭārtha* says that some of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines discussed by Śaṁkarācārya in his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* represent an older school and agree with the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, but they are not in harmony with *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. Consequently, Rāvaṇa is held to be later than Praśastapāda."[100] Needless to point out that the fact is quite the opposite, and the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* was older than the work of Praśastapāda. It shows that at the time of Śaṁkara, Praśastapāda's work did not occupy so dominant a position in the Vaiśeṣika school as it did from the close of the tenth century, i.e., from the time of the three great commentaries on it. With the dominance of Praśastapāda, it appears that *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* came into disuse, and that in the fifteenth century and onwards only its name was known. Thus, although Padmanābhamiśra in the sixteenth century mentions the name of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, Śaṁkaramiśra of the fifteenth century, the author of *Upaskāra*, the oldest extant commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, expressly says that for his work he got no help from any other commentary and had to depend on the *sūtras* alone.[101]

Another erroneous idea has gained currency amongst scholars that, according to Padmanābhamiśra, Udayana made use of

which sentence is simple enough and means, 'this part of the commentary (of Śaṁkara) is in accordance with the theory of the older school (cirantana) of the Vaiśeṣika, i.e., Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya. Bodas, however, wrongly supposed that the view quoted from Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya is different from the one given by Śaṁkara and, therefore, he construed the passage to mean that the view set forth in Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya is different from the one stated by Śaṁkara, and, therefore, that part of the commentary (of Śaṁkara) is in accordance with the older school, i.e., that of Praśastapāda.

99 ILA. p. 27.

100 H. Ui, pp. 13-14.

101 Sūtra-mātrāvalambena. Upaskāra, introductory verse 3.

Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya. There is no statement by Padmanābhamiśra to that effect. In fact, *Kiraṇāvalī*, while explaining the word *pravakṣyate* of the first stanza of Praśastapāda, says, as already noted above, that the work of Praśastapāda is not prolix like a commentary. Padmanābhamiśra, commenting upon this statement of *Kiraṇāvalī*, says that the commentary referred to in *Kiraṇāvalī* is *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. From the statement of *Kiraṇāvalī* itself, however, it does not follow that Udayana knew of any commentary on the Vaiśeṣika, much less the commentary of Rāvaṇa. To jump to the conclusion that he made use of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is unwarranted. It is extremely surprising that scholars like Bodas, Keith and H. Ui should all have fallen into an error for which there is hardly any justification.[102]

(vii) *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*. That there existed a commentary on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* named *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*[103] is a sheer myth based on a strange confusion and perhaps a little deliberate exercise of imagination. There is no trace of it anywhere. *Upaskāra* of *Śaṁkaramiśra* does refer to a *vṛttikāra* or *vṛttikṛt* several times. But it is not known whether it was a running commentary on the *sūtras*, or an independent treatise. Śaṁkaramiśra's statement that he wrote his commentary without any help goes to suggest that it was an independent work. And there is nothing to show that the same had any connection with Bhāradvāja. There is a work named *Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya* by Gaṅgādhara Kaviratna Kavirāja.[104] The title of this work gives an impression that it might be a sub-commentary on *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*, but an examination of the work shows that it is an independent commentary. And there is no trace in it of any passage of the *Vṛtti*[105] quoted in the *Upaskāra*. The only other reference to the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* is in a foot-note of the Sanskrit introduction to *Nyāya-kandalī* by Pandit V. P. Dvivedi. It is to the effect that he once saw at Banaras in the possession of

102 Bodas, p. xl; ILA. p. 27; H. Ui, p. 15.

103 V. P. Dvivedi : Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 12; Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 306; Radhakrisnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 180.

104 Published at Behrampur (Murshidabad), 1778-79 A.D. It was perhaps the earliest published Sanskrit text of Indian philosophy.

105 Faddegon, p. 35 ff.

a saṁnyāsin a copy of *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* on palm leaves written in Maithila script which was extremely tattered and soiled.[106] Can any reliance be placed on the evidence of a manuscript of which there is no trace? This kind of baseless evidence and the confusion caused by Gaṅgādhara's *Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya* have created the fiction of a commentary of Bhāradvāja on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* which, strangely enough, finds a place in the histories of Indian philosophy.

8. PERIOD OF CONFLICT WITH THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

(i) *Dignāga.* The second period opens with the advent of Dignāga somewhere in the fifth century. He is the dominating figure in Indian philosophy during the period extending from the fifth to the tenth century. This period is undoubtedly the most glorious period of Indian philosophy. The date of Dignāga, which is closely connected with that of Vasubandhu, has been discussed by eminent scholars. Without entering here into the merits and demerits of the various theories, it may be stated that overwhelming opinion places him in the fifth century A.D.[107] His principal work is *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* in which he included some of his shorter works.[108] In this work he laid the foundation of his realist-idealistic epistemology, and threw a challenge to the realism of the orthodox schools. It is a tragedy that this work, which is one of the brightest gems of our literary treasure, is irretrievably lost in its original Sanskrit text. Fortunately, a Tibetan translation[109] is preserved from which Vidyābhūṣaṇa has given a brief synopsis of its subject matter in his *History of Indian Logic.* Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* in two volumes, is an excellent guide to a proper understanding of the epistemology and logic of Dignāga. Besides, there are copious extracts from Dignāga scattered in Sanskrit philosophical treatises. Randle collected the extracts which are found in *Nyāyavārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīka* and *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha.*[110]

106 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 12. n. 2

107 *Supra*, IV. 7. (iv).

108 Cf. Pramāṇa-siddhyai svakṛti-prakīrṇanāt
Nibadhyate viprasṛtaṁ samuccitam.
PS. Introductory stanza.

109 It is surprising that Pramāṇa-samuccaya is unknown in China.

110 Fragments from Dignāga, published by the Royal Asiatic Society London, 1926.

H. R. R. Iyengar has edited such extracts from Dignāga found in Pārthasārathimiśra's *Nyāya-ratnākara*, a commentary on the *Śloka-vārtika*.[111] *Tattva-saṁgraha* and its commentary *Pañcikā* are a mine of information for the views of Dignāga. Recently H. R. R. Iyengar has also restored the Sànskrit text of the first chapter (on perception) of *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* with extracts from Dignāga's own *vṛtti* and from the commentary by Jinendrabuddhi.[112]

(ii) *Uddyotakara*. The challenge of Dignāga was met on the orthodox side by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika*. His family name was *Bhāradvāja*, and in the colophon of the *Nyāya-vārtika*, he is styled as Pāśupatācārya. With regard to his date, there is fortunately a good piece of evidence in the form of a reference to his name in Subandhu's *Vāsavadattā*,[113] which work, in turn, has been referred to in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa. The latter was a junior contemporary of King Harṣavardhana, and belonged to the middle of the seventh century. If, therefore, Subandhu is placed in the beginning of the seventh century, the close of the sixth century would be the *terminus ad quem* for Uddyotakara. This will accord with the date of Dharmakīrti who has most probably referred to Uddyotakara.[114] The date of Dharmakīrti may be suggested to be the first part of the seventh century. The Jaina *Śloka-vārtika* held that Uddyotakara was attacked by *Dharmakīrti*.[115] But the definition of *Pratijñā* as quoted in the *Nyāya-vārtika* from the *Vāda-vidhi* has been identified with that in the *Vāda-nyāya* of Dharmakīrti. On that ground, Vidyābhūṣaṇa has suggested that *Vāda-vidhi* was only another name of *Vāda-nyāya*. Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti, who thus seem to have referred to each other were, in the opinion of Vidyābhūṣaṇa, contemporaries.[116] But that is not pro-

111 His article on Kumārila and Dignāga. IHQ. Sept. 1927.

112 Published by the Mysore University.

113 Nyāya-sthitim iva Uddyotakara-svarūpām. Vāsavadattā, Hall's edition, p. 235.

114 Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks that the śāstra and the śāstrakāra referred to in the Nyāya-bindu (pp. 110-11, Peterson's edition) are the Nyāya-vārtika and Uddyotakara. HIL. p. 124.

115 Randle, p. 34. n. 3.

116 HIL. p. 124 "Yad api (wrongly printed in Cal. edition 'yadyapi') vādavidhau sādhyābhidhānaṁ pratijñeti pratijñā-lakṣaṇam uktam." NV. I. i. 33. p. 282.

bable because in that case, we should expect many more references to Dharmakīrti. For instance, Uddyotakara when dealing with Dignāga's definition of perception,[117] must have referred to that definition as revised by Dharmakīrti,[118] had he known it. Secondly, *Vāda-vidhi* is a work proved to have been written by Vasubandhu, and not by Dharmakīrti.[119] The definition referred to above might, therefore, have been borrowed in *Vāda-nyāya* from *Vāda-vidhi*, and there is no reason to suggest that *Vāda-vidhi* was only another name of *Vāda-nyāya*. Besides, the contemporaneity of Uddyotakara with Dharmakīrti militates against the sure evidence of *Vāsavadattā*. There are, however, scholars who hold that Uddyotakara, Subandhu and Bāṇa might all have been contemporaries.[120] This is possible, but not probable. That the close of the sixth century is the lower limit of Uddyotakara is almost a certainty. But with regard to his upper limit, we have no evidence except that he flourished later than Praśastapāda and Dignāga. The fact that Vācaspatimiśra (841 A.D.) refers to Uddyotakara's work as very old[121] goes to suggest rather an earlier date for him. His reference in the *Nyāya-vārtika* to *Srughna*,[122] a town situated near Thanesar, the capital of Harṣavardhana, can give us no clue either to the place of Uddyotakara's residence or to his patronage by Harṣavardhana as suggested by Vidyābhūṣaṇa.[123] The reference in question might also be due to the fame of that place.

Subandhu's tribute to Uddyotakara that he was 'an embodiment of the Nyāya defence', is fully justified. In his defence of the Nyāya, he brings in a polemical fervour which is all his own. Uddyotakara was fortunate in having a commentator of the calibre of Vācaspatimiśra who has added lustre to Uddyotakara's work. But he himself lacked the philosophical grasp and depth of Vācaspatimiśra. The latter is marked for his meticulous fairness to his opponents, but for Uddyotakara no stick was too big to beat his opponent with. Very often he argues by

117 NV. I. i. 4. p. 130.
118 Randle, p. 34; NV. I. i. 4. p. 102.
119 Winternitz: A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II. p. 360: n. 5.
120 Randle, pp. 32-33; HIL. pp. 123-24; ILA. p. 28.
121 Uddyotakara-gavīnām atijaratīnām. NVT. p. 1.
122 NV. I. i. 33. p. 273.
123 HIL. pp. 124-25; ILA. p. 28.

verbal twists which even Vācaspatimiśra, otherwise so reverent to him, feels constrained to criticize.[124] Sometimes he tries to silence his opponent by mere tricks of debate.[125] At times he does not reproduce the full argument of his opponent which Vācaspatimiśra feels obliged to do.[126]

(iii) *Dharmakīrti.* The position of the Nyāya school as established by Uddyotakara was assailed by Dharmakīrti, the great successor of Dignāga, who not only continued his work, but also improved upon it. That he lived in the first part of the seventh century is well-nigh certain. He was initiated as a Buddhist monk by Dharmapāla whom Hsüan tsang met in 633 A.D. But he is not mentioned by the latter who travelled in India between 629-45 A.D. He must have been rather young at the time. He is, however, mentioned by I-tsing (671-95 A.D.) as one who introduced reform in logic.[127] *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is his principal work. He wrote six other works of which *Nyāya-bindu*[128] is the most important. *Nyāya-bindu* with the commentary of Dharmottara is extant in original Sanskrit, and is at present the principal source of our information about the school of Dignāga.

(iv) *Kumārila and Prabhākara.* The exact dates of Kumārila and Prabhākara are a matter of controversy, but there

124 *Infra*, X. 8.

125 With reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that the objective reality of 'connection' (saṁyoga) should be accepted because it is an essential cause in the production of an effect, an opponent points out that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, connection itself is produced by an action without requiring any connection. To this Uddyotakara addresses his opponent thus "You say there is no such reality as 'connection' and yet you say that connection is produced by action; this is a contradiction." (NV. II. i. 33. p. 483.) Uddyotakara does not realize that the opponent has quoted a case which is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and not by himself. Several instances of Uddyotakara's crude method have been noted at many places in this work.

126 *Infra*, VI. 17.

127 Randle, p. 34.

128 Nyāya-bindu was edited by Peterson and published in the Bib. Ind. Series 1889. In 1918 an excellent edition of this work by Stcherbatsky was published in the Bib. Buddhica Series, Leningrad. The same author has published an English translation with explanatory notes in Vol. II. of *Buddhist Logic.*

is little doubt that they both flourished some time during the seventh or eighth century. They both commented upon Śabara's commentary. The commentary by Kumārila on the first part of the first chapter (called *Tarka-pāda*) is known as *Śloka-vārtika*, and may be regarded as one of the most remarkable contributions to Indian philosophy. It has been widely quoted and commented upon by many writers. Another independent treatise on *Tarka-pāda*, belonging to the Kumārila school, is Pārthasārathimiśra's *Śāstra-dīpikā*. *Bṛhatī* [129] is a commentary by Prabhākara on *Tarka-pāda*. There is a sub-commentary on *Bṛhatī* by Śālikanātha who also wrote an independent work named *Prakaraṇa-pañcika*.[130] *Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* by Dr. Ganganath Jha is an illuminating source of information regarding that school.

Simultaneously with Kumārila and Prabhākara, we find intense activity in the Buddhist field too. To the eighth century probably belong Śāntarakṣita, the author of the great Buddhist work *Tattva-saṁgraha*, and his commentator Kamalaśīla, and also Dharmottara who commented on the *Nyāya-bindu*. Dharmottara has been referred to by Vācaspatimiśra by name.[131]

(v) *Vācaspatimiśra*. Vācaspatimiśra of Mithilā is decidedly the greatest scholiast of Indian philosophy. Fortunately, his age is definitely fixed in the first half of the ninth century. The colophon of his *Nyāyasūcī-nibandha*, a short work concerned with the arrangement of *Nyāya-sūtras*, gives the date of that work as the year 898[132], which must be the Vikrama era corresponding to 841 A.D. Trilocana appears to have been his teacher from whom he learnt the theory of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalapaka pratyakṣa*).[133]

129 This important work which was known only in manuscript has recently been edited with Ṛjuvimalā commentary, and published by the Madras University.

130 Published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras.

131 Yathāha bhadanta-Dharmottaraḥ. NVT. II. ii. 66. p. 682.

132 Nyāyasūcī-nibandho 'sāv akāri sudhiyāṁ mude
Śrī-Vācaspatimiśreṇa vasv-aṅka-vasu-vatsare.

133 Trilocana-gurūnnīta-mārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ
yathā-mānam yathā-vastu vyākhyātam idam īdṛśam. NVT. I. i. 4. p. 114.

Another thing deserves our notice. It used to be held that Tātparyācārya, a great name in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, is identical with Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the *Tātparya*, i.e., *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*. Pandit Kavirāja rejected this view on the ground that the *Nyāya-līlāvatī* expressly mentions 'Tātparyācārya' as a follower of Bhāsarvajña and as the author of the famous dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, viz., 'saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam'.[134] When Pandit Kavirāja expressed that view, the dictum in question was found only in the later works like *Upaskāra*, *Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā* and *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, etc. But now I have found this dictum in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* itself.[135] In the light of this, the reference in the *Nyāya-līlāvatī*, far from disproving the old view, will rather suggest that Vācaspatimiśra was probably the author of this dictum and that 'Tātparyācārya' was his designation.

The *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* is his masterpiece in which the conflict with the Buddhist reaches its climax, and, as a consequence thereof, a firm foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is laid. By his versatile genius and encyclopædic learning, he enriched all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy.[136] His exposition of every philosophical system is so faithful that it appears as though he were a follower of the school which he expounds for the time being. This shows his grasp and depth of understanding. There have been giants like Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, Kumārila and Prabhākara who may be deemed greater than Vācaspatimiśra as original thinkers. But in one respect, he ranks supreme in the whole range of Indian philosophy; he

134 SBS. III. p. 94.

135 NVT. II. i. 36. p. 506. Also *supra*, I. 7.

136 The following is the list of the known works of Vācaspatimiśra:

Nyāya	(i)	Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā and
	(ii)	Nyāya-sūcīnibandha
Sāṁkhya	(iii)	Sāṁkhyatattva-kaumudī
Yoga	(iv)	Tattva-vaiśāradī
Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā	(v)	Nyāya-kaṇikā (vi) Tattva-bindu
Vedānta	(vii)	Bhāmatī
	(viii)	Tattva-samīkṣā or Brahmatattva-samīkṣā (still un-

recovered) is referred to in the Bhāmatī (Nirṇaya Sāgara edition p. 1020, concluding stanza 3). Tattva-samīkṣā is also referred to in NVT. (I. i. 2. p. 76) where the author says that he has discussed the *theory of error* at length in that work. These are his principal works which he has himself

is undoubtedly the greatest master and the greatest expositor of Indian philosophy.

(vi) *Jayanta.* In philosophical depth and versatile learning, Jayanta may not be an equal of Vācaspatimiśra, but in the elegant flow of his style and in penetrating criticism, he is seldom surpassed. In wit and humour he has no rival in the whole range of Indian philosophical literature. Besides all these merits, a rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness is his humility in declaring that he could lay no claim to originality.[137]

As for his date, it is fortunate that his son, Abhinanda, in the introduction to his *Kādambarī-kathāsāra*, has left a definite clue. According to Abhinanda, Śaktisvāmin, his great-grandfather, was a minister of the king Muktāpīḍa (*alias* Lalitāditya) of Kashmir whose reign ended in 753 A.D. Allowing some sixty years for the two intervening generations, the period of Jayanta would fall in the beginning of the ninth century. This brings Jayanta approximately to the age of Vācaspatimiśra. But Jayanta's priority or posteriority to Vācaspatimiśra remains uncertain. No clear reference by one of them to the other has so far been found. It is probable that they lived approximately in the same age and did not know each other. It has been suggested that Trilocana (the teacher of Vācaspatimiśra) may be identical with Jayanta, for, in the introductory stanza of his Nyāya-kaṇikā, a *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* treatise, Vācaspatimiśra offers salutation to his

enumerated in the concluding stanzas (Nos. 3-4) of Bhāmatī (perhaps his last work), viz.,

Yan Nyāyakaṇikā-Tattvasamīkṣī-Tattvabindubhiḥ,
Yan nyāya-sāṁkhya-yogānāṁ vedāntānāṁ nibandhanaiḥ,
Samacaiṣaṁ mahat puṇyaṁ tat phalaṁ puṣkalaṁ mayā
Samarpitam athaitena prīyatāṁ parameśvaraḥ.

Besides, there are many unrecovered works attributed to him. One of them is Yukti-dīpikā on the Sāṁkhya system. *Brahmasiddhi* is referred to in the Nyāya-kaṇikā (p.80). Brahmatattva-saṁhitoddīpanī and Vedāntatattva-kaumudī are some other unrecovered works. Cf. An excellent note on the works of Vācaspatimiśra by M. M. G. N. Kavirāja. SBS. III. p. 98.

137 Kuto vā nūtanaṁ vastu vayam utprekṣituṁ kṣamāḥ,
Vaco-vinyāsa-vaicitrya-mātram atra vicāryatām.

NM. part I. p. 1.

Na hīyaṁ kavibhiḥ pūrvair adṛṣṭaṁ sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ,
Śaktā tṛṇam api draṣṭuṁ matir mama tapasvinī.

NM. Part. I. p. 363.

teacher who is mentioned as the author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī.*[138] But this does not seem to be at all plausible. In his lengthy discussion on the meaning of the terms *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* in Gotama's definition of perception, Jayanta does not seem to be even conversant with the interpretation of these terms given by Vācaspatimiśra. But if he were identical with Trilocana, he would himself be the author of that interpretation. Moreover, coming before a *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* work, this salutation could not, in the fitness of things, be addressed to the author of a Nyāya work which contains refutation of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* theories. The *Nyāya-mañjarī* referred to in the stanza in question might have been some *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* work. Attempts to put Jayanta after Vācaspatimiśra[139] are equally groundless. They are based on an erroneous notion that Jayanta has quoted Vācaspatimiśra.[140] The title *jaran-naiyāyika* used for Jayanta suggests rather an early date for him. Besides *Nyāya-mañjarī*, another work attributed to Jayanta by Guṇaratna (the commentator of Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*) is *Nyāya-kalikā.*[141] A work of this name has been published in the Sarasvatī Bhavana Series.

It is of exceptional interest to note that, like many masterpieces of world literature, *Nyāya-mañjarī* was written in prison. In the course of an argument, Jayanta says that he cannot lay any claim to originality. Then a question is asked: If it is so, why did you care to write a treatise at all? In answer, he says: I have been thrown by the king into this dark dungeon where even a sound is not heard. Here I have passed my days by the diversion of writing this work.[142]

138 Ajñāna-timira-śamanīṁ para-damanīṁ Nyāya-mañjarīṁ rucirām,
Prasavitre prabhavitre vidyā-tarave namo gurave.

Nyāya-kaṇikā, p. 1.

Relative age of Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta is fully discussed in my paper on '*Distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception*' read in the Oriental Conference (Lucknow Session).

139 Keith: Karma-mīmāṁsā, pp. 15-16.

140 G. N. Kavirāja, (SBS. Vol. III. pp. 103-104).

141 See Guṇaratna's commentary on SDSm. p. 94.

142 Rājñā tu gahvare 'sminnaśabdake bandhane vinihito'ham,
Grantha-racanā-vinodād iha hi mayā vāsarā gamitāḥ.

NM. Part I. p. 363. (I am indebted to Dr. J. N. Sinha for this information).

It may be said of Jayanta that he is a Naiyāyika *par excellence.* Vācaspatimiśra can be claimed by any one of the orthodox systems of philosophy as its own. Śrīdhara and Udayanācārya, although primarily scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, show leanings towards the Vedānta.[143] But Jayanta stands alone in adhering to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to the last. He puts up the most vigorous defence of the Nyāya against all other systems including the Vedānta.[144]

(vii) *Bhāsarvajña.* To the close of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth century belong the two great writers, Bhāsarvajña and Śivāditya, who stand at the head of the two types of works which were usually written in the third period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The former was the fore-runner of Gaṅgeśa in treating the Nyāya as pure epistemology (i.e., dealing only with *pramāṇas*) and in divesting the system altogether of metaphysics. He seems to have been a bold and original thinker. He discarded the *upamāna-pramāṇa* which was a vulnerable point of the Nyāya school. His work, *Nyāya-sāra,* seems to have acquired great popularity because Guṇaratna mentions as many as eighteen commentaries upon it.[145] One of them, according to him, was *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa,* perhaps also called *Bhūṣaṇa.* Vāsudeva, an old commentator of the *Nyāya-sāra,* says in the colophon of his commentary that he wrote it for the benefit of those who could not plunge into the ocean called *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa.* This shows that it was the commentary *par excellence,* and it was, in all probability, by Bhāsarvajña himself. *Nyāya-līlāvatī* refers to him as Bhūṣaṇakāra.[146] If it be so, reference by Ratnakīrti (of about 1000 A.D.) to *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*[147] would help us in determining the date of Bhāsarvajña. If Jayanta also wrote a commentary on *Nyāya-sāra,* the date of Bhāsarvajña will have to be pushed back to the eighth century, and there is nothing to militate against it.

(viii) *Śivāditya.* He is held to be the pioneer of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *prakaraṇas.* He was also the first to enunciate

143 *Supra,* I. 9.
144 NM. Vol. II. p. 96 ff.
145 See Guṇaratna's commentary on SDSm. p. 94.
146 Nyāya-līlāvatī, Nir. Sāgar edition, p. 33.
147 Apoha-siddhi, published in SBNT. p. 11.

non-existence (*abhāva*) as a regular seventh category, although *abhāva* as an external reality had already been recognised.[148] Gaṅgeśa has referred to Śivāditya by name.[149] Another work by him, named *Lakṣaṇa-mālā*, is known from its reference in *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* of Śrīharṣa[150] who is earlier than Gaṅgeśa. Śivāditya, therefore, in all probability, belonged to the tenth century. His identification with Vyomaśiva, the author of a well-known commentary on *Praśastapāda*, is based on confusion in one of the manuscripts of *Sapta-padārthī* where its author is named as Vyomaśivācārya Śivāditya. But as this name occurs in none of the other manuscripts, this may be taken as an error. The two must be different, because, while Vyomaśiva accepts *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa*, Śivāditya follows the traditional Vaiśeṣika position of accepting only two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.[151]

(ix) *Vyomaśiva*. There are three great commentators on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*. They are Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara and Udayanācārya, of whom the last two definitely belong to the close of the tenth century. But the date of Vyomaśiva, who appears to be the earliest of the three, is uncertain. His work has become available only recently. Jaina Rājaśekhara in his (unpublished) subcommentary on the *Nyāya-kandalī* mentions four commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* in the following order (i) *Vyomavatī*, (ii) *Kandalī*, (iii) *Kiraṇāvalī*, and (iv) *Līlāvatī*.[152] As the last three are definitely given in their chronological order, it may be presumed that, in the opinion of Rājaśekhara, Vyomavatī is the earliest. Discussing the definition of *kāla* (time) in Kiraṇāvalī, Udayana refers to a statement by an *Ācārya* which has been explained by Vardhamāna in *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* as referring to Vyomaśivācārya.[153] More-

148 SBS. Vol. III. p. 117.

149 TC. Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, p. 830; See also HIL. p. 406.

150 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi, p. 19. n. 2.

151 See Pt. V. B. Bhattacarya's article on Vyomaśiva in the G. N. Jha Research Institute Journal, Nov. 1945, p. 41.

152 The passage is quoted in the Sanskrit Introduction to the Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi. p. 19. Līlāvatī is not a regular commentary, but it discusses only some controversial topics.

153 Cf. G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 108; Kir. p. 114. n. 3.

over, his closer touch with the Buddhist doctrines, as compared with the other commentaries on the *bhāṣya*, confirms the view that he was the earliest of the three. We have, however, no data to prove his date more definitely.

(x) *Śrīdhara.* His *Nyāya-kandalī* is the most popular standard work on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*. In the colophon of the *Nyāya-kandalī*, Śrīdhara gives the date of its composition which is equivalent to 991 A.D.[154] At the same place he also mentions his native place, a village named Bhūrisṛṣṭi in southern Rāḍha in Bengal. His other works referred to in the *Nyāya-kandalī* are: (i) *Advaya-siddhi* (NK. p. 5), (ii) *Tattvaprabodha* (NK. pp. 82, 146), (iii) *Tattva-saṁvādinī* (NK. p. 82), and (iv) *Saṁgraha-ṭīkā* (NK. pp. 117, 159). Of all the commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-kandalī* may be said to be the neatest and most lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories. It occupies the same place of honour as the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra and *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayanta.

(xi) *Udayanācārya.* His contribution to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is most voluminous. All the writers noted so far belong only to one of the two systems, the Nyāya or the Vaiśeṣika. For example, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña belong to the Nyāya school, while Vyomaśiva, Śivāditya and Śrīdhara to the Vaiśeṣika school. But Udayana belongs equally to both the schools. Of his six works, two, viz., (i) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi*[155] and (ii) a short work called *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa* belong to the Nyāya school, and two, viz., (i) *Kiraṇāvalī* and (ii) a short work named *Lakṣaṇāvalī* to the Vaiśeṣika. The remaining two works, (i) *Kusumāñjali* and (ii) *Ātmatattva-viveka* are independent treatises which belong to the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. All his works seem to have been extremely popular, because they have been extensively commented and sub-commented upon, and an extensive literature

154 Try-adhika-daśottara-navaśata-śākābde Nyāya-kandalī racitā. NK. p. 331.

155 Published with Vardhamāna's Nyāyanibandha-prakāśa in Bib. Ind. Series, only up to 768 which does not complete even the 5th sūtra of the first chapter.

grew round Udayana, which space does not permit us here to notice. But one long chain of eight commentaries may here be noticed as an interesting illustration of the Indian scholiasts' habit of heaping commentary upon commentary. It will be seen that Udayana's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi* is the fifth in the following chain of commentaries in which each succeeding one is a commentary on the preceding: (i) the *Nyāya-sūtras*, (ii) *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*, (iii) *Nyāya-vārtika*, (iv) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, (v) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi*, (vi) *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* by Vardhamāna, (vii) *Vardhamānendu* by Padmanābhamiśra and (viii) *Nyāya-tātparya-maṇḍana* by Śaṁkaramiśra. There is no knowing if the chain actually broke at this point, because there may be many manuscripts yet undiscovered.

Like Śrīdhara, Udayana has also given us the date of one of his works, namely *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, which is equivalent to 984 A.D.[156] This date is seven years earlier than the date of the *Nyāya-kandalī*. In *Kiraṇāvalī* the views of the *Nyāya-kandalī*. are quoted and refuted.[157] Although the name of Śrīdhara is not mentioned, it is clear that he knew him and his *Nyāya-kandalī*. The *Nyāya-kandalī* also refers to the views expressed in *Kiraṇāvalī*.[158] The chronological order of the two works which quote each other is a matter of great puzzle. M. M. G. N. Kavirāja has made a suggestion to solve this difficulty. According to him, *Kiraṇāvali* was written later than the *Nyāya-kandalī*. "But Udayana did not live to complete the work.... On the death of Udayana, Śrīdhara, still living, began to revise his book in the light of the criticism made, not failing, however, in his turn to cast a fling at Udayana, whenever occasion permitted." [159]

Udayanācārya stands at the juncture of the second period

156 Tarkāmbarāṅka-pramiteṣv atīteṣv śakāntataḥ,
Varṣeṣūdayanaś cakre subodhāṁ Lakṣaṇāvalīm.
Lakṣaṇāvalī, concluding stanza.
This gives 906 Śaka era which corresponds to 984 A.D.

157 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi, p. 21. n. 5; and G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 111.

158 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi p. 21, n. 3.

159 G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 111.

of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school with the third which is already anticipated in his writings. We have in his works, as already stated, a glimpse of the method of subtle argumentation without much substance, and this is the chief characteristic of Navya-nyāya which developed in the third period. Like the writers of the Navya-nyāya school, he lacks philosophical insight and originality and, as in their case words get the better of the sense. Lastly, a sense of arrogance which developed in the later period, is equally noticeable in him. An anecdote is related of him in an appendix of *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*. When he went to the temple of Jagannātha, he found all the four doors of the temple shut against him, whereupon, he, being enraged, directed his banter against the Deity himself in the following words: "Intoxicated with thy supreme glory, thou despisest me upon whom thy very existence depended when thou wast attacked by the Buddhists."[160]

9. THE POST-BUDDHIST PERIOD

(i) *Anticipatory Significance of Udayanācārya, Bhāsarvajña and Śivāditya.* The beginning of the third period, which synchronises with the disappearance of the Buddhists from this country, is marked by a decadence in philosophical thought. The period commences somewhere in the eleventh century, although Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Navya-nyāya school, came a century later. There are, in this period, two distinct and different channels of intellectual activity, the foundations of which were already laid in the second period by Bhāsarvajña and Śivāditya. Bhāsarvajña, as already stated, treated Nyāya as pure epistemology and logic, divesting it of all its metaphysical appendage. This served as model for the new school of Gaṅgeśa, who like Bhāsarvajña treats of only four means of knowledge. The new school henceforward supersedes the old Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. The principal activity of the period centres round Gaṅgeśa, whose methodology is amplified and made more and more subtle in endless commentaries and sub-commentaries. The other line of activity, for which

160 Aiśvarya-mada-matto 'si mām avajñāya vartase,
Upasthiteṣu Bauddheṣu mad-adhinā tava sthitiḥ.

the way was already shown by Śivāditya, is the writing of *prakaraṇas* and commentaries thereon.

(ii) *Varadarāja, Vallabhācārya and Śaśadhara.* Three writers who preceded Gaṅgeśa deserve mention. Varadarāja, the author of the *Tārkika-rakṣā*, probably belongs to the eleventh century. All the manuals headed by *Sapta-padārthī* are the Vaiśeṣika *prakaraṇas* in the sense that their structure is based on the Vaiśeṣika categories in the framework of which the Nyāya topics are also incorporated. Varadarāja's work is a Nyāya *prakaraṇa* which primarily deals with the sixteen Nyāya topics, *pramāṇa*, etc. He includes the Vaiśeṣika categories as a second set of *prameyas*. His example was followed by Keśavamiśra, the author of *Tarka-bhāṣā*, who probably belongs to the thirteenth century. The *Tarka-bhāṣā* is an excellent treatise, and must have been very popular as indicated by the large number of commentaries on it. The other two writers are: Vallabhācārya, the author of *Nyāya-līlāvatī* and Śaśadhara, the author of *Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa*. Both of them preceded Gaṅgeśa. They do not attempt a complete and systematic exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines. The former deals with all the principal controversial topics in the usual order of the Vaiśeṣika manuals, but the latter discusses only a few topics at random. As evidenced by the large number of its commentaries and subcommentaries, *Nyāya-līlāvatī* seems to have been a popular work.

(iii) *Gaṅgeśa and his Successors.* Gaṅgeśa, the hero of the third period, probably belongs to the twelfth century. In his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, he laid the foundation of a new methodology on the basis of sharp and subtle distinctions in the connotations of logical terms. Exactitude and precision are sought to be achieved by a hair-splitting process of logic, which in intellectual, or, perhaps more appropriately in verbal, subtlety remains unsurpassed. Not only has Navya-nyāya made no contribution to the *prameya* part of the system (metaphysics), but none even to the *pramāṇa-vāda* (epistemology). Gaṅgeśa's school evolved a new terminology and a new language in which the long compounds of Subandhu reappear in a far more formidable form. Amongst the successors of Gaṅgeśa, there are two

important figures: Vardhamāna, his own son, who, though not possessing the brilliance of his father, is the author of a large number of works of merit, and Pakṣadhara, the renowned teacher of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, whose real name was Jayadeva. The Bengal school of Navya-nyāya at Nadia was vested with glory and fame by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. After Gaṅgeśa, he is regarded as the second great figure of the Navya-nyāya school. He was an independent thinker. Besides his famous *Dīdhiti*, a commentary on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* on which about a dozen sub-commentaries were written, he also wrote a short treatise, *Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa* in which he refuted the Vaiśeṣika categories, particularly the category of *viśeṣa*. Mathurānātha and Jagadīśa are two other famous writers of the Navya-nyāya school, belonging respectively to the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Jagadīśa is also the author of a manual named *Tarkāmṛta*. In Gadādhara, belonging to the middle of the seventeenth century, the subtlety of Navya-nyāya reaches its climax.

(iv) *Syncretic Manuals.* It has already been noted that side by side with the development of Navya-nyāya, manuals and commentaries, belonging to the old school, were also written. But these manuals and especially their commentaries are overloaded with the terminology of the new school.

Reference has already been made to two early Nyāya manuals, viz., *Tārkika-rakṣā* and *Tarka-bhāṣā*. Of the Vaiśeṣika manuals, the most important is the *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa who belongs to the seventeenth century. Many manuals must have been written before the *Tarka-saṁgraha*. One such work is the *Pramāṇa-mañjarī* of Sarvadevasūri. As it is quoted in the *Nayana-prasādinī* (a commentary on Citsukhī of the fifteenth century), it must be an older work. It appears that the manuals of the intervening period were all eclipsed by the dominating popularity of the *Tarka-saṁgraha* which, with its commentary called *Dīpikā* by the author himself, is regarded as the most important introduction to Nyāya philosophy. Many commentaries on the *Tarka-saṁgraha* were written. In the *Tarka-saṁgraha,* although the basic structure of the Vaiśeṣika categories is maintained, the Vaiśeṣika theory of the two *pramāṇas* gives place to the Nyāya theory of the four *pramā-*

ṇas. The next *prakaraṇa* in chronological order as well as in popularity is *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* of Viśvanātha with its commentary called *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* by the author himself. Viśvanātha belongs to the second quarter of the seventeenth century. In his *Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti*, he has given his date which corresponds to 1634 A.D. In the *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvaī*, *pramāṇas* assume important position. Here the *pramāṇas*, instead of being treated under *guṇas* which is the usual way of Vaiśeṣika manuals, are dealt with under *ātman* and a separate chapter is devoted to each of the four *pramāṇas*. After the treatment of the four *pramāṇas*, the qualities are dealt with; and strangely enough, a part of epistemology (i.e., topics like illusion, doubt, validity of knowledge, etc.), is treated under *guṇa* (*buddhi*) according to the usual Vaiśeṣika scheme. There is a third manual named *Tarkāmṛta* by Jagadīśa. *Tarka-kaumudī* is another work by Laugākṣibhāskara whose date is not known.

(v) *Commentaries on the Sūtras*. The *sūtras* and other ancient works of the school seem to have been completely neglected in this period. But there are two exceptions which show that at least up to the seventeenth century, these works had not been completely forgotten as they decidedly were about the close of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth century. Śaṁkaramiśra, who belongs to the period near about the second quarter of the fifteenth century,[161] and whose works on the Nyāya system and other systems number over a dozen, wrote a commentary called *Upaskāra* which is the oldest extant commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. According to Śaṁkaramiśra's own statement, as already stated, he got no help in preparing this commentary from any other commentary, and had to depend on the *sūtras* alone.[162] The commentary is laden with the Navya-nyāya terminology. Another commentary of this age is the *Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-sūtras* by Viśvanātha, the author of *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*. Although written at a late period, this work is in a simple and easy style and is entirely free from the frightening Navya-nyāya terminology.

161 G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. pp. 150-51.
162 *Supra*, IV. 7 (vi).

(vi) *Decadent Tendencies of the Third Period.* No giant of the calibre of Jagadīśa or Gadādhara appeared in the Nyāya school after the close of the seventeenth century. Soon after that time decadence seems to have set in. So far as genuine philosophical thought is concerned, the decadence had commenced right from the opening of the third period in the eleventh century. Methodology of the Navya-nyāya school was, of course, cultivated, developed and perfected through these long centuries, but, as already pointed out, it was a fruitless pursuit.

(vii) *Climax of Decadence in the Eighteenth Century.* By the beginning of the eighteenth century, practically all is lost. While the school of Navya-nyāya was itself decaying, the works of the older school had completely been forgotten. As a result thereof, even the manuscripts of those books were lost. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has published some correspondence of the Portuguese Jesuits who were collecting manuscripts, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, for the King's library at Paris. The correspondence throws some light on the conditions obtaining at that period. Reference to one of the dispatches of these missionaries has already been made. Even the *Nyāya-sūtra* was not traceable.[163] Publishers' prefaces of some of the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which were published in the second half of the last century tell us that those works were unknown to pandits, and with what great efforts they could be procured. Colebrooke (1765-1837) says that he never came across a copy of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya.*[164]

(viii) *Recovery in the Nineteenth Century.* Thanks to the interest and enthusiasm evinced by European savants, there came about, at the close of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a sort of Renaissance of Sanskrit literature. Although the interest of European scholars was, for a long time, restricted to Vedic and Buddhist literature, some basic works of Indian philosophy were also published chiefly under the ægis of the Bengal Asiatic Society, and through the

163 *Supra*, I. 10.

164 Essays, Vol. I. p. 262, quoted in the preface of the Nyāya-bhāṣya published in Bid. Ind. Series, 1861.

encouragement given by the Principals of the Government Sanskrit College Banaras. One of them, James Ballantyne, wrote a work in Sanskrit. It is in the style of the old philosophical writers. The work is named *Nyāya-kaumudī*.[165] It gives the principles of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy together with those of Chemistry and Physics. This work may be regarded as the sole contribution of the nineteenth century to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Some of the orthodox pandits also took active part in the Renaissance of Sanskrit in the nineteenth century.

Recapitulation. It would appear that in the third period which has been designated as the post-Buddhist period or the period of decadence, there are four distinct stages:

(i) The first two centuries before the advent of Gaṅgeśa (eleventh and twelfth) are a sort of intermezzo between the second and the third period.

(ii) For five hundred years, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, Gaṅgeśa reigns supreme over the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and perhaps over the whole range of Indian philosophical thought. During that period the older works of the school were neglected, but not altogether forgotten.

(iii) In the eighteenth century, degeneration in the Navya-nyāya school set in, and as far as these old works were concerned, they were wholly forgotten and lost.

(iv) The nineteenth century is the age of the Renaissance of Sanskrit, in which some of the principal philosophical works, including those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, were discovered and published.

165 A copy of this book is preserved in the Saraswati Bhavana Library, Banaras. The fact that the same author also translated Becon's *Novam Organum* into Sanskrit shows what great pains were taken in those days to instil real philosophical thinking amongst orthodox pandits.

Chapter V

THE NATURE OF REALITY

1. EXISTENCE FROM NON-EXISTENCE

Is reality eternally fixed to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted? In other words, nothing that is non-existent can come into being and all that exists can never be non-existent. Or does reality come out of the void and resolve into the void without leaving any residue? Every philosophical school must accept one position or the other on this fundamental point. Of Indian philosophical schools, the Sāṁkhya upholds the former position. The Sāṁkhya view is succinctly put in the famous words of the *Gītā*: "There can be no existence of the non-existent and no non-existence of the existent."[1] The other view, namely, that reality comes into existence out of the void and resolves into the void, is held by the Buddhist.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory stands midway between these two positions. According to its theory of causation, an effect which was *altogether non-existent* comes into existence after the operation of its causes. As the effect was altogether non-existent before, the question arises as to wherefrom it has

1 Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ.
Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 16.

derived its existence. The answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that an effect has come into existence through the operation of its causes. According to its theory, however, an effect is not produced *out of* its cause, but it is produced *in* its cause.[2] A piece of cloth is not produced *out of the yarn* which (yarn) continues to exist separately and simultaneously with the piece of cloth. In other words, although a piece of cloth subsists *in* the yarn which is held to be its inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), the essence of cloth does not come *out of* the yarn, for the simple reason that, even after the production of cloth, the yarn continues to exist intact as it did before, not a whit of its essence being lost or subtracted from it to constitute the essence of its effect (cloth). Whence does, then, an effect derive its essence? It would appear that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the *essence* of an effect comes into being out of the void, although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would emphatically deny that position and point out that causes have actually worked to bring about an effect. The position of the school as formulated by Vācaspatimiśra is--*sataḥ asaj jāyate*,[3] i.e., from the existent (cause) comes into being an effect which was non-existent before. But the existent cause, as pointed out above, does not impart essence to its effect. Of course, according to the later view of the school, even the prior non-existence of an effect is not merely void or unreal, but it is a reality called 'antecedent negation' (*prāg-abhāva*). The *prāg-abhāva,* however, does not and cannot impart essence to an effect, its essence being only negative.[4] Moreover, the *prāg-abhāva* of an effect is accepted only as an accessory cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), and not an inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The essence can be imparted to an effect (e.g., cloth) only by its inherent cause (e.g., yarn), but the latter does not and cannot do it, as already pointed out.

2 CAUSE AND EFFECT DIFFERENT IN THEIR ESSENCE

The Mādhyamika Buddhist holds that an effect coming out of the void or non-existence is itself void or non-existent. Accord-

2 *Infra,* VII. 2-3

3 STK. Introduction to verse No. 9.

4 The abhāva (non-existence), though a reality, is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as niṣedha-rūpa, i.e., of negative character.

ing to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as also according to the Dignāga school, an effect, although non-existent before its production, is existent after its production. The principal cause (e.g., yarn) is not conceived, by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, as material cause or *upādāna-kāraṇa* (as it is by the Sāṁkhya school), but as inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). Writers of the school sometimes use the term *upādāna-kāraṇa* for *samavāyi-kāraṇa*,[5] but the usage is not quite warranted, as the implication of *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) is that it should impart its essence to its effect. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school an inherent cause is always in the form of 'parts' (*avayavas*), while an effect is in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains against the Buddhist that a 'whole' is not merely an aggregate of its parts, but an altogether new entity quite different from its parts. A 'whole' (*avayavin*) emerges as residing in its parts by inherent relation (*samavāya sambandha*). This means that an effect is different *in essence* from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as a separate entity. Cause and effect are not conceived by the Sāṁkhya as different entities; they are identical. A piece of cloth, according to the Sāṁkhya, is only a different arrangement of threads. The thread imparts essence to the cloth, or more exactly, the essence of both is the same. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, the inherent cause, which exists simultaneously and side by side with its effect and as such retains its full essence to itself cannot, in any way, impart essence to its effect. An inherent cause is thus not a material cause.

In fact, so far as the essence of an effect is concerned, the inherent cause (e.g., yarn) is as extraneous to its effect as the accessory causes (*nimitta-kāraṇas*) like loom, shuttle, etc. This point deserves better appreciation than it has hitherto received at the hands of the students of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a

5 E.g., Yad dravyaṁ yad-dravya-dhvaṁsa-janyaṁ tat tad-upādānopādeyam. NSM. on verse, 35.

It is interesting to note that even Buddhists, who emphatically maintain that a previous moment does not impart its essence to the subsequent moment in any way, use the term 'upādāna-pratyaya' for the previous cause-moment.

material cause, but is extraneous like the accessory causes. He says: "Yarn is an entity quite different from cloth, because it is the cause of the latter like the shuttle, etc. As the shuttle, etc., which are the cause of cloth, are different from it, similarly, the yarn also (which is a cause) is different from cloth".[6] Now, if an inherent cause were regarded as material cause, Uddyotakara's argument will lose its point. It has force only when it is held that the yarn does not impart essence to the cloth like the shuttle, etc.

The question of the source of the essence of cloth is thus a problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The only possible answer can be that an inherent cause, without transferring its own essence and retaining it intact, imparts in some way essence to its effect *which resides in it by an inherent relation.* This is the beauty of the peculiar *inherent* relation. The essence of an effect is constituted by the fact of its residing in the cause by *inherent relation.* Or perhaps we may say that the same essence-stuff simultaneously serves the purpose of being the essence of the cause as well as of its effect which are, albeit, two quite different entities.

The problem of the separate essence of cause and of its effect has been a puzzling one to the exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It came into prominence in connection with the question of the separate *weights* of a cause and its effect. In connection with the examination of the theory of 'whole' (*avayavi-parīkṣā*),[7] the question is raised, if a 'whole' were an entity different from its *parts,* there should be separate weights for the *parts* and their 'whole.' In that case, as soon as a piece of cloth emerges from the yarn, its weight should get doubled, inasmuch as a new object with its separate weight has been added. Or else, it will have to be assumed that as soon as a new effect is produced, the cause has lost its weight. An alternative assumption may be that the same weight is shared by the two entities, the cause and the effect (yarn and cloth). There can be no other alternative. The problem was so confounding

6 Arthāntaraṁ paṭāt tantavaḥ tad-hetutvāt turyādivad iti. Turyādi paṭa-kāraṇam arthāntaram iti dṛṣṭam, tathā ca tantavaḥ, tasmād arthāntaram iti. NV. II. i. 36. p. 513.

7 NS. II. i. 33. and NV. II. i. 33. pp. 492-96.

that Uddyotakara quotes two explanations given by some thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, which he himself summarily rejects. According to one of them, the weight of the cause after the emergence of its effect is obstructed by the latter, and therefore, not cognised; while, according to the other, the weight of the cause is destroyed by that of its effect.[8] Obviously, there is difficulty in accepting any of these two views when full, separate, and simultaneous reality is to be maintained for both the cause and its effect.

Uddyotakara holds that a cause and its effect have *separate weights.* This view, in fact, seems to be more queer than the two views rejected by Uddyotakara. The obvious difficulty in maintaining separate weights for a cause and its effect is met by him by a strange device. He says that the weight of an effect, as different from that of its cause, is not manifested because it cannot be ascertained how much of the total weight belongs to the cause and how much to the effect. "When a substance is weighed, it should be understood that a collection of many substances beginning from atoms to the last effect is weighed".[9] The weight indicated belongs not to the last effect (cloth) only, but to atoms and all intervening substances between the atoms and the cloth, i.e., *dvy-aṇukas*, etc. Vācaspatimiśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* adds that "a collection of substances means the collection of all the intervening effect-and-cause substances. i.e., the weight of a jar includes the weight of the particles of earth, the powder of earth, the pebbles of earth, the two lids of the jar (kapāla) and the jar itself".[10] Uddyotakara further says that "it is not possible for ordinary men (with imperfect knowledge) to say how much is the weight of the cause and how much that of the effect".[11] Obviously, this does not solve the

8 Apare tu kārya-gurutvena kāraṇa-gurutvaṁ pratibaddhaṁ bruvate ...etena kārya-gurutvena kāraṇa-gurutva-vināśo 'pi vyākhyātaḥ. NV. II. i. 33. p. 496.

9 Ācaramād ā ca paramāṇor dravya-samāhāra unmīyate. NV. II. i. 33. p. 494.

10 Dravya-samāhāra iti kārya-kāraṇa-dravya-samāhāraḥ, mṛt-kaṇa-mṛccūrṇa-śarkarā-kapāla-kumbha-samāhāra ity arthaḥ. NVT. II. i. 33. p. 494.

11 Tatra manuṣya-dharmaṇo na yuktaṁ vaktum iyat kāraṇa-gurutvam iti. NV. II. i. 33. p. 494.

difficulty. Granting that the weight indicated by an object belongs to the whole series of cause and effect constituting that object, the question remains unsolved why the weight does not increase when a new effect like cloth, with its separate weight, emerges from its cause (yarn).

Śrīdhara gives a still more queer explanation. With regard to there being no separate weights of the parts and the 'whole', he says that the weighing machine does not indicate any difference between the weights of the two, because the difference between them is very slight. For instance, when a big substance is being weighed, the weight of the small particles, sticking to it, is not indicated.[12] Is it an explanation at all?

Uddyotakara's desperate effort to solve the problem of separate weights of cause and effect shows how difficult it was to maintain cause and effect as two separate entities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was principally assailed, so far as this theory is concerned, by the Satkārya-vādins of the Sāṁkhya school who held that an effect existed in its cause in an unmanifested form even before its production.

3. THE EXISTENT BECOMES NON-EXISTENT

As is the case with the production of an effect, so also with its destruction. An effect comes into existence without having any source for its essence-stuff. Similarly, an effect is destroyed without leaving any residue, i.e., any of its essence-stuff. It is complete destruction. It is in a way *niranvaya vināśa,* i.e., the destruction of an object without its continuity in any form. Usually, that term is technically employed to denote the destruction of a moment as propounded by the Buddhist theory, and not in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the destruction of an object. But it is equally applicable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory in connection with the destruction of an object. The fact that the yarn continues after the destruction of the cloth does not mean the continuity of cloth in any way, because the latter, which is quite different from the former, is destroyed

12 Yat punar avayavi-gurutvasya kāryātireko na gṛhyate tad avayavāvayavi-gurutva-bhedasya alpāntaratvāt, yathā mahati dravye unmīyamāne tat-patita-sūkṣma-dravyāntara-gurutva-kāryāgrahaṇam. NK. p. 264.

without leaving any bit of its essence. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika calls the destruction of an object as its past condition (*atītāvasthā*) which it also designates as 'consequent negation' (*dhvaṁsābhāva*). Of course, the consequent negation, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is a reality. But it may be noted that the *consequent negation* of a cloth (*paṭa-dhvaṁsa*) is quite a different entity from that of the cloth, and continuity of the consequent negation (*dhvaṁsa*) of the cloth does not mean the continuity of the cloth in any way. Therefore, the destruction of the cloth is complete and without any continuity (*niranvaya*). In the same way, the production of an effect may also be regarded as *niranvaya*, i.e., without cause continuing in the form of an effect, for the simple reason that the cause does not impart its essence in any way to its effect. This, of course, would be resisted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school even more vehemently than the destruction of an effect being regarded as without any continuity (*niranvaya*).

This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory was noted by ancient writers. Commenting on Śaṁkara's remarks that the Vaiśeṣika is a semi-nihilist (*ardha-vaināśika*)[13] in comparison with the Buddhist who is a full nihilist (*sarva-vaināśika*), Vācaspatimiśra remarks: "The Vaiśeṣikas are semi-nihilists because while they accept as eternal the five substances, ether, time, space, soul and *manas*, and the categories—*sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*, and also some qualities, they hold that the destruction of other objects (effects) comes about without the continuity of its cause-stuff (*niranvaya-vināśa*). Hence, they are semi-nihilists."[14]

In the case of production, however, cloth is produced as residing in its cause (yarn) by inherent relation, and there is, thus, continuity of the cause from which its effect has emerged as residing in it by inherent relation. But it would appear that this is the continuity of cause *as cause*, and not its continuity in the form of its effect. So far as the effect is concerned, it has

13 Śārīraka-bhāṣya, II. ii. 18.

14 Vaiśeṣikāḥ khalu ardha-vaināśikāḥ, te hi paramāṇv-ākāśa-dik-kālātma-manasāṁ ca sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṁ ca guṇānāṁ ca keṣāṁcin nityatvamabhyupetya śeṣāṇāṁ niranvaya-vināśam upayanti, tena te 'rdha-vaināśikāḥ. Bhāmatī, II. ii. 18.

come into existence without having any previous trace of its essence-stuff. The production of an effect (cloth) is therefore *niranvaya*, i.e., without any former essence-stuff continuing in the form of effect. The fact that an effect resides in its cause cannot be cited to refute the objection that the production of an effect is without any continuity of cause-essence (*niranvay-otpatti*), inasmuch as the cloth and the yarn are two different entities.

The implication of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation suggested above, viz., the production and destruction of an effect are to be held as being without continuity of the cause-stuff (*niranvayotpāda-vināśa*), brings that school dangerously near the Buddhist view of causation.[15]

According to the Buddhists, there is a series of discrete, disconnected and discontinuous moments. The past moment is destroyed completely without imparting any of its essence to the present moment. The description that an effect is produced and destroyed without any continuity of its cause-stuff (*niranvayotpāda-vināśa*) is principally applicable to the Buddhist view of causation. The difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that while the reality, according to the former, is momentary, according to the latter, it is stationary, i.e., it lasts for some time. Further, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect after being produced resides in its cause which continues to exist side by side with its effect. But according to the Buddhist, the cause disappears without any continuity of its stuff as soon as its effect is produced.

4. THE ESSENCE OF NON-ETERNAL SUBSTANCES

So far we have discussed the nature of the reality of objects which are effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) and which are non-eternal. They are products of atoms of the first four substances (earth, water, fire and air). The four types of atoms

15 The theory of causation of the Buddhist is called pratītya-samutpāda. According to it, although a previous moment is a condition of the subsequent moment, it is not the material cause of the subsequent moment, inasmuch as, the former does not impart any essence to the latter. The theory and its implications will be further explained and discussed in chapter (VII.) on causation.

of these substances and their effect-substances constitute material and physical substances according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. The four substances are in two forms. In the form of atoms, they are eternal, and as effects of those atoms, they are non-eternal. All physical or material objects, or strictly speaking, all substances which we see, touch, taste or smell, are effect-substances produced out of the four kinds of atoms. It has been said with regard to these non-eternal effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) that they have not derived their essence-stuff from their immediate causes, e.g., a piece of cloth has not derived its essence from the yarn, and the latter (yarn), in turn, from its cause, filaments of threads (*aṁśus*),[16] and so on. We thus reach dyads (*dvy-aṇukas*) which likewise do not derive their essence from the atoms. As already explained, a cause is conceived as different *in essence* from its effect—the former existing and retaining its essence intact, side by side with its effect. The necessary corollary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation which is forced on the school—forced because not expressly admitted—is that all physical objects or effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) have an essence or reality which has not been imparted to them by their causes, and which has come about, all of a sudden, through the operation of causes, as though from the void. Only the four kinds of atoms, which are eternal, have their eternal essence. As these eternally real atoms, in the last resort, are causes of all the effect-substances which ultimately—through a chain of their causes—reside in them, it may be said that the essence of an effect-substance hangs on the essence of eternal atoms. But it must not be forgotten that inasmuch as these eternal atoms continue to have their essence intact, they have not transferred or imparted their essence to their effects or to the effects of their effects. The essence of all the effect-substances, thus, has got to be admitted, as though it had sprung up from the void. This is the inevitable consequence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, a cause continues

16 The parts of a substance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, being conceived as its cause, the finer filaments of thread (aṁśus) are held to be the cause of threads. Similarly, the smaller parts of the filaments will be regarded as the cause of the filaments, and so on.

to exist, after the emergence of its effect, simultaneously and side by side with it. If it were not so, the atoms would not continue to exist after the dyads (*dvy-aṇukas*) had been produced, and in that case atoms would not be eternal. If they were not eternal, they would not be atoms, and thus the very foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism would be demolished. Besides, the effect-substances reside in their causes by *inherent relation*. The residing of an effect in its cause by inherent relation makes the effect inseparable from its cause, and appear as identical with it. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect can exist only in its cause. It is this fact which gives essence to an effect, and which principally differentiates the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory from that of the Buddhists. A necessary conclusion from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, (namely, that a cause continues to exist retaining its essence intact side by side with its effect) is that the essence of effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) has got to be admitted as though sprung up from the void. What type of essence or reality do, then, these effect-substances possess? They appear and disappear having no essence before and leaving no essence as residue afterwards.

5. FOUR KINDS OF ETERNAL ATOMS

While the reality of effect-substances is without any abiding essence-stuff, the reality of four kinds of eternal atoms is based on their eternal essence. As pointed out above, it is on the bedrock of eternal atoms that effect-substances with their 'come-from-nowhere' essence somehow rest. The essence of atoms is fixed. New atoms cannot come into existence, and the existing ones can never be non-existent. These four types of atoms are physical or material substances; it is only through them that the physical or material nature belongs to effect-substances which, apart from atoms, have no essence. The reality of these four types of atoms is the reality *par excellence*, if that expression can be hazarded in relation to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. For, although in a realistic system gradation of reality cannot be permitted, one gets an irresistible impression about different levels of reality in the realistic categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as we shall presently see.

These four substances—earth, water, fire and air—constitute

matter. There are five more substances—ether, time, space, *manas* and soul—which are eternal. Inasmuch as they are substances they possess quality and other properties, but still they are not material or physical substances.[17]

The most important characteristic of these four atomic substances which differentiates them from other substances is that they produce effect-substances (*dravyārambhakatva*).[18] But there is no universal (*sāmānya*) which may cover all these four substances. These four substances, together with the ether, have been regarded in ancient philosophical and non-philosophical literature as the five elements (*bhūtas*). It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has regarded ether as an element only in deference to the old usage. Śrīdhara says, that there is nothing in common to the five substances which are given a common name *bhūta* simply because that term has been in use for them".[19] Obviously, ether, as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cannot be an element, and it is not conceived as a cause of physical objects like the four atomic elements.

6. FIVE EXCLUSIVELY ETERNAL SUBSTANCES

While the four atomic substances are found in both eternal and non-eternal forms as explained above, the remaining five substances, (1) ether, (2) time, (3) space, (4) *manas*, and (5) soul, are exclusively eternal. They do not produce any effect-substances. These five may be divided in two groups. The first three of them—ether, time and space—are non-psychic sub-

17 It has been suggested that the eight substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the four atomic ones and ether, time, space and *manas*, i.e., all substances except soul constitute matter (Dr. Umesh Mishra: *Conception of Matter*, p. 58 ff). If the last four eternal substances are included in matter simply because they are substances and possess qualities, or because they are inherent causes of some of the qualities, why should the soul also not be regarded material for the same reason? The eight substances, in fact, have never been grouped together in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and not one property common to all the eight substances has been given in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, or can even be conceived except the negative one, i.e., of having no knowledge. This conception of matter, is therefore, a misconception, and quite alien to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

18 Another common property of these four atomic substances is that they all possess the quality of touch.

19 NK. p. 22-23.

stances. They are all-pervading (*vibhu*), and each of them being only one, they possess no universal (*sāmānya*). Time and space are always present in our common experience, or it may be said that all our experience is presented through time and space. But the case of ether is different. In the Vedāntic systems, ether was conceived as an element, i.e., one of the five primary elements which create the physical world. But the ether of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception, although nominally regarded as an element (*bhūta*), is not an effect-producing substance. It is conceived only as the inherent cause of sound, and for that reason alone its existence is postulated. The remaining two substances, *manas* and *ātman* (soul) are psychic, i.e., related to the mental phenomenon of knowledge. Each of them being many, they possess universals (*manastva* and *ātmatva*). Soul, like ether, time and space, is all-pervading, but the *manas* has atomic measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*), and being of atomic size, it (unlike the other four eternal substances) possesses movement also. The five exclusively eternal substances, although non-material, are held to be substances because they possess qualities.

7. CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE

When we perceive a substance like a jar, we perceive its qualities, colour, touch, size, form, etc. Apart from these qualities, do we also perceive a separate substratum called substance in which these qualities reside? The *Naiyāyika* says, Yes; the Buddhist says, No. The Buddhist refutes the conception of a separate substance apart from its qualities as emphatically as he does that of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from its 'parts' (*avayavas*). The acceptance of substance, as an entity separate and distinct from its qualities, is a bone of contention between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist. In fact, from the Buddhist point of view, the basis of the two erroneous conceptions, viz., that of *substance* and that of 'whole', is the same. The Buddhists hold that qualities like colour, touch, etc., are atom-like point-instants (*kṣaṇas*), or unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*). They are discrete and disconnected point-instants which come, one after the other, in a constant flux. Apart from these point-instants which are mere *dharmas*[20] (qualities or

20 *Supra*, III. 19.

properties), there is no substratum in the form of a substance in which these properties may be residing, even as there is no separate entity called 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from the aggregate of its parts. The Buddhists thus reject in the same breath the conception of *substance* and that of *avayavin*.

It may be pointed out that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a substance which we can experience with external senses is always an effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*) and it is necessarily an *avayavin* 'whole'. Although all the effect-substances are *avayavins*, the denotation of the term *dravya* (substance) is wider. While all *avayavins* are substances (*dravyas*), all the substances are not *avayavins* inasmuch as they also include eternal substances (*non-avayavins*) like ether, etc. The connotations of the two terms are different. A substance connotes an entity in which qualities and movement reside by *samavāya* relation. An *avayavin* connotes an entity which has parts in which it resides by *samavāya* relation. For instance, a cloth, as *avayavin*, resides in its parts (threads) by *samavāya* relation, but as a substance, it is the abode of its qualities—colour, etc.—which reside in it by *samavāya* relation.

Now, let us revert to the question of the conception of substance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as already noted, follows the dictum that "our experience is the sole criterion for determining the nature of reality".[21] In our experience we distinctly see that there is a substratum (e.g., a jar) in which qualities like colour, touch, size, etc., reside. Our experience presents two separate realities, the properties and their substratum, which two are different in their essence. We have seen that differentiation between properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A substance is thus conceived as the substratum of its properties. Of course, a substance itself may be a property (*dharma*). A 'whole' (*avayavin*) is a property (*dharma*) of its parts (*avayavas*) in which it resides. Thus, while a substance may itself sometimes be a property, a substratum of properties is necessarily a substance. An exception may, however, be noted.

21 Saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam. NVT. II. i. 36. p. 506.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, properties include universals (*sāmānya*), and the universals reside in qualities and actions also. For instance, the universal 'colourness' (*rūpatva*) resides in 'colour' (*rūpa*) which is a quality. Here we find a substratum of properties other than a substance. But properties, such as substance (in the form of *avayavin*), quality and action, in which the universal (*sattā*) resides, are, for that reason, real *objective* properties.[22] These properties reside only in a substance.

The difference between properties and their substratum, i.e., the substance, is that the former are dependent for their existence on the latter. So long as the properties exist, they can exist only as residing in their substance. But a substratum (substance) does not depend for its existence on anything else. Śrīdhara says that "apprehension of substanceness is just an apprehension of having independent existence."[23] Substance is defined by Kaṇāda as "possessing qualities and actions, and as an inherent cause."[24] The theory of a substance in the form of a 'whole' residing in its *parts* was not perhaps firmly established in his time, otherwise, Kaṇāda would have included *substance* also in the properties residing in a substance. On the question of the separate existence of substance, the Buddhist joins issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra have devoted a full section to this topic. Their arguments and counter-arguments will be stated in the next chapter.

In the context of differentiation between properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*), it may be pointed out that the word property (*dharma*) in this context does not mean only qualities, but it is used in a wider sense and includes all the five kinds of properties, (i.e., substance, quality, movement, the universal and *viśeṣa*) which subsist in their substrata by inherent relation. These five properties may be divided into three types. The first type is substance itself which, in the form of a 'whole', resides in its *parts* by inherent relation. The second type consists of *quality* and *movement*, which properties to-

22 According to Kaṇāda, only dravya, guṇa and karman were held to be *objectively* real (artha).

23 Sva-prādhānya-pratītir eva dravyatva-pratītiḥ. NK. p. 13.

24 Kriyā-guṇavat samavāyi-kāraṇam iti dravya-lakṣaṇam. VS. I. 15.

gether with the first one (i.e., substance) possess the universal 'being' (*sattā*). The third type consists of the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) which do not possess the universal being, and which, in the early stage of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, were regarded as mere intellectual abstractions,[25] and not full-fledged objective realities, as they were held in the later period.

8. REALITY OF THE CATEGORIES OTHER THAN SUBSTANCE

The differentiation between properties and their substrata being the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, qualities, actions, the universals, *viśeṣas* and even the relation called *samavāya* are held to be externally existent objective realities, quite different *in essence* from the substance in which they reside. Even the seventh category, the negation (*abhāva*), which was added later on to the list of the original six ones, is accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as an objective reality. According to it, *abhāva* is not unreal or non-existent like the horn of a hare. It is, of course, negative, but even then, it is real and existent.

From the standpoint of the nature of their reality, the six categories other than substance may be divided into four groups. It has been stated that of the seven categories, the first six are of a positive nature, while the negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) is negative. The last three of the six positive categories, namely, *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya* are eternal, while the second and third categories, namely, qualities and actions, are non-eternal, except that some of the qualities of eternal substances, such as, oneness (*ekatva*) of ether, time, space, etc., are eternal. These two categories, i.e., *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (movement) together with the substance, are held to be possessing the universal 'being' (*sattā-jāti*). Kaṇāda says that the word *artha* (which literally means a *real* object) is applicable only to the first three categories, viz., substance, quality and movement.[26] The last three categories, *sāmānya*,

25 See V. 10.

26 Artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu. VS. VIII. ii. 3.

etc., according to Kaṇāda, are *padārthas*, but not *arthas*. This clearly shows that Kaṇāda conceived *padārtha* only as 'the meaning of a word' and not as an external *objective* reality. With regard to *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, he has expressly declared that they depend merely on our intellect.[27] They reside in their substrata by *samavāya* relation. But *samavāya* itself does not reside by some other relation. *Samavāya* may, therefore, be said to possess even a lesser degree of reality than *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. In fact, the subsistence (*vṛtti*) of *samavāya* in the objects related, not being by any other relation, is in the form of the related objects themselves. Thus, we find that from the standpoint of reality—out of the categories other than substances —qualities and actions form one group, the *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, the second group, and *samavāya* forms a third group. Negation (*abhāva*), being of negative character, constitutes the fourth group. It may, however, be noted that this kind of gradation, although it follows from the account of the categories as given in the authoritative manuals, is not expressly stated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works.

9. EXTREME REALISM OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

Different grades of reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories result from the basic principle that whatever enters into the texture of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. Critical thinkers of the school, however, did not fail to notice the limitations of this basic principle. In the first instance, all our experience, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is not necessarily valid as it is held to be by the Prabhākara school of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. The evidence of experience therefore may sometimes be erroneous. Secondly, if we were to assume an external counterpart for every factor of our experience, our world of reality would be flooded with unlimited contents. For instance, in that case, we shall have to assume a new relation for the subsistence of the inherent relation (*samavāya*) also. Another relation will have to be assumed for the subsistence of *abhāva* in the objects where it resides. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika held that the relation of *abhāva* with the object where it resides is in the form of that object itself (*svarūpa*

27 Sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhy-apekṣam. VS. I. ii. 3.

saṁbandha). That relation, therefore, apart from the object in which it resides, is not a separate external entity; it thus appears to be only a mental entity. External reality, according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is to be assumed only where the assumption leads to brevity (*lāghava*). *Samavāya* as a separate category is accepted on the same principle. Instead of numerous relations in the form of numberless objects, the assumption of one ubiquitous entity (*samavāya*) leads to brevity.[28] Similarly, the universal *dravyatva* is accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not because of its being experienced as such, but because it is the determining or distinguishing characteristic (*avacchedaka*) of the inherent causation.[29] In simple language it means that only a substance can be an inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The universal *sattā* is accepted not because it causes the common notion of existence in the case of the first three categories (*dravya, guṇa* and *karman*), which notion is present in the case of the other categories, *sāmānya*, etc., also, but because it is the determining characteristic of the causality of the consequent negation (*dhvaṁsa*).[30] It only means that whatever is destroyed (i.e., the subject of consequent negation) is one of the first three categories in which *sattā* resides. Of course, the external entities which were accepted by old masters of the school were not discarded by the neo-scholiasts. But prior to the *Navya-nyāya* school, the existence of an external reality corresponding to everyone of our ideas was always assumed. It went in some cases to the extreme length of even assuming the creation of a new reality just for a few moments, simply for the purpose that it may serve as an external counterpart of an idea. This may be illustrated by two examples:

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, our notion of remoteness or nearness (*paratva* or *aparatva*) with reference to time and space, is due to the presence of these qualities in the object which we experience as remote or near. But these qualities do not permanently exist in those objects. They are only produced for the

28 Ananta-svarūpāṇāṁ saṁbandhatva-kalpane gauravāl lāghavād eka-samavāya-siddhiḥ NSM. on verse 11.

29 Samavāyi-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā. NSM. on verse 3.

30 Dhvaṁsa-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā. Dinakarī on verse 9 of NSM.

time being, i.e., at the time of their perception. The process of origination of the quality of remoteness with reference to space is given by Praśastapāda thus: "When two objects are situated in the same direction, and connections of the connected points of space of one of them, taken from the point of the ground where an observer is standing, are more than those of the other, then there arises in the mind of the observer of both objects a notion of not being close (*asannikṛṣṭā buddhiḥ*) with reference to the object which has the larger number of connections of the connected points of space and which is the *would-be-substratum* of the quality of remoteness. The notion of not being close takes the form that that object is distant in relation to the other object which is close (and which has got lesser number of connections of connected points of space in relation to the observer). Then, with reference to that notion of not being close, the connection of the object with the distant point in space produces[31] the quality of remoteness in that object, and then there arises the notion of remoteness.[32] Obviously, the external quality of remoteness is produced in an object according to this view, simply to serve as the external counterpart of our perception of remoteness. And after serving that purpose, it is forthwith destroyed.

The process of the production of the quality of duality (*dvitva*) is still more striking. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the quality of oneness (*ekatva*) resides in every object permanently. When, however, we see two objects simultaneously, we have a collective perception of two *onenesses*. On account of this collective perception (*samuccaya-buddhi*), which itself is *one* and which is technically called *apekṣā-buddhi,* there is produced an *external objective quality* (called *dvitva*) jointly, i.e., *one* quality residing simultaneously in the *two* objects—

31 Connection with the distant point in space serves as the 'asamavāyi-kāraṇa' of the quality of remoteness (paratva) produced in the distant object which is the 'samavāyi-kāraṇa' of that quality.

32 Ekasyāṁ diśy avasthitayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ saṁyukta-saṁyoga-bahv-alpa-bhāve saty ekasya draṣṭuḥ sannikṛṣṭam avadhiṁ kṛtvā etasmād viprakṛṣṭo' yam iti paratvādhāre 'sannikṛṣṭā buddhir utpadyate tatas tām apekṣya pareṇa dik-pradeśena saṁyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ. PP. p. 164. The above passage is translated, not literally, but in the light of its explanation in the Nyāya-kandalī.

each of which is the abode of the quality of oneness separately. Only after the production of the objective quality of duality in the two objects, can we have a perception of the same. It is pointed out that the collective notion (*samuccaya-buddhi*) of two onenesses cannot cause the perception of duality, because we see duality externally, and therefore it must exist externally in the objects themselves. We have here a striking illustration of the principle that our mind can have no perception of which the counterpart reality does not exist in the external world. Where a reality corresponding to our perception cannot be accepted as existing permanently in the external world, it must be assumed to have come into existence even for a few moments in order to serve as a counterpart of the perception. The process of the production of duality, its cognition and its destruction, as given in Praśastapāda[33] and its commentaries, are frightfully intricate. No wonder, then, that it was declared that only he who knew the intricacy of duality, etc., was a true adherent of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[34]

External realities are, thus, created as if by a magic wand to be the counterparts of our cognitions. But could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adhere to the last to the principle that every cognition must have its counterpart in the external world? No. The most striking example is that of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) where something that does not exist as an outside reality enters into our experience. In the example: "He is the same Devadatta whom I saw at Patna", the past condition of Devadatta being at Patna is not present before my eyes; there is no reality like Devadatta's being at Patna existent now. Yet it does enter into our cognition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika takes great pains to explain the process.[35] It insists that in the case of recognition, the notion of the past condition is not a recollection (*smṛti*), but a constituent part of the direct perception of the object present before the eyes. Similarly, although the existence of a universal is assumed on account of the notion of commonness in objects of the same class, yet it is not done in all cases. While

33 PP. p. 111.
34 Dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje,
Yasya na skhalitā buddhis taṁ vai vaiśeṣikaṁ viduḥ.
35 *Infra*, VI. 23 and 31; and XII. 11-12.

brāhmaṇatva (belonging to Brāhmaṇa caste) is a universal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *bhāratīyatva* (belonging to India) is not a universal, although it also gives a common notion of community. A Naiyāyika may advance reasons for it, but the fact remains that every mental notion cannot be said to have a counterpart in the external world.

It has been pointed out above that the *svarūpa-saṁbandha* by which *abhāva* (non-existence) resides in an external object is not an external entity, but only a mental one. But here also, instead of plainly admitting it to be a mental entity, a Naiyāyika says that *svarūpa-saṁbandha* is in the form of the object in which non-existence resides. Its objectivity is denied in the same breath as it is asserted. When it is said that the *svarūpa-saṁbandha* is in the form of the object, it only means that it does not exist as an external reality apart from the object. Early writers of the third period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were fully conscious of it. In the *Tarka-bhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra (of the twelfth or thirteenth century), an objection is raised by the Mīmāṁsaka that *abhāva* (e.g., non-existence of a jar on the ground) cannot be cognized by perception which comprehends only the objects that are related to the sense. The non-existence of the jar resides in the ground by *svarūpa-saṁbandha* or *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇabhāva* which is not an objective relation like *saṁyoga* or *samavāya*. Therefore, the sense which is connected with the ground cannot be connected with non-existence. Keśavamiśra meets the objection by pointing out that the principle, that senses cognize only that which is related to them, is applicable only in the case of positive objects (*bhāva-padārtha*), and not in that of negative objects (*abhāva-padārtha*). It is, therefore, clear that Keśavamiśra did not hold *svarūpa-saṁbandha* to be an objective reality.[36]

The most significant example of a cognition which has no corresponding external reality at the time of its cognition is, strangely enough, that of duality (*dvitva*) itself which was assumed as temporarily produced for the very purpose of being an external counterpart of its perception. It appears that under the influence of the theory of the succession of moments as propounded by the Buddhists, Praśastapāda adopted the view that

36 TB. pp. 51-53.

at the *exact moment* of its cognition, the quality of *dvitva* was not present.[37] *Dvitva* causes its cognition by virtue of its existence in the immediately preceding moment. It does so exactly in the manner of a *sva-lakṣaṇa* (point-instant), which, according to the Buddhist theory, produces its sensation in a subsequent moment when it exists no more. Whatever be the justification of the Buddhist for holding that view, there is none for the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Acceptance of the fact that *dvitva* does not exist at the moment of its perception is a clear violation of the principle that every perception must have its counterpart in the external world.

It may also be noted that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, qualities like nearness or remoteness or *dvitva* are produced by our mental notions which precede the perception of those qualities. These external objects are, thus, the creation of our own mind. Faced with this difficulty, Śrīdhara declares with the typical boldness of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school : "There is nothing extraordinary in the production of an object by knowledge. It is well-known that pleasure, etc., are produced by knowledge."[38] Obviously, the case of pleasure, etc., which are mental objects is different. But if even external objects, like *dvitva*, etc., are accepted to be produced by our knowledge, do we not approach very near Idealism? An idealist maintains that the external objects do not exist outside the mind, that they are simply projections of our ideas, and that they do not exist independently of those ideas. The qualities mentioned above are produced, not by their own ideas, but by the ideas which precede their cognition; and then these qualities disappear just after producing the cognition. If this is not idealism, what else is it? Extreme realism inadvertently slips into idealism.

10. CONCEPTION OF EXISTENCE (SATTĀ) IN THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Is there any warrant for postulating different gradations of reality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? In order to answer this question,

37 Yady api dve dravye iti jñānotpatti-kāle dvitvaṁ nāsti tathāpi tad asya kāraṇam. NK. p. 118; Dvitva-pratyakṣa-jñānasya pūrva-kṣaṇa-varty evārtho viṣayo 'sti. Ibid. p. 121.

38 Jñānād arthasyotpāda iti nālaukikam idaṁ, sukhādīnāṁ tasmād utpatti-darśanāt. NK. p. 116.

let us first consider as to what constitutes the existence or reality of an object. According to the Buddhist, efficiency for purposive action, i.e., efficiency to produce an effect, constitutes the existence, the essence or the reality of an object.[39] According to Kaṇāda, it is the universal called *sattā-jāti* (existence or being) which produces the notion of existence in the case of the first three categories, viz., substance, quality and action.[40] Here the notion of existence is not analysed beyond what is given in experience. It will be seen that there is a fundamental difference in the Buddhist's and Kaṇāda's conception of reality. According to the Buddhist, reality is constituted solely by the efficiency to produce an effect, i.e., a desired object. According to him, the perception of an object is followed by a desire either to take it or to leave it (*hānopādāna-buddhi*). On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that, besides these two desires, perception is sometimes followed by indifference (*upekṣā-buddhi*) also. This is emphatically denied by the Buddhist. In the works of both the schools there are arguments and counter-arguments on the point whether a perception is followed in some cases by the idea of indifference or not.[41] The real reason of this controversy lies in their different conceptions of reality. If reality, as held by the Buddhist, consists only in causal efficiency, the attitude of indifference towards it is not possible. On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceives reality as something static towards which there may be, sometimes, an attitude of indifference as well.

'Being' (*sattā-jāti*) is accepted by Kaṇāda as a universal which resides only in the first three categories. As already stated,[42] Kaṇāda regarded only the first three categories as *artha* (objective reality). The highest universal is named by Kaṇāda as *bhāva* (existence). *Bhāva*, according to him, is the pure universal (*sāmānyam eva*) inasmuch as it is the cause of inclusive notion alone (*anuvṛtter eva hetuḥ*)[43] and not of

39 Arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ. NB. (Chap. on Pratyakṣa).

40 Sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu sā sattā. VS. I. ii. 7.

41 NM. Vol. I. p. 23. Also NVT. p. 88.

42 *Supra*, V. 8.

43 Bhāvo 'nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. VS. I. ii. 4.

exclusive notion (*vyāvṛtti*). It is difficult to say whether this *bhāva* is the same as *sattā* (which resides only in the first three categories), as all commentators explain; or *bhāva* is a wider universal than *sattā,* and covers all the six categories. The last aphorism[44] of this section of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* suggests that the two may be identical. But why Kaṇāda should have used two words for the same thing in the same context is inexplicable. In this connection, it is worth noting that the Jaina Rohagutta, who introduced Vaiśeṣika theories into Jainism, stated that the *sāmānya* is of three kinds:[45] (i) *mahā-sāmānya* which resides in all the six categories, (ii) *sattā-sāmānya* which resides in the first three categories and (iii) *sāmānya-viśeṣa, dravyatva,* etc. It would appear that the first *mahā-sāmānya* is the same as the *astitva* of Praśastapāda which resides in all the six categories.[46] It is, therefore, probable that *bhāva* of Kaṇāda may be equivalent to *mahā-sāmānya* of Rohagutta and *astitva* of Praśastapāda.

Be that as it may, the real difficulty arose when after the recast of the Vaiśeṣika system by Praśastapāda, full objective reality was assigned to the last three categories, and when, at a still later stage, even negation (*abhāva*) was accepted as an existent reality. In face of this, how could the universal *sattā* (which means being or existence) be conceived as residing only in the first three categories? There was another problem. Praśastapāda, holding *sattā* as identical with the *bhāva* of Kaṇāda, declared that the universal *sattā* was the cause of the inclusive notion alone (*anuvṛtter eva hetuḥ*).[47] But, if it resides only in the first three categories, it will surely exclude the last three categories from the first three ones, and thus it will be the cause of exclusion also. Śrīdhara replies thus: "Although the universal *sattā* is excluded from subsisting in *sāmānya,* etc., it cannot exclude its substrata *dravya,* etc., from

44 Sad iti liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ. VS. I. ii. 17.

45 H. Ui, p. 35.

46 PP. p. 16.

47 Tatra paraṁ sattā mahā-viṣayatvāt, sā cānuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. PP. p. 11.

sāmānya, etc., inasmuch as these latter are also comprehended in the notion of being, which is their own nature."[48]

This would indicate that besides *sattā*, there is also *svarūpa-sattā*, 'existence by the very nature of an entity', which is possessed by the last three categories. Now, what is this 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*) which is different from the universal 'existence' called (*sattā*)? Praśastapāda says that *svarūpa-sattva* which he calls *svātma-sattva*,[49] i.e., existence by one's very nature, is a common characteristic of the last three categories, *sāmānya*,[50] etc. Śrīdhara explains that the categories *sāmānya*, etc., do not possess the universal existence (*sattā-jāti*), and 'existence' in their case consists only in 'the form of their own nature' (*svarūpa-sattva*). Here, a question arises: Do the first three categories, substance, etc., not possess the 'existence by their own nature' (*svarūpa-sattva*)? We shall revert to this point later on. Now the problem is: if the categories *sāmānya*, etc., do not possess the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jātī*), why do they appear as *existent*? Śrīdhara gives a queer explanation: "Why there is the common notion of *being* existent in the case of *sāmānya* etc.? It is because existence (*sattā*) is imposed upon them on account of similarity between the universal existence (*sattā-jāti*) and existence in the form of their own nature (*svarūpa-sattā*). Then, is that notion false? Who says it is not? It is indeed false. A notion of commonness of existence in the case of objects which are of different nature

48 Yady apy eṣā sāmānyādibhyo vyāvartate, tathāpi na tebhyaḥ svāśrayaṁ vyāvartayituṁ śaknoti, teṣām api svarūpa-sattā-saṁbuddhi-saṁvedyatvāt. NK. p. 12.

Dr. Ganga Nath Jha has translated this very important passage thus:—

"Though it is true that 'being' differentiates itself from such entities as 'generalities' (sāmānya) and the like, yet it cannot in any case exclude or differentiate from them, the things wherein it inheres, as these—generalities, etc.—also are *often* (italics *mine*) recognised as having an existence in themselves" (Trans. of Nyāya-kandalī, a reprint from Pandit, p. 25).

This translation is not only wrong, but it does not make any sense. How can 'being' (sattā) differentiate itself from generality (sāmānya)? It is itself a generality. Insertion of the word 'often' is rather queer.

49 Svarūpa-sattā, svarūpa-sattva, svātma-sattva.

50 Sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇāṁ svātma-sattvaṁ. PP. p. 19.

cannot but be false. Of course, the comprehension of their nature is not false, because their nature is real."[51]

This is a strange explanation. The categories (*sāmānya*, etc.) are existent because their nature is real; but they are not existent, because commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is not apprehended in those objects. But why commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is upheld in the case of the first three categories which are also of a different nature? By a mere verbal trick, the categories, *sāmānya*, etc., are held to be at the same time existent and non-existent.[52]

The real reason why the exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika made such frantic efforts at a solution was that Kaṇāda had accepted the objective reality of the first three categories alone, and, therefore, he rightly assigned the universal 'existence' only to them. But the exponents of the school, from Praśastapāda onwards, ascribed objective reality to categories, *sāmānya*, etc., also. As its corollary, they should have extended the universal 'existence' also to them, but in deference to Kaṇāda, the founder of the system, they continued to hold that the universal 'existence' resided only in the first three. Hence arose their puzzle whether to accept or not to accept 'existence' in the categories, *sāmānya*, etc. Anyway, this differentiation between 'existence as a universal' (*sattā-jāti*), and 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*) clearly indicates that the ascription of objective reality to the categories, *sāmānya*, etc., was only half-hearted. It is a proof positive that different levels or gradations of reality were conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, though not expressly admitted.

Now, let us return to the question whether the first three

51 Kutas tarhi sāmānyādiṣu sat-sad ity anugamaḥ? Svarūpa-sattva-sādharmyeṇa sattādhyāropāt, tarhi mithyāpratyayo 'yam; ko nāmāha neti; bhinna-svabhāveṣv ekānugamo mithyaiva, svarūpa-grahaṇaṁ tu na mṛṣā svarūpasya yathārthatvāt. NK. p. 19.

52 Udayana, who was in this matter followed by the neo-Naiyāyikas, explains the notion of existence in the categories, sāmānya, etc., by yet another device. He says that it is because these categories reside in the same objects in which the universal existence (sattā-jāti) also resides, i.e., there is their coexistence with sattā in the same object (sattaikārtha-samavāyāt). Kir. p. 24. Hence indirectly these, sāmānya, etc., also appear as if possessing the universal 'existence'.

categories, substance, etc. (possessing the universal *existence*), have also 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*). Praśastapāda who declares that this is the characteristic of only the last three categories *sāmānya*, etc., clearly implies that 'existence by nature' does not belong to the first three categories, substance, etc. Obviously, he thought that their existence was constituted by the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*). But is this possible? 'Existence' as a universal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is *in essence* different from the individuals in which it resides. If individual objects, substance, etc., have their existence by virtue of the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*) which is different from them, it will mean that they exist through the agency of something which, *in essence*, is extraneous to them. It would imply that apart from the universal 'existence', these individual objects do not exist. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika might say that apart from the universal 'existence' they actually do not exist. The Buddhist questions whether 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*) is associated with the object which is existent or with one which is non-existent. In the first alternative, the association of *sattā-jāti* would be meaningless. The second alternative is absurd on the face of it. Uddyotakara meets the objection by declaring that "*sattā* is associated neither with the existent nor with the non-existent. Whenever an object comes into existence, it is already associated with *sattā-jāti*."[53] The well-known dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that the origination of an individual object and its relation with its universal takes place at the same moment.[54]

But even this dictum does not solve our problem. Granted that an individual substance is related to existence at the very moment of its origination, the question before us is whether after its birth and relation with the universal 'existence', the individual substance is identical with or different from the universal 'existence'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a universal is different *in essence* from the individual in which it resides. But, can an individual substance be different from the universal 'existence' if its own essence is constituted by that universal?

53 Na sataḥ sattā-saṁbandho nāsataḥ. Yadaiva tad vastu tadaiva sattayā saṁbaddham iti. NV. II. ii. 64. p. 669.

54 Jātaḥ saṁbaddhaś cety ekaḥ kālaḥ.

It can be different *in essence* from the universal only if it has its separate individual essence or existence, i.e., it has its 'existence by its own nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*). Therefore, it will have to be admitted that the first three categories (substance, etc.) also possess 'existence by their own nature'. Vācaspatimiśra refuting the Buddhist theory of flux concludes: "The causality of an object does not constitute its reality or existence (as accepted by the Buddhist), but causality is only its property, and a property is different *in essence* from its substratum".[55] As to what constitutes the reality of an object, he says, "The own nature (*svarūpa*) of an object, like *blue*, etc., which is apprehended in sensation and, later on, in a perceptual judgment, constitutes its reality or existence."[56] Now, if existence by nature (*svarūpa-sattā*) is accepted as residing in all categories including the first three, the assumption of a universal called *existence* (which resides only in the first three categories) becomes quite superfluous,[57] unless it were intended to indicate that only the first three categories possess objective reality.

11. RECAPITULATION

Although, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all the objects coming under the categories and their sub-divisions possess objective reality, it appears that there are different levels or gradations of reality. Conclusions arrived at in this chapter may be summarised thus:

I. In the case of substance as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika:

55 Janakatvaṁ nāma na vastu-svabhāvaḥ, api tu tad-dharmaḥ dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhidyate. NVT. III. ii. 14. p. 843.

56 Na ca kāraṇataiva sattā, kintu svarūpaṁ nīlāder anubhūtāvasitam. NVT. III. ii. 14. p. 843.

57 For more or less identical reasons, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi discards the universal *existence* as residing in the first three categories. Dinakarī, the famous commentary of the Nyāya-Siddhānta-muktāvalī, quotes (on verses 8-9) the view of some neo-Naiyāyikas according to which the notion of existence is due to 'bhāvatva' (i.e., existence by nature) which is common to all the categories including sāmānya, etc. They discard the universal 'being' (sattā-jātī). This view is accepted by Dinakarī, but the author further says that the 'sattā' (as a universal residing in the first three categories) should be accepted for another reason, i.e., it is the determining factor (avacchedaka) of the causality of consequent negation (explained in section 9 of this chapter).

(i) The material or physical reality, to which nothing can be added or from which nothing can be subtracted, belongs only to the four types of eternal atoms.

(ii) All effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) held to be produced ultimately from the four types of atoms have got their separate and simultaneous essence side by side with their causes, i.e., atoms. Although their essence has come about through the operation of causes, it has not come *out of* those causes (atoms). The conclusion, therefore, seems to be forced on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that essence of all the effect-substances, apart from the atoms, has come as if out of the void.

(iii) Of the five exclusively eternal substances which are immaterial, the soul and *manas* are psychic and related to the phenomenon of knowledge.

(iv) Time and space are non-psychic substances, but they are also connected with the phenomenon of knowledge in the sense that all objects of our experience are presented to us through time and space.

(v) Ether is another non-psychic substance. Its existence is assumed solely for the reason that it is held to be the inherent cause of sound.

II. Besides substance, only two other categories, viz., *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (movement), were originally regarded as objective realities. The universal (called *sattā*) was held to be residing only in these three categories.

III. *Sāmānya* (universal) and *viśeṣa* were, in the beginning, regarded only as intellectual abstractions. Objective reality was ascribed to them by Praśastapāda. They both reside in their substrata by *samavāya*.

IV. *Samavāya* (inherent relation) is also regarded as an objective reality. It is related to the objects (which are related by it) not by any other relation, but in the form of the related objects themselves. Therefore it appears that its level of reality is different from that of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

V. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds 'negation' (*abhāva*) also to be a reality. But its reality, being of a negative nature, is different from that of the first six categories which are of a positive nature.

Chapter VI

DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE

1. SUBSTANCE AS A SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE

The Buddhist splits reality into discrete, disconnected, and discontinuous bits called moments or point-instants (*kṣaṇas*)[1] coming in continuous succession. The so-called perceptible objects do not exist as such in the external world. They are constructed (not created)[2] by our mind on account of the continuity (*saṁtāna*) of point-instants (*kṣaṇas*). But as the continuity of point-instants is not an objective reality, there is no principle of synthesis or unity of these bits of reality in the external world. It is only our mental synthesis which causes the

Note: From this chapter onwards, many *long* Sanskrit texts will have to be quoted in the footnotes. It has been thought advisable that instead of putting them at the bottom of pages, such passages, except where they are needed for ready reference, should be given in a Text Appendix at the end. There they are indicated in serial order with reference to the chapter and page.

1 Kṣaṇas (moments) are not the smallest units of time; they are, as conceived by the Buddhist, the smallest bits of reality, the ultimate reals.

2 The idealist would say that the external objects are 'created' by the mind, but according to the Dignāga school, they are not created; they are only constructed by the mind on the basis of point-instants, the ultimate reals.

appearance of synthetic or unified objects. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the world of external objects is made up of the smallest bits called atoms, the ultimate reals. The difference between the *kṣaṇas* of the Buddhist and the atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will be brought out at a later stage. But the fundamental difference between the two schools is that while the Buddhist discards any real principle of synthesis in the external world, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are two synthetic principles which are objectively real. These two principles are 'substance' (*dravya*) and the 'universal' (*sāmānya* or *jāti*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, besides the smallest ultimate reals called atoms, there is also 'substance' in the form of a unifying 'whole' (*avayavin*). The *avayavi-dravya* (substance in the form of 'whole') is distinct and different *in essence* from the parts which it holds together. As already stated,[3] it is a basic doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that parts (*avayavas*) and their 'whole' (*avayavin*) are two different substances. The parts, in their turn, are also *avayavins* in respect of their own parts, and so on, till we reach the atoms which are only parts, and themselves have no parts, and, therefore, they are not *avayavins*. It may, however, be noted that although a substance in the form of *avayavin* is the unifying principle of its *avayavas*, the conceptions of *avayavin* and that of 'substance' (*dravya*) are not identical. Substance has a wider scope and includes atoms and eternal entities like ether, etc., which are not *avayavins*. Of course, so far as the material objects of ordinary experience are concerned, they are all effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*), and, as such, they are *avayavins*, i.e., the unifying principles of their parts. The term 'effect-substance' (*kārya-dravya*) is co-extensive with *avayavin*. A 'substance' in the form of *avayavin* is thus a unifying principle.

The other unifying principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which brings about the unity of the objects of a class is the 'universal' (*sāmānya*). The substance and the universal have an objective existence in the external world. Both the concepts (as external entities) were vehemently assailed by the Dignāga school, according to which, all synthesis is mental. The nature of the 'universal' and the Buddhist polemic against it will be discussed

3 *Supra*, V. 7.

in chapter IX. The substance, as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, has already been briefly dealt with. In this chapter we propose to examine the principal arguments advanced by the Buddhists and others for refuting the conception of substance, and its defence by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

2. THE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE AS THE HALL-MARK OF THE ORTHODOX CAMP

The conception of substance is one of the basic tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which is also adopted by other orthodox realist schools like the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, etc. In fact, in one form or the other, it has a place in all the systems of the orthodox camp. 'Substance', as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not, of course, acceptable to the Vedānta or the Sāṁkhya, but they both accept the existence of a substratum (*dharmin*) of properties (*dharmas*). Properties are held to be identical with the substratum by the Sāṁkhya, and unreal by the Vedānta. Acceptance of a *dharmin* is a common doctrine of all the orthodox systems. It was stated[4] that the differentiation between the substratum and its properties (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the line of demarcation between the realistic schools (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*) which accept it and the idealistic schools (the Vedānta and the Mahāyāna Buddhist) which reject it. The Vedānta denies the differentiation of *dharma* and *dharmin*, because, according to it, only the *dharmin* (*Brahman*) is real. The Buddhist also denies it, but he does so because he holds that only *dharmas* (momentary point-instants, the *kṣaṇas*) are real. It would appear that the acceptance of *dharmin*, the substratum of properties, is a common point of all the orthodox schools, realistic as well as idealistic. Emphatic denial of *dharmin*, on the other hand, is the corner-stone of Buddhist metaphysics. As already stated,[5] the 'no-soul theory' (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist, which is contrasted with the 'soul-theory' (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniṣads, is not simply a denial of the soul in human beings or other living creatures, but it is also a denial of 'soul', i.e., the unifying principle called substance

4 *Supra*, III. 20.
5 *Supra*, III. 2.

(*dravya*) or 'whole' (*avayavin*) as existing in the external world. The Buddhist theory of 'no-soul' is, therefore, fundamentally 'a denial of the theory of substance' (*adravya-vāda*) against which all the orthodox schools, realistic or idealistic stand arrayed. Internally, the orthodox schools differ from one another. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the *avayavin* as different from its parts is as emphatically denied by the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya as by the Buddhist, but the existence of a permanent or abiding substratum (*sthira-dharmin*) is an essential tenet of all the orthodox systems. It is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory of the flux of discrete point-instants (*kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*).

There is a fundamental difference between the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in their conception of substratum. According to the Sāṁkhya, substratum (*dharmin*) is identical with its properties (*dharmas*), while, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is different *in essence* from its properties. Vyāsa, the commentator on the *Yoga-sūtras*, has actually used the Vaiśeṣika word *dravya* for substratum. But he explains that in his system (Sāṁkhya-Yoga), *dravya* means the *aggregate* of general and special properties.[6] In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, *dravya* means substratum of those properties from which it is different *in essence*.[7] According to the Vedānta, properties are unreal. The reality of the substratum is, however, common to all the orthodox systems. When therefore the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advanced interminable arguments in refutation of the theory of flux, it was leading a crusade on behalf of the whole orthodox camp against a common enemy. All the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, such as the *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, and *Nyāya-kandalī*, devote one full section each to the refutation of the doctrine of flux (*kṣaṇabhaṅga-nirākaraṇa*).

3. FOUR PLANKS IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE

The refutation of flux and the establishment of *avayavin* are the two main planks in the defence of the theory of sub-

6 Sāmānya-viśeṣa-samudāyo 'tra dravyam. Vyāsa-bhāṣya, p. 255.

7 Vācaspatimiśra commenting in Tattva-vaiśāradī on the Vyāsa-bhāṣya, says that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it would be sāmānya-viśeṣāśrayo dravyam. *Ibid.*

stance. In fact, these are the two aspects of one and the same thing. Substance, when conceived in terms of extension in space, requires the establishment of *avayavin* (whole), but when conceived in terms of duration in time, it presupposes the refutation of the theory of flux.

There are two more theories which are also related to the defence of substance. The atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as we have already seen, provides a material or physical basis for its realistic structure. That theory was attacked by other schools, especially by the Buddhist. Their arguments and counter-arguments deserve consideration in the context of the defence of substance. Secondly, in the history of Realism in India as well as in the West, the question is raised whether a substance exists apart from its qualities, colour, touch, etc., of which it is the substratum. This topic, which has raised so much controversy in the history of western philosophy, has not received the same amount of attention of Indian thinkers. The Buddhist holds that there is no separate substance apart from qualities. Of course, they conceive of point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) as something like qualities. That view has been referred to and refuted here and there by the orthodox writers. We shall deal with it in the present chapter.

There are thus four topics which we have to discuss in connection with the defence of substance:

(i) The theory that a 'whole' (*avayavin*) is different *in essence* from its parts (*avayavas*).

(ii) Refutation of the Buddhist theory of flux (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-nirākaraṇa*).

(iii) The atomic theory, especially its metaphysical aspect.

(iv) The theory of substance being separate from and independent of its qualities.

4. THE ATOMIC THEORY OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

All the physical objects of the universe, i.e., all the effect-substances which are made up of parts, when split into their parts or parts of parts, culminate in atoms (*paramāṇus*) which cannot be split further, and are therefore indivisible and part-

less. Kaṇāda to whom the atomic theory is traditionally ascribed conceived only the basic idea. He declared that the existence of partless atoms must be assumed, and that inasmuch as, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, causes are always in the form of parts, atoms must be held to be causeless (*akāraṇavat*) and therefore eternal (*nitya*).[8] Further development of the atomic theory, viz., the combination of two atoms into *dvy-aṇukas* (dyads), and of three *dvy-aṇukas* into *try-aṇukas* (or *trasareṇus*) is not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda, but is met with only in Praśastapāda. And although the atomic theory is chiefly associated with the Vaiśeṣika school, its defence against the arguments of the Buddhist is neither found in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda nor even in Praśastapāda, but occurs in the *Nyāya-sūtras.*

The stock argument for proving the existence of the atom is: if the existence of partless atoms is not accepted and the process of splitting up into parts and parts of their parts goes on infinitely, the Meru mountain and a mustard seed, both having in that case infinite parts, would be of the same size. This argument has been repeated in almost identical words in all the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, such as the *Nyāya-vārtika,*[9] *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīka,*[10] *Nyāya-mañjarī,*[11] *Nyāya-kandalī,*[12] *Kiraṇāvalī,*[13] *Vyomavatī,*[14] and later manuals. Another argument allied to the previous one is: the measure called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*) has its culmination in 'all-pervading measure' (*vibhu-parimāṇa* as that of ether). Similarly, the 'minute measure' (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) should also have its culmination in the minutest measure, which can only be that of an atom. The existence of the atom, therefore, must be assumed. Udayana, however, rejects the argument on the ground that it leads to the fallacy of interdependence.[15] This is explained in *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* thus: the measure called 'minute'

8 Sad akāraṇavan nityam. VS. IV. i. 1.
9-10 NV. and NVT. pp. 1057-1071.
11 NM. Part II. pp. 72-73.
12 NK. pp. 31-32.
13 Kir. pp. 50-52.
14 VV. pp. 224-25.
15 Kir. p. 52.

(*aṇu*), as different from the measure called 'large' (*mahat*), can be assumed only if the existence of the atom is first established; and its existence is sought to be established by the assumption of the measure called minute.

From a *try-aṇuka* which has the smallest perceptible measure, we arrive at the conception of an atom through an intervening entity called *dvy-aṇuka* which partakes of the nature of both, the objects of our experience and the atom. Like the former, it is made up of parts, and like the latter, it possesses minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). The existence of the intervening *dvy-aṇuka* is argued in this way: the smallest perceptible particle, viz., a *try-aṇuka,* must be made up of parts (*dvy-aṇukas*), because it is perceptible, and further its constituent parts (*dvy-aṇukas*) must also be made up of parts (atoms) because *dvy-aṇukas* are the cause of the measure called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*). The argument can in the same way be further extended to prove that these parts of a *dvy-aṇuka* (atoms) should also be made up of further parts on the ground that they give rise to an effect-substance (*kārya-dravyārambhakatvāt*). But that kind of argument would lead to a process *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*), and therefore the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that it should be rejected.

5. PROBLEM OF CHANGE IN MEASURE

It has been stated that in the first instance only two atoms combine to produce an effect. Śrīdhara points out[16] that one atom cannot produce an effect, because if it could, it would always do so, for which it would not stand in need of anything else. Secondly, the effect produced from one atom would never be destroyed, because destruction takes place only by the disconnection of parts. Nor could three atoms combine in the first instance to produce an effect. It is held, for reasons to be explained in the sequel, that the number, more than two (*bahutva*), of the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* is also one of the causes of the large measure. Three atoms, as inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), therefore, having a number more than two (*bahutva*), will produce an effect characterized by 'large mea-

16 NK. p. 32.

sure' (*mahat-parimāṇa*); but another condition of the large measure is that it can be produced only by such constituent parts as are themselves made up of parts, i.e., effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*). If, in the first instance, three atoms produce an effect, the constituent parts would be atoms which are not effect-substances. It is therefore held that in the first instance only two atoms (neither less nor more) combine to produce an effect, i.e., a *dvy-aṇuka.* A *dvy-aṇuka* is held to possess, like an atom, the minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). As the large measure can be brought about only by plural number, at least three *dvy-aṇukas* must combine in the second instance to produce an effect having large measure, i.e., a *try-aṇuka.* But as the large measure can be produced even by four or more *dvy-aṇukas* (which possess *bahutva,* i.e., plural number), the possibility of those combinations cannot be ruled out.[17] But usually a *try-aṇuka* has been regarded as the necessary unit of a material object by writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, especially of the later period. If alternatively three, four or more *dvy-aṇukas* are held to combine to produce the first smallest perceptible particles, the latter would be of various dimensions. It appears that probably in order to bring about uniformity of the smallest perceptible particles of matter (comparable to the molecules of modern science), the later writers laid down that, in the first instance, only three *dvy-aṇukas* combine to make a *try-aṇuka* (molecule) which was regarded as the smallest *perceptible* unit. After the formation of a *try-aṇuka,* two, three or more of them might combine to produce larger objects.

One of the problems of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was: how from the measure called minute (*aṇu-parimāṇa*), belonging to an atom, there could arise the measure called large (*mahat-parimāṇa*) which is the measure of a different kind. The smallest *perceptible* measure (which belongs to a *try-aṇuka*) is technically called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*). Now this large measure, which is different *in kind* from the minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) belonging to an atom or to a *dvy-aṇuka,* cannot arise from the measure of either. It is held that the measure of an atom does not produce the measure of a *dvy-*

17 NK. p. 32. line 8.

aṇuka, and the latter, likewise, does not produce the measure of a *try-aṇuka*, because in that case the measure would not be of a minute type, but it would become minuter still. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika principle, the measure of an effect must be of the same kind as, and of a higher degree than, that of its cause.[18] The measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is therefore held to be produced by duality residing in two atoms. As already stated, the large measure is produced by a number more than two (*bahutva*), and therefore it is produced in a *try-aṇuka* which is made up of three *dvy-aṇukas*. The measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* which is made up of two atoms continues to be minute. It does not become more minute because it is not produced from the measure of atoms, but from the number *two* inherent in two atoms. Duality and plurality are, however, produced, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, by the simultaneous perception (*apekṣā-buddhi*) of two or more *onenesses* residing in atoms or *dvy-aṇukas*. There being no human perceiver at the time of primeval creation, it is assumed that God is the perceiver whose perception produces duality and plurality in a *dvy-aṇuka* and a *try-aṇuka* respectively. Now, plurality residing in three *dvy-aṇukas* produces the large measure of a *try-aṇuka*. The Buddhist objection that the minute measure of an atom can never produce the large measure is here met only by superseding the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika principle that the qualities of an inherent cause produce similar qualities in its effect, and by invoking the aid of God.

6. MEASURE OF ATOM AND DVY-AṆUKA

The measure of an atom and of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute. There is no difference in the minute measure of the two except that the minuteness of an atom is eternal, and that of a *dvy-aṇuka* is non-eternal. The minute measure of an atom is named as *pārimāṇḍalya* which means spherical or circular. *Parimaṇḍala* is the word used by Kaṇāda for the atom.[19] Praśastapāda says that the eternal measure of an atom and *manas* is *pārimāṇḍalya*.[20]

18 Parimāṇasya sva-samāna-jātiyotkṛṣṭa-parimāṇa-janakatvāt. NSM. on verse 111.

19 VS. VII. i. 20.

20 PP. p. 130.

Although an atom, which has a measure without any dimension, can have no shape (triangular, square, or circular), the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school probably thought that in the case of an object which has no facets, *circular* would perhaps be the nearest description. But the circular shape also has facets or sides. Neither can an object which has no dimension can be circular. Anyway, the term *pārimāṇḍalya* has exclusively been used for the minute measure of the atom,[21] and not for that of a *dvy-aṇuka.* Can there be conceived any quantitative difference between the measures of the two? None, according to the latest Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, because the very nature of minute measure precludes the possibility of quantitative difference. Early writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, seem to have conceived of some kind of difference between the two. Śrīdhara, for example, describes *pārimāṇḍalya* as the minutest of all measures.[22] He says that "the measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute (*aṇu*), but the measure of an atom is lesser than that of a *dvy-aṇuka.*"[23]

The term *aṇu* is used to denote substance (atom) as well as quality, i.e., the minutest measure residing in an atom or a *dvy-aṇuka*. The term *paramāṇu* is also likewise used in both the senses, but when it is used in the sense of measure, it denotes the measure of an atom only and not that of a *dvy-aṇuka*. Apart from the question of measure, both the words *aṇu* and *paramāṇu* have been used for an atom without distinction. Some writers use the word *aṇu* and others *paramāṇu*.[24] The real reason of this double usage seems to be that Kaṇāda had not arrived at the conception of *dvy-aṇuka,* which is the intervening link between the *paramāṇu* and the *try-aṇuka*. Kaṇāda used the word *parimaṇḍala* for an atom, and following this usage, Praśastapāda named the measure of an atom as *pārimāṇḍalya*. He introduced the conception of a *dvy-aṇuka* as possessing the same minute measure as that of an atom. But at

21 Nityaṁ paramāṇu-manassu tat pārimāṇḍalyam. PP. p. 130.

22 Pārimāṇḍalyam iti sarvāpakṛṣṭaṁ parimāṇam. NK. p. 133. line 18.

23 Dvy-aṇuka-parimāṇaṁ tāvad aṇu...tasmāc ca paramāṇu-parimāṇam apakṛṣṭam. NK. p. 133 lines 9-10.

24 Nyāya-sūtra uses the word aṇu (IV. ii. 16), while Praśastapāda uses the word paramāṇu, and NSM. uses both.